Emotion Researcher

ISRE's Sourcebook for Research on Emotion and Affect

http://emotionresearcher.com

August 2019

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Editors' Column

Considering the When, Where, Why and How of Anger

Carolyn Price & Eric A. Walle

This issue focuses on a familiar, complex and often troubling emotion: anger. As Roger Petersen, one of our contributors remarks, this seems a good time to talk about anger. At a time of polarized politics, acute social and environmental challenges and clashing values, we live in heated times. Now more than ever, we need to understand the role that anger plays in our personal and political lives.

Our first feature article is by Roger Petersen, Arthur and Ruth Sloan Professor of Political Science at MIT, who has published widely on war, violence and the role of emotion in conflict. In his article, he sets out a model of anger as understood by political scientists, then goes on to examine political actors seek to arouse anger in others as a means to achieve their goals; and he considers why anger is such a useful political tool. He ends by raising some possible future directions for research.

Our second article is by Ursula Hess Professor of Social and Organizational Psychology at the Humboldt University, Berlin, an expert on the communication of emotions. In her article, she explores the effect of anger on the angry individual, both in motivating them to take action and in energizing and emboldening them to do so. However, while she emphasizes the positive effects of anger for the angry individual, she also notes the disparities in how anger is perceived in men and women.

Macalester Bell, Associate Professor of Philosophy at Bryn Mawr College has contributed our third article. Bell's research is in ethics and moral psychology, and has written about anger, contempt, blame and forgiveness. While Petersen and Hess focus on the uses of anger, Bell focuses on its moral and political value. As she points out, philosophers commonly stress the damaging effects of anger; however, there is scope for a more positive evaluation of anger – or rather resentment – for example, as a protest against injustice and a motivation for action against it. She then considers what features anger must have if it is to play these roles.

The fourth and final article is by Andrew Beatty, Senior Lecturer in Anthropology at Brunel University, London. Beatty brings a rather different approach to the study of anger as it is experienced and used by the Niha people in Indonesia. As an anthropologist Beatty is more concerned to understand anger in a particular cultural context, using both ethnographic and narrative approaches. In his article, Beatty describes how the Niha use expressions of anger as a tool of negotiation and bargaining, and as a way of avoiding – rather than provoking – violence. But he also offers a narrative account of a case of 'raw' anger, emphasizing that in neither case is it possible to draw a clear line between the natural and cultural.

While these four articles represent different disciplinary perspectives on anger, there are significant common threads. Most obviously, they all emphasize anger's communicative functions, while most also emphasize its role in motivation. Several note its varied forms (rage, indignation, resentment, and so on), and raise questions about the relationship between anger and related emotions such as disgust and contempt. Hess and Bell touch on questions of gender; Petersen and Beatty both described ways in which anger is not only experienced but also used.

ISRE Interview

We are thrilled to have Professor Carolyn Zahn-Waxler join us for an interview in the current issue. Zahn-Waxler pioneered the early research on the development of empathy and prosocial responding in infancy. Her stories from her time working at the National Institute of Health demonstrate both the difficulties faced by women scientists and the hard-fought progress that has been made. Moreover, Zahn-Waxler's recognition and ownership of her own mental illness provides a powerful example of recognizing and normalizing often stigmatized psychological issues. No doubt many of our readers, junior and senior alike, will resonate with her experiences. Though retired, Zahn-Waxler remains a prominent presence in current research

examining the early development of empathy, relations of empathy with developmental psychopathology, and engagement in translational research.

ISRE Spotlight

Our Spotlight feature highlights the research of Professor Jessica Lougheed. Her work stands at the forefront of utilizing advanced methodological techniques to examine micro- and macro-level emotion processes. Lougheed overviews her research examining the unfolding of real-time emotions in parent-adolescent interactions. Her approach views the interpersonal context of emotion as a dynamic system in which the experience and expressive behavior of the individuals are inherently connected in time, both in the present and in subsequent social and emotional behaviors. Though her research is developmental in nature, its elegance lies in conceptualizing the intertwined nature of emotion systems across social partners, providing intriguing possibilities for emotion researchers across multiple disciplines.

Announcements

This year, ISRE President Christine Harris stepped down as President of ISRE. Agneta Fischer has served as Interim President and has kindly written our regular column on ISRE Matters for this issue. She emphasizes the increasingly competitive environment in which ISRE operates, its continuing as an interdisciplinary, and the importance of its members, including its junior members. Agneta also notes the recent changes to the ISRE Board and the election of Ursula Hess as incoming ISRE President.

A recap of the recent ISRE Meeting in Amsterdam is provided by hosts Disa Sauter and Agneta Fischer. We are sure that we speak for everyone in applauding their work putting on a superb conference!

We hope that our readers have enjoyed a peaceful and productive summer in 2019, as we look forward to planning and assembling the next issue of Emotion Researcher.

Warmly,

Carolyn & Eric

Carolyn Price is Senior Lecturer in Philosophy at the Open University (UK). Her research addresses a broad range of questions about emotions – what they are, what they tell us about the world, the norms by which we evaluate them, and (most recently) their relation to the self. She is also interested in particular types of emotions, – such as love, grief and regret. Her book *Emotion* (Polity) appeared in 2015.

Eric Walle is an Associate Professor of Psychological Sciences at the University of California, Merced. His theoretical writings emphasize the functions of emotions, particularly in interpersonal contexts. His empirical work examines emotional development, principally in infancy and early childhood, as well as how individuals perceive and respond to emotional communication.

ISRE Matters

ISRE Matters

Agneta Fischer

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Professor Agneta Fischer

It is for a sad reason that I am writing this column in my capacity as interim-president of ISRE. In the beginning of this year, Chris Harris had to step down as president due to health issues. We therefore had to miss her at the most recent ISRE meeting in Amsterdam, which we all very much regretted. I sincerely hope that she will be able to come to the next ISRE meeting.

Chris asked me to act as interim president in order to support a smooth transition into a new ISRE board without her. That has happened fortunately! A new ISRE board was chosen at the business meeting of the Amsterdam conference, and I think ISRE should be very happy that Ursula Hess, a long standing and extremely committed ISRE member, will be ISRE's new president.

Other board members include Chris Harris (Past President), Yochi Cohen-Carash (Membership Secretary), Jody Clay-Warner (Treasurer), Disa Sauter (Secretary), Jerry Parrott (Editor, Emotion Review), Eric Walle (Editor, Emotion Researcher), Andrea Scarantino (Member at large), and Tanja Wingenbach (Early Career Researcher Section Liaison). One additional vacancy on the board will be filled soon.

Ages ago, I was ISRE president (from 2004-2009), and since then ISRE, as well as the academic context in which ISRE operates, has changed a lot. ISRE has grown, become more professional, and has its own journal. But other societies interested in emotion have been founded or have grown and we are facing more competition than before. Competition can definitely be good, but it also has drawbacks. Especially because many of us are facing cuts in travel grants, we have to choose between various interesting conferences that cover emotion research.

Since emotion has become a major topic in many different disciplines we also compete with disciplinary organizations that organize their own symposia and workshops on emotion. Examples are *The Queen Mary Centre for the History of Emotions* in the UK, the *Society for Philosophy of Emotion* in the US, or the *Sociology of Emotions Research Network*, coordinated from Sweden. Moreover, at the last *International Conference for Psychological Science* in Paris, the topic of emotion was abundant and many ISRE members presented their work.

In many of these societies research examines emotions from their own disciplinary perspective and this means there is an important role for ISRE here. We are and strive to be an interdisciplinary society and although some disciplines are more present than others, our mission is to be open to other perspectives and to stimulate an interdisciplinary focus. I think this goal should become more prominent for ISRE in the coming years: to join forces with disciplinary organizations that study emotion. Inviting them to ISRE conferences could be a good start. And I should immediately acknowledge that we, as Amsterdam organizers, started too late with reaching out to these organizations.

ISRE started in 1985 and, despite the growing competition, is still attractive to many active researchers in the field, as illustrated by the

good attendance at ISRE conferences (usually between 300-400 registrations). ISRE is the home of many excellent and highly visible emotion authors, and I know that attending ISRE conferences is a motivating and exciting event for junior as well as senior academics. We should cherish and enlarge this.

You, our membership, are the most important source of our existence. Soon, a new website will be launched that better communicates our news and messages to the outside world, but also to you. We want members to become active, to organize workshops, meetings, conferences, to share insights, tools or ideas. The section of early career researchers in ISRE (ECRS) has already pointed the way: they are very active and full of ideas and initiatives. I hope that the new ISRE board will develop new activities in between the bi-annual meetings and offer grants through which these can be realized.

All the best!

Agneta Fischer

ISRE Biennial Meeting Update

The ISRE 2019 Meeting

Disa Sauter & Agneta Fischer

Conference Organizers
Department of Psychology
University of Amsterdam

The Biennial Conference of the International Society for Research on Emotion was held in Amsterdam, the Netherlands, from July 10th through 13th, 2019. Over 400 researchers came together to learn from each other and to enjoy the beautiful city of Amsterdam. Participants came from 34 countries and represented over 30 different fields of study, including philosophy, sociology, history, literature, computer science, linguistics, education, and psychology. The composition of delegates was well balanced with approximately half being faculty and half being PhD students or post-docs.

The three inspiring keynote talks illustrated the breath of current emotion scholarship: Andrea Scarantino took on ontological constructionism in a talk on emotion theory, Dacher Keltner presented new statistical approaches to mapping emotional experiences and expressions, and Carien van Reekum discussed how emotion regulation is instantiated in the brain. The ISRE 2019 conference started with an invited symposium featuring three post-docs who showcased new technological and methodological developments in emotion science. The rich and varied program also included 21 symposia with 90 symposium talks,

62 individual talks, 42 flash talks, and more than 180 posters.

Nearly half of conference delegates also attended one of the five pre-conference hosted at ISRE 2019: Learning to Value: Emotion Development from Infancy to Adolescence; Baby FACS workshop; On the social dimensions of emotion: New philosophical perspectives; Affective computing; and The Socio-Cultural Shaping of Emotion.

The much enjoyed social events included a welcome reception, a conference dinner at the gorgeous neo-classical church De Duif with chartered canal boats, and drinks in the garden of the spectacular Amsterdam Museum.

The ISRE Early Career Researchers Section hosted a much appreciated social event for early career researchers on the first evening and also organized the ISRE 2019 Early Career Researcher Dissertation Award and the ISRE 2019 Early Career Researcher Poster Award. More details on these awards can be found in the ECRS section of this issue.

The ISRE business meeting saw the election of the new president, Ursula Hess, new membership secretary, Yoshi Cohen-Charash, and new treasurer, Jody Clay-Warner. The board thanked interim president Agneta Fischer, past presidents Arvid Kappas and Chris Harris, past treasurer Stephanie Shields, and past board members Agnes Moors, Julien Deonna.

We would like to thank everyone who contributed to the conference for helping to make it such a successful and thoroughly enjoyable event. We hope you enjoyed it as much as we did!

The conference program is available at
https://www.isre2019.org/program/full-program

ISRE Early Career Researchers Section: Who we are and our Initiatives since 2013

Tanja S. H. Wingenbach, Manuel F. Gonzalez, Soohyun Lee, Zhixin Pu, Melina West, Derya Gürcan Yıldırım, and Claire Ashley

The International Society for Research on Emotion - Early Career Researchers Section (ISRE ECRS) is a platform within ISRE for emotion/affective science researchers from any field, discipline, method, or culture. The ISRE ECRS is committed to organize introductory meetings (i.e., professional and social) for early career emotion researchers, both during ISRE conferences and between meetings. Additionally, the ISRE ECRS strives to create and maintain member support through awards, career development opportunities, expert feedback, webinars, and more.

The ISRE ECRS continues to grow since its launch in 2013 and has implemented several initiatives for early career emotion researchers. At the 2017 ISRE meeting in St. Louis, the ECRS implemented its first major initiative - a 'Meet the Editors' preconference. In the off-year following that conference, the ECRS launched its inaugural emotion webinar series and mentoring program. The ECRS has continued to promote a strong community of early career scholars within ISRE, such as in the most recent ISRE meeting in Amsterdam ISRE, which included poster and dissertation awards to recognize research excellence, and an informal networking social event for early career researchers.

Award Recipients

The ISRE Dissertation Award recognizes outstanding emotion research at the doctoral level. The first prize was a one-year ISRE associate membership, free registration for the ISRE 2019 meeting, and partial airfare to the conference. Both the recipient and two other outstanding nominees received an accompanying

certificate. Whereas the inaugural ISRE Dissertation Award was organized by the ECRS, this award will be handled by the main ISRE executive board for all following rounds. Dissertation award recipient and runner-ups for 2019 were:

1. **Aaron Weidman**: 'Define, Measure, Repeat'
2. **Jessica Tetchner**: 'Positive Mood and Cognition'
3. **Laura Sakka**: 'Affective Responses to Music in Depressed Individuals'

The ISRE ECRS Poster Award recognizes an excellent ISRE poster presentation by an early career researcher. Both the quality of the research and its presentation were taken into account. The best poster award winner in 2019 received a cash prize, a voucher from SAGE, and a certificate at the awards ceremony at the conference. Two runner-ups also received a certificate. Poster award recipient and runner-ups for 2019 were:

1. **Domicele Jonauskaite**: 'Data-driven approach reveals universal patterns in colour-emotion associations across 30 nations'
2. **Kelly L Ziemer**: 'Reasoning, Recommendations and Implications: Self-Transcendent Emotions with Marginalized Populations to Remedy Social Isolation and Loneliness'
3. **Daphne Stam**: 'Functional Brain Correlates of Emotional and Social Memory'

Upcoming Initiatives

You can expect the following initiatives from the ECRS in 2019/2020:

(1) the second round of web-based mid-year seminars on topics relevant to emotion research
(2) the second round of a mentoring program that brings together early career emotion researchers and established emotion researchers

We also have action items planned for the 2021 conference:

(1) early career researcher poster award for excellence in emotion research
(2) a career development workshop
(3) a networking event for early career researchers

ECRS Board

Besides the constant development and implementation of initiatives, a new structure has

been developed and introduced to the ECRS. That is, we now have our own board within the ECRS and the chair of the ECRS also represents the section in the main ISRE board. This structure and our rules and procedures were approved at the ISRE 2019 business meeting. Currently, there are four board members who will serve on the board for the following 2 years:

Chair: Tanja S. H. Wingenbach
The chair's role is to coordinate and initiate activities, liaise with the ISRE president/board, serve as spokesperson of the ECRS, and represent the ECRS within the ISRE board.

Secretary: Claire Ashley
The secretary is responsible for internal and external communication (i.e. communicates with the membership, e.g. through Facebook, the ISRE mailing list) and liaises with the ISRE conference organizers.

Events Coordinator: Melina West
The event coordinator is responsible for special events, e.g., webinar series, social events, coaching, workshops.

Poster Award Coordinator: Soohyun (Ashley) Lee
The poster award coordinator is responsible for the poster award at each ISRE conference (contacting ISRE board, communicating with jury members, calls, etc.).

The ECRS team also includes volunteers. Our current volunteers are: Derya Gürcan Yıldırım, Zhixin Giselle Pu, and Manuel F. Gonzalez.

The whole team is excited to implement initiatives that align with the interests of ISRE and support early career emotion researchers. We would also like to thank ISRE for its support in implementing these initiatives, the publishers that have supported our initiatives financially, the senior researchers who have participated in our initiatives, and the early career researchers who have been part of our journey thus far.

Get Involved!
Would you like to volunteer within the ISRE ECRS? If you are an ISRE Associate Member[1]

and keen to get involved yourself, please get in touch. We are excited for you to help us best support our emotion research community. Our upcoming initiatives to work on are the webinar series and a mentoring program. Please note that volunteer commitment should be at least 1 year and requires continuous involvement.

Should you be interested in playing an active role in the ISRE ECRS, please email Tan (tanja.wingenbach@bath.edu). In your interest email, include a short bio as well as which initiative you prefer to get involved with, and why.

Are you an early career emotion scientist or faculty that support early career emotion scientists? Join our Facebook page: **https://www.facebook.com/groups/ISRE.JRS/?ref=br_rs**

For any other questions or comments, please email Claire Ashley (claire.ayako@gmail.com)

Tanja S. H. Wingenbach (Chair)
Postdoctoral Senior Research Fellow, University of Zurich/University Hospital Zurich, Switzerland

Claire Ashley (Secretary)
M.Sc., University of Sussex, UK

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[1] ISRE Associate Membership is defined as: "less-established emotion researchers who have not yet obtained the terminal degree in their field or are engaged in postgraduate training. Associate Members are typically advanced graduate students or postdoctoral students."

Melina West (Events Coordinator)
Postdoctoral Researcher, University of Connecticut, USA

Derya Gürcan Yıldırım (Volunteer)
Assistant Professor, Atatürk University, Turkey

Soohyun (Ashley) Lee (Poster Award Coordinator)
PhD student, Baruch College & The Graduate Center, City University of New York, USA

Zhixin Giselle Pu (Volunteer)
M.A. student, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, USA

Manuel F. Gonzalez (Volunteer)
PhD Candidate, Baruch College & The Graduate Center, City University of New York, USA

ISRE Interview

A Researcher Who Found Herself

Carolyn Zahn-Waxler

An interview with Eric Walle

Carolyn Zahn-Waxler is an Honorary Fellow both at the Center for Healthy Minds and the Center for Child and Family Wellbeing at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. She spent her career as a Research Psychologist at the National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH) in Bethesda, MD, in the Intramural Research Program. She was past editor of the journal, Developmental Psychology, past President of APA Division 7, and recipient of the G. Stanley Hall Lifetime Achievement Award. She has published more than 175 scholarly papers and chapters on the development and socialization of empathy and prosocial behavior, coping, psychopathology and gender.

I'd like to start with your personal history. Where did you grow up? What did your parents do? What was your family like?

I grew up in a small town on a peninsula in northeastern Wisconsin. Often called the Cape Cod of the Midwest, it is known for its rugged beauty: cliffs along coastlines, forests of birch and pine, and farmlands. It was an idyllic, carefree place to grow up, playing with friends and roaming the countryside. We hiked and biked, walked beaches, and swam in Lake Michigan or Green Bay. We had a lot of freedom to come and go as we pleased. My father was a banker and active in the community, while my mother was a housewife. She envisioned more for herself than wife and mother. But that was not to be, due both to the role of women in the mid-20th century and to her own emotional problems. Early on my younger sister and I were largely unaware of her struggles and those of my father. But there were dark times ahead. Their arguments often took center stage in family life. My sister

Professor Carolyn Zahn-Waxler

and I were sidelined and swept into whirlwinds of their negative emotions.

My mother sometimes took her unhappiness out on me. She resented my intelligence and the fact that I would go to college, something she had not done. There were also times when we enjoyed each other's company as we had many common interests. She was often very funny, though her moods could shift on a dime. In retrospect, it was here that I likely developed my strong drive to understand people's responses to human suffering, i.e. with healthy empathy vs. too much empathy, or avoidance or antipathy/disdain. My mother told me that I was selfish and uncaring. I learned over time that I was caring, even though I could not help her.

About 10 years ago I wrote a memoir chapter where I talk about how these early experiences affected my later life, both personally and professionally. It was for a book edited by Steven Hinshaw, titled Breaking the Silence. It is about professionals' disclosures of mental illness in their families, themselves, or

both. My chapter is about intergenerational transmission of depression, from a psychological perspective. Often it strikes a common chord in people, even though specifics vary. Tolstoy's book, Anna Karenina, opens with the quote that all happy families are alike, but each unhappy family is unhappy in its own way. It's not that simple of course. But there's a kernel of truth. It's probably not coincidence that there are many more kinds of negative emotions than positive emotions. Anger, fear, guilt, sadness, shame, disgust and more. Suffering is pervasive. This may be one reason negativity bias exists, beginning in childhood. I do ascribe to a functional theory of emotions. All emotions exist for a reason. They are adaptive and have survival value. But they can easily become dysfunctional.

I especially like sharing the memoir with students. Their stress levels, anxiety and depression are at all-time highs, across disciplines. They may worry that their problems and family histories might prevent them from being objective. Students may think they are different from their teachers and professors, who appear competent and functional. But when you've been in the field long enough, as I have, you know that's just not the case. Much lies hidden below the surface in all of us. Many highly successful academics (and people in all kinds of careers) also deal with mental health issues. Stigma is still deep-seated. Few chapters were written by people who were already mid-career and tenured. Even they must have worried about their reputations. To students I would say, find someone safe to share your feelings and seek help for yourself. If you work in a climate where it is possible to be more open all the better.

But weren't nervous? I'm really struck that you felt comfortable disclosing everything that you did in that chapter.

I had no reason to be nervous. Remember that I wrote it when I had been retired and away from NIMH for several years. It would not have been wise to do when I was still at NIMH. Especially there, it would have been seen a sign of weakness and vulnerability. There was an implicit message that you had to be strong and healthy to study mental illness. Best to be different from "them", so that bias would not infiltrate your work. How

ironic is that? I learned over time that life experience can richly inform research rather than bias it. After I retired, I realized at a deeper level the fully intertwined nature of my personal and professional lives. Self-disclosure benefits others so it's something I like to do.

Do you mind sharing a little bit about what were like as a child? What personal and professional ambitions did you have as a child? Were you successful in your early schooling? Did you always have a curious streak?

Oh sure. I did well in school and that was a source of satisfaction. I think I got some of my curiosity from my mother through her (over) sharing of her mental illness and her intense interest in the personal lives of others. I feel like I was learning my profession early on. She would tell me about the problems of different family members, relatives, friends and community members. Sometimes in a judgmental way but not necessarily. She could observe what others didn't

Carolyn, age 5 years, with her younger sister.

see. She had an uncanny eye and penetrating insights.

She would take me to movies that most others would view as inappropriate for a child. I liked that she did this. It made me feel grown-up, as her companion. I can imagine other children being totally bored, but I was riveted. I remember watching the 1948 film about mental illness with her, The Snake Pit, starring Olivia De Havilland. It was about people living in an insane asylum (the term used back then). I was around 8 or 9. She also took me to All About Eve with Betty Davis and Ann Baxter; about a rivalry between an older and a younger movie star. This is one way I got hooked on understanding the (mainly unhappy) lives of others. I devoured books from the library on other's personal lives and inner worlds. I still do, because there is so much that can be learned from literature and the arts.

Tell me about your time as an undergraduate and your path to pursuing higher education. What was that experience like? What was the focus of your early research?

I never would have obtained advanced degrees had it not been for men. The idea of college had been deeply ingrained by my father. He first told me I would go to college, when I was 6 or 7 years old; moreover, that it would be the University of Wisconsin. This really antagonized my mother. My father was the first in his family to go to college and it transformed his life. Initially I majored in languages, but once I took psychology, I found my calling. Herbert Pick was one of my professors and I especially enjoyed his

classes. He did research on children's learning and perception. I worked as a research assistant for him on projects with mentally retarded children living in an institution across the lake from campus. Herb was about to leave UW to take a position at Institute of Child Development at the University of Minnesota (ICD) and he encouraged me to apply. I had no plan for the future. I vacillated because I wanted to stay in Madison to be near a boyfriend. Herb persisted and one day he showed up with the application form. Without his encouragement, I would never have gone to graduate school.

My roommates in graduate school at ICD, also received clinical training in the Psychology Department. This assured that they would be gainfully employed with a Master's Degree. But that was not for me. It would be too anxiety provoking, trying to help people deal with their negative feelings and relationship issues. That's what I was running away from! As for research, I couldn't even imagine how emotions could be measured – so soft, so wispy, so vague. It is ironic that I ended up making a career of studying perhaps the most elusive of all emotions. I wanted to use experimental designs that would provide rigor, control, and straightforward answers to research questions. Little did I know then. For my dissertation I studied the role of different kinds of delayed reinforcement on discrimination learning. It was a topic my advisor John Wright was interested in, it fit my criteria for rigorous research, and was probably also the story of my career. There are *long* delays when you conduct longitudinal studies and have to wait for the answers!

Almost all of the professors were males and they uniformly supported the female students. I planned to stop with a MA, but the head of the department, Harold Stevenson, offered me a NIMH fellowship if I would stay and complete the PhD. At the next choice point, another professor, Robert Orlando, steered me firmly in the direction of a postdoctoral position at the NIMH Intramural Research Program in Bethesda, MD. My choices after obtaining the PhD were to go to NIMH as a post-doc, or to teaching jobs in small state colleges in California. California sounded more intriguing, but Bob emphatically explained (it felt like a decree) that I would not be

able to do research there. That it would be a poor career decision.

I am curious to hear about your time working at the National Institute of Mental Health. What was that experience like?

I was fortunate to receive a tenured position there, but it came with significant restrictions. I would not be allowed to have a budget or staff to conduct my own research. The two male leaders of the NIMH Intramural Program, a psychologist and a psychiatrist, were trying to help in ways that were possible at the time. They wanted to support the work of Marian Radke-Yarrow, the woman who had hired me. At the time the agreement felt gentle because I was busy learning about naturalistic methods and different ways to observe young children's emotions and behaviors.

I've only ever been in at a university, but I always imagined that the Intramural Research Program at NIMH would be isolating with regards to the lack of colleagues and opportunity for discussion. Were there trade-offs that you found between being at a research versus a university setting?

Like you, I only worked in one setting, so I have no direct basis for comparison. It was isolating because we didn't have many psychologists as colleagues there. At NIMH there were around 30 labs, all headed by men but for two. I was in one that was headed by Marian Radke-Yarrow, the Laboratory of Developmental Psychology. We had a few developmental psychologists and several male psychologists, reassigned from the Laboratory of Psychology. A new administration cleaned house to make way for biological work and neuroimaging studies. One of the reassigned men stated that it would be 'over my dead body' to work for a woman and he retired. The rest stayed in Marian's lab and helped to create a hostile work environment. The only way she could obtain adequate resources to conduct her programmatic research was to squeeze them out. Over time, the developmental program grew, there were great post-docs, and visiting fellows from other countries. It was very stimulating.

When I was hired, post-docs were never, ever, put into permanent positions. The heads of the IRP gave Marian a slot for a full-time position for me. That would be equivalent to your tenure. But there was that important stipulation: I could never have resources to conduct my own research. It was called a 'gentleman's agreement'. I would always be tied to her. There was a written memo to that effect. There were few opportunities for women then. I was grateful at the time, but eventually it would create another 'mother-daughter' conflict about separation and independence.

During my tenure at NIMH, administrations changed several times, each intended to establish purer biological/genetic approaches. Relatively little research was done with humans. And when it was, the focus was on psychiatric disorders. Environmental factors were assumed to play little or no role. Once the two heads of the Intramural Program retired, the new leaders created a different agenda. They tried to eliminate work on behavioral, social, and psychological processes. They closed the Laboratory of Family Psychiatry and replaced it with the Laboratory of Biological Psychiatry. The Laboratory of Socio-Environmental Studies was closed. The Child Research Branch was closed after Richard Bell retired. The Laboratory of Psychology continued to exist, but with a different cast of characters. This coincided nicely with President Reagan's funding ban on behavioral research in the extramural program that lasted for several years. It certainly had a chilling effect. In looking back now I am amazed at all that we accomplished. Marian's lab continued for several years but eventually it too was closed. My section on Developmental Psychopathology was placed in the Child Psychiatry Branch, headed by the other female lab chief, Judith Rapoport.

Marian experienced the double whammy of being a woman and a behavioral psychologist. Actually, it was a triple whammy because within the National Institutes of Health, mental health was on the lowest rung of the ladder, compared with physical diseases (cancer, heart and lung, etc.). We found ways to work around the system when writing our research protocols, using language that had a more biological ring to it at the time. Affect was thought of as a biological process then, so we used affective terminology in

our research protocols. We couldn't refer to social or behavioral processes. It sounds completely silly now, but it got us through some hurdles then.

For years we remained hidden from view. We worked in a very large old English Tudor House previously owned by a wealthy family. It was situated on the top of a hill on campus, covered with trees – aptly named Tree Tops House. At one time it housed an experimental nursery school that the Kennedy children attended. Observation rooms were created for studying couples, families, and children. It had originally been for the Child Research Branch. It was perfect. But then they cut down many of the trees and our treasure became evident to others. After Marian retired, I was given the go ahead to refurbish the house. After I had done that, they took it away and gave it to a new lab. They gave me plenty of space in another location across the street from NIH. But I had to start all over again.

Wow, that's fascinating. How did you manage the shifting landscape at NIH? Could you advocate for yourself?

I learned to work around the system, which I thought of as 'acquired deviousness'. There was always a certain kind of wiggle room. I learned how to finesse situations. Periodically, we had external reviews by a group called the Board of Scientific Counsellors. My research reputation was growing. Reviewers questioned why I didn't have my own budget and resources. This placed pressure on Marian to provide more resources and independence. But the administration did not provide additional resources for her to do so. She did share a couple research assistants and post-docs. I collaborated with Mark Cummings on studies of young children's responses to anger and aggression between adults. The first one was on responses to their parents' fights. Some toddlers tried to break up the fights and serve as peacemakers, certainly not a job for children! And I collaborated with Grazyna Kochanska on the early development of guilt, both adaptive and maladaptive forms.

So, Marian was someone you met as a post-doc and worked with for much of your professional career. Would you say that she

Mark Cummings, Marian Radke-Yarrow, and Carolyn Zahn-Waxler (L-R).

was almost like a second advisor to you after you finished graduate school?

Well, that's an interesting question. Yes, because I never had anybody advising me in those research areas during my graduate research. Later I realized it was because I'd never sought it out. I avoided research on social and dynamic processes, emotions in particular, because of my family background. Instead I took courses on perception, learning and cognition. There was a lot of focus then on 'grand' learning theories based on behaviors of rats and humans. Eventually I became disillusioned. So it was a fresh start when I went to work with Marian to learn new research methods, especially naturalistic observation. She pioneered this approach, one that we now take for granted. I learned so much from her personally and professionally. Our families were close as well. She taught me about homemaking, picking out furniture and carpets, even how to paint and wallpaper. Marian was wonderful during the period when I was a junior colleague.

The very first study I worked on was about learning concern for others (Yarrow, Scott, & Waxler, 1973). Preschool children were placed in different kinds of learning environments that could lead to prosocial behavior – concern for others. Marian used the term *concern for others,* and I think it's still a good one because it's broad enough to capture affective, cognitive and behavioral aspects of outer-and-other directed prosociality. There were 4 different training conditions. Children in a preschool came in small groups for several hours to a mini-preschool

setting there, a few mornings each week for a six-week period. The group was with a 'teacher' who was either nurturant or non-nurturant (aloof/neutral), who would demonstrate different ways of caring for others. These conditions were crossed with two types of training methods. One involved use of didactic, symbolic situations only where children were taught caring behaviors using pictures or dioramas of animals and humans in distress. The other training condition also included learning how to help real people in distress. So, there were 4 different learning conditions in addition to a control group. Only one condition led to generalized altruism. This was when the child had both experienced warmth from the teacher and training that included both symbolic materials and real-life opportunities. We found the same patterns with these children six months later, and also in a replication with inner-city, low income children.

I spent the first couple years working on that project. Then we did other studies where Marian provided me with some opportunities for first-authored papers. Perhaps most notable were

Carolyn in her 30's with her husband at a meeting for the Society for Research on Child Development.

studies of the development of concern for others and child-rearing practices associated with different levels of empathic concern. My professional independence grew when I obtained outside funding for research on these topics. This happened roughly ten years into my career, through interactions with Robert Emde, a catalyst for my own research program. He and four other investigators in different locations had obtained a McArthur grant to start an interdisciplinary project on development in the first years of life. The entire group met once a once a year for almost a week in great locations, for cross-fertilization of ideas and collaboration on projects across sites. They provided small grants that allowed me to increase staff and to travel. Many friendships developed in this cooperative group setting. This where I met your mentor, Joe Campos, a wonderful man. Our paths crossed again when Bob Emde, Robert Plomin, Jerome Kagan and a group of behavior geneticists received another MacArthur grant to study early cognitive, social, and emotional development in a sample of MZ and DZ twins at the Institute for Behavior Genetics at the University of Colorado. Bob wanted us to join the research team for our expertise in measurement of different emotions, empathy in my case.

Wow, what an invigorating time that must have been.

It was indeed!

As a woman in the field of psychology, have you faced difficulties or discrimination that you had to overcome?

Yes indeed! I experienced discrimination throughout my career at NIH as did all of the women who worked there. I had worked there for 25 years when I was asked to mentor a male, child-psychiatrist, post-doc who began at a higher salary than my current salary. I declined and no one challenged my decision. Eventually, we had the fortune of having a woman in charge for a period of time, Susan Swedo. First, she was deputy director of NIMH and then the acting director. She strove to change the inequities by forming a committee of women to explore gender discrimination. We interviewed laboratory chiefs

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and did surveys. Outside reviewers compared research contributions of professional males and females. Some of the interviews of lab chiefs were fine, some were disrespectful, and some came on to the women. There was blatant disregard. Data collected from the reviewers with expertise in our areas of work were compelling. Women doing comparable work to men in terms of their scientific contributions were paid substantially less. This report got the attention of the administration. Finally, the administration acknowledged the problem with a 'gender equity adjustment', certainly a better alternative for them than a class action suit. Women who could show their accomplishments equaled those of men at a higher salary level were moved to that higher pay grade, so there were big salary bumps. There was also retroactive pay for the last few years.

It is interesting, in retrospect, that NIH 'led' the way for gender equity in salary. Discrimination is still rampant in so many other institutions. We were lucky to have a female leader for a while. Otherwise I don't think it would have happened. I used my "gender equity adjustment" for a big down payment for a second house up in Door County. At the time we had no concrete plans for retirement. Morris had grown up in Washington, DC and was comfortable with spending the rest of our lives there. I was less enamored but didn't have a clear vision of what to do next. That all changed after we bought the second home. Gender equity helped guide a decision eventually to move back to Wisconsin.

What a biased setting to work in. What advice would you offer to women?

Know that discrimination still exists and comes in many guises. Try to be aware of what needs to change, both in yourself and your environment. Women still undervalue their contributions more than men, not just in academia but throughout life. Women are also more likely to hesitate, to speak softly, and to assume an apologetic stance. Try to persist, to make yourself heard. And if you can't speak easily, try to do it in writing. That's another way to make your voice heard. I was quiet in my early years and needed to be nudged along. This happened through outside collaborations with people like JoAnn

A painting of Carolyn's house in Door County, WI – made possible by her NIH gender equity settlement.

Robinson, Robert Emde and so many others who enriched my knowledge base and broadened my perspective. The corpus of work on concern for others could not have happened without them.

I've mentored many women (and some men as well) both formally and informally, at NIMH, the University of Wisconsin, and through collaborations with women at other sites. I still do. I love this process. I like to encourage and recognize of the value of younger people's ideas. I have often been surprised by how little women especially think of their contributions and talents, and how important it is to explicitly acknowledge their worth.

You conducted some of the pioneering research on the development of empathy and prosocial behavior in infancy. How did you get interested in this topic of study?

Our interest was piqued by the first study with Marian on optimal learning conditions for concern for others. While we identified those conditions, we also realized the potential was already there even in the youngest children studied. It just required the right circumstances for its expression. So, we became curious about the origins of concern for others. We started another study, beginning with infants around the age of 1 and followed them over time to span 2.5 years using an expanded age-cohort design. This required the use of naturalistic observation. The situations required to observe empathy (and empathy related responding – a term used by Nancy Eisenberg), are not frequent or predictable in natural settings. So it is not feasible to send

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A 3-year-old participant (Carolyn's daughter) observing an experimenter expressing pain.

outside observers into home settings. Instead, we carefully trained mothers to make detailed observations of their children's responses to others in distress, which they tape recorded just after a distress incident (e.g. pain, sadness, anger, fatigue). We also had mothers and examiners simulate distress in the home and report their responses. Next, we video recorded infants' and toddlers' reactions to simulated distresses in the lab, so we could code from the videos.

Experimental probes provided strong evidence for veridicality of mothers' observations, in an era when mother reports were suspect. Here, observations were often richly, elaborately detailed. We obtained glimpses into aspects of family life (e.g. fights between parents, parental despair, harsh and guilt-inducing parenting practices) that we could not have seen otherwise. We could not use this approach for the larger scale longitudinal studies we wanted to do next. But once we demonstrated reliability and validity of mothers' observations with the use of structured probes, we could use these probes in the rest of our work.

We did several longitudinal studies that began infancy, with children followed for anywhere between 2 and 20 years. We traced different developmental pathways linked both to dispositional and environmental factors. We began with normative samples and then expanded to risk populations. Pamela Cole and I did a study of preschool children at risk for developing conduct problems. We also worked with infants with a parent with bipolar disorder and then added mothers with unipolar depression. This

happened because two child psychiatrists at NIMH approached us about adding our procedures for assessing social-emotional processes to their battery of measures of these children and their parents. One of them, Leon Cytryn, came to be known as the father of childhood depression – the first to identify depression as an illness that could afflict children as well as adults. We now take this for granted, but it was strongly challenged at the time.

I began to delve into literature based on psychodynamic and neo-psychoanalytic approaches to understanding family dynamics and parent-child interactions. This is how I came to the study of child and parent psychopathology, depression in particular, and parenting practices. I never sought it out. But when the opportunity emerged, I was more than ready. The final longitudinal study I did with Paul Hastings and Bonnie Klimes-Dougan was on the role of emotions in the development of psychopathology in adolescents. The very first longitudinal work coincided with the emerging domain of developmental psychopathology, initiated by people like Alan Sroufe and Dante Cicchetti. So we were on the forefront of that movement as well. Again, it was an exciting time in research. In studies of social and emotional development, in particular, it is important to be able to compare risk groups with groups of typical children and/or parents (i.e. screened for psychopathology). Most research on socio-emotional processes does not do this. It assumes normal or typical processes absent specific assessment. This is a problem.

Much like emotion, empathy is a term that is often lacking in definitional precision. How do you define empathy? Are there separate cognitive and affective components or are they integrated?

I do not like to use the word empathy alone for precisely that reason, when I talk about my research. I do use it in ordinary conversations and in settings like this interview. People outside of academia seem to have a common understanding of it as sympathy or concern for others. Concern for others was what we called it in the first study with Marian and I still use it today. It is outer-oriented and other-directed. For measurement purposes, I then divided it into three parts.

Concern for others, in my view, has three basic elements. One involves affect or emotion, which we measure via facial expressions, vocalics (e.g. cooing sounds) and sometimes postures (leaning in). One is about behavior – all the different prosocial acts on behalf of another – helping, comforting, sharing, protecting, defending, and more. And one is cognitive, reflected in awareness and exploration of another's distress, measured through non-verbal gestures and verbal inquiries. (Affect, Behavior, Cognition, or the ABC's of empathy). We score the three components separately. We've also done global ratings that incorporate the three components. They are strongly interrelated, but there is also enough variability to warrant separate statistical analyses. The components behave differently in early development. Affective empathy occurs early and levels off with age, while behavioral and cognitive empathy increase over time. Emotions are not well characterized by stage theories. They may become more complex, nuanced, and regulated over time, but not as predictable stages.

So, to answer your question, the components are *both* separate and integrated. This reminds me of a review article I read many years ago, by Watson and Clark (1992) titled, "Affects Separable and Inseparable." Measurement is always arbitrary and imperfect to some degree. There are infinite ways to carve nature at its joints. This is true of our conceptualization and measurement as well. But our operational definitions and measures have stood the test of time. At least they've provided a very good start.

I also became interested in measuring children's maladaptive responses to others' distress. They include (1) self-distress or personal distress – crying, whimpering; (2) overinvolvement in the other's distress – trying to comfort distressed or angry parent – a kind of role-reversal; (3) lack of regard for the other – little or no awareness or interest in the victim; and (4) active disregard, being judgmental and hostile toward victim. Decety refers to the latter two categories, respectively, as passive empathy deficits vs. active empathy deficits. Each of the other four responses can be seen as an 'opposite' of empathic concern. These categories are not always mutually exclusive. Children can vacillate between concern for the other and personal distress; they can be both caring and hostile, and so forth. But many children develop different patterns that coalesce into styles, e.g. a caring child, an indifferent child, a bullying child. They can become more trait-like.

Sometimes people use the word "empathic distress" to refer to a child's inability to regulate emotions; when they see someone else in distress, they too feel distressed. In Hoffman's theory, this contagion of emotional distress was the first stage on the way to mature empathy. But to call it *empathic* distress creates conceptual confusion. It is self-distress or personal distress. It is one opposite of empathic concern *for* the other, as it signals the need for caregiving. Two different systems are in place almost the onset of life. The infant/child who is distressed by the victims' distress is in need of care. The one who shows concern for the other shows the potential to provide care. So, seeking vs providing caregiving, two completely different systems (Zahn-Waxler, Schoen, & Decety, 2018). They can operate in close conjunction, but are different both conceptually and functionally. I'll talk more about that a bit later.

But again, one where you need the longitudinal data to actually refute something that other researchers might have questioned.

Almost everything of significance I've done requires the use of longitudinal designs. I'll give you an example from our work on observed active disregard for others in the first years of life. In work with Soo Rhee at the University of Colorado-Boulder, we've found that early active disregard for the suffering of others predicts later antisocial behavior and psychopathic traits; at multiple time points across childhood, adolescence and adulthood, assessed by multiple observers. This points to the need for early interventions. The fact that active disregard occurs so early in development does not necessarily imply that it is innate. Others have shown a history of child abuse for young children who behave in this way.

So, with this term disregard, you seem to be describing instances where I see your distress but I'm not behaving in a prosocial manner. I'm curious how you'd view this in terms of

someone who's walking past a beggar on the street. Is that disregard? Or a doctor who's causing pain to a patient. Would that be disregard?

I'd have a hard time answering those hypotheticals without more information. People step by others in need for different reasons. As for the doctor causing pain to a patient, it is a kind of disregard but not really what I mean. The doctor is so focused on his own needs that he does not think about those of the patient. I'm talking about something that is more judgmental ("you shouldn't have done that") or hostile (swatting at the victim), or sometimes laughter in young children This has more of an anti-social quality. It emerges later in development than concern for others and is seen in a much smaller proportion of the children. Joe Campos and I had a running disagreement after he saw videotapes of a couple of children laughing at the victim's distress or saying, 'you didn't really hurt yourself'. Joe said, "That means the simulation doesn't work. The children see through it. They know it's fake and it's not real." But if it was fake, why are the children who act like this at 14 and 24 months, the same ones who later show antisocial patterns and psychopathic traits even into early adulthood. With Paul Hastings, we also replicated these findings with a sample of preschool children, followed into early grade school, with clinical levels of conduct problems. So the procedures were fine after all. The results were robust, replicable, and a good example of why longitudinal designs matter. You have to be very patient to do this kind of work. Answers emerge slowly.

How do you feel that the field of empathy has evolved since you began researching this topic?

Well, when we started to work in this area, we avoided use of the word empathy. It was seen as loose, slippery – feeling what the other is feeling ("I feel your pain"), well, how could that be? Feeling something inside of someone else's body? Some saw it akin to paranormal processes and deemed it pseudoscience.

In the beginning, I would get unusual calls and letters from people. There was a priest who

Carolyn enjoying time biking on the open road.

lived in Newcastle, PA who would call me late in the evening to talk about these ideas. It felt a little odd, but the conversations intrigued me. There was an Air Force Colonel who used to contact me. I can't even remember why now. I had a cousin who believed our findings with young children were definitive proof of the existence of God. When Edwin Mitchell, the astronaut, had an out of body experience in outer space he founded the organization called IONS, the Institute of Noetic Sciences. One subdivision was called the Altruistic Spirit Program. I received a call from them one day, asking if I would like a small grant to study something related to empathy. I said yes, of course, and they provided partial funding for a study of concern for others in young children of depressed and well mothers.

The term empathy began to achieve greater credibility as a scientific construct when neuroscientists started to study it along with related constructs, such as affective resonance or emotional contagion. If you could show where it existed in the brain through neuroimaging studies, this is proof of its existence. Resonance, of course, is a whole-body experience. The philosopher Adam Smith defined sympathy as the

ability to understand another's perspective and to have a visceral/somatic or emotional reaction, which could lead to caring actions. We hear another's cry; we see their facial, vocal and body expressions. This is part of how it 'gets into' our own bodies, or as some say, 'under the skin'.

Adam Smith's definition provided a framework for the later study of sympathy/empathy. It included cognitive, emotional, and physiological components that could be empirically assessed. Later the study of interconnections within the brain and between the brain and body would reveal more about dynamics that underly empathic processes. Jean Decety's neuroscientific work and imaging studies of children across an age range helped to transform knowledge in this area. Around this time, some researchers began to study a related concept, namely compassion – defined as a deep awareness of the suffering of others and a desire to alleviate that suffering. Helen Weng and Richie Davidson at the Center for Healthy Minds at UW did neuroimaging studies to compare brain activity in adults before and after compassion training practices intended to heighten kindness both toward the self and the victim. I find this work to be powerful.

Concern for others is one of those ideas that draw people into the big questions about our roles in the universe – how we have evolved as humans, the nature of good and evil, our purpose on the planet, the nature of consciousness and self-other awareness, etc. Decety speaks of the moral brain. This includes integration of cognitive, emotional and motivational mechanisms, shaped through evolution, development, and culture, to facilitate how people should treat each other, with empathic concern as a guide to moral acts.

Do you think that research on empathy is moving in the right direction?

The short answer is yes and no, but mostly yes. Certainly, research has provided us with substantially more information about children's moral lives. I consider kindness and caring for others as an essential component of morality. I see human concern for others as part of our evolutionary history as mammals whose role, according to Paul MacLean, is to nurture and nourish their young. McLean's view brought me more in tune with ways in which we are similar to other species.

MacLean proposed that empathy emerged with the evolution of mammals (and some avians) and what he termed "a family way of life". This brought with it processes of extended caregiving, sensitivity to suffering, and responsiveness to distress cries of the young. MacLean emphasized interconnections of the limbic system with the prefrontal cortex, linked to parental concern for the young. This, in turn, provided the basis for the emergence of a more generalized sense of responsibility for the welfare of others. This suggests a deeply embedded capacity for concern for others that is part of our evolutionary heritage and history. Now, brain imaging methods of neuroscience have mapped out brain regions, processes and pathways consistent with MacLean's early ideas, but with important elaborations.

Note that this argument emphasizes the role of parenting, more aptly the role of mothers, as females have mainly played this role throughout history. Only female mammals suckle their young. However, most theories about the course of human evolution, how we've established societies, how we've become less violent and more caring as a species, have been written by men. Some of them are quite funny actually, in a dark sort of way. One is that men killed off the bullies in order to create more peaceful societies. Well, all you have to do is look around you, my friends! There are enough weapons on planet Earth to destroy it. And enough bullies to dominate others and create widespread oppression. While active disregard emerges later than concern for others, and is much less common, its consequences are deadly.

What research studies do you view as exemplary of the type of research that there should be more of in the study of empathy?

I've already mentioned the work of Jean Decety. I value the contributions of Michael Tomasello and the people he has mentored like Warneken, Vaish, Hepach, Carpenter, and others. Vaish's concepts of sophisticated and flexible concern for others in early childhood have been very helpful in advancing ideas about our human

potentials. The work of Kiley Hamlin and her mentors also was ground-breaking. They showed that infants in the first year of life show a sense right and wrong, preferring helpful to harmful behaviors. Other important studies have been done with older children and adolescents. The contributions of Nancy Eisenberg and those she has mentored have been substantial. I appreciate her leadership in the field. Dale Hay is another person, as well as Judy Dunn. And I value the work of Daniel Batson who speaks of a pluralism of prosocial motives and studied these processes in adults. Eisenberg adapted his research designs to study these processes in children. And there are so many others, too many to name here.

The idea of positive affect as an important component of empathy is also gaining traction. Sharee Light and I (Light & Zahn-Waxler, 2011) have written about empathic cheerfulness during another's distress as another form of prosociality. It consists of positive affect, like smiles, as social communication intended to change another's negative mood state; to coax them out of their distress. This phenomenon also has been observed in studies of peer interactions with 6-month-old's by Hay and 9-10-month-old's by

Carolyn putting her feet in the Mediterranean Sea.

Liddle. Liddle showed that these efforts have some functionality; they seem to reduce the other baby's distress.

So, if a communicative smile is instrumental in changing another's behavior, is the caring response an emotion? A behavior? Both? This is where carving nature at its joints becomes tricky. This reminds me of the work of Frans de Waal, whose work I very much admire. He's a primatologist who studies empathy in bonobos and chimpanzees and other species. If empathic concern for the other is an emotion, how do you code that in chimps? De Waal uses the term 'consolation behaviors' seen when other chimps rush over to comfort another in distress – and he slips in the word sympathy now and then. I was able to observe these consolation behaviors directly when I visited him at Living Links, the Yerkes's laboratory outside of Atlanta, GA. We were busy talking to each other in an observation tower. One of the younger chimps who really liked Frans was trying to get his attention, but failed to do so. She became very upset and several other chimps rushed over to comfort her. Both emotion and action appeared to play a role.

What are some mis-steps or ill-advised directions have you seen in the study of empathy?

I think one way we got stuck in the field was getting into either-or arguments about human nature – all those variants of questions of whether we are primarily self-serving or focused on others. Human behavior is too multi-faceted to pose these kinds of either-or questions. In hindsight some of it seemed foolish and unproductive. Again, there are many ways of carving nature at its joints. And the carving goes way beyond the joints. Each time we 'dissect', we have the potential to create both fact and myth. It's easy to get caught up in, what I find to be, dissatisfying conceptual arguments.

Overly simplistic cognitive developmental theories of morality and concern for others hindered the establishment of more sensitive models, that would focus as well on the role emotions and motives. This has started to change. But there are still those who believe that a moral sensibility is tainted or sullied by emotion. When I started to work in this area, cognitive models

were dominant. Advanced morality required advanced cognition. This began with Piaget's stage theory in which the young child is seen as egocentric and incapable. Kohlberg's theory of stages of moral reasoning prevailed for some time. Here, emotion, including sympathy, was lower on the totem pole. Other theories, for different reasons, viewed young children in a similar light (e.g. learning theory, psychoanalytic theory).

Martin Hoffman's seminal theory in the mid-70's changed all that. He argued that true concern for others begins in the second and third years of life and proposed a four-stage theory. This was unique in that it ascribed potentials for empathy in very young children. The first stages were based on a few anecdotal observations, but the theory was productive in galvanizing the field into a different mindset. A part of the theory though remained tied to the idea that a certain level of cognitive understanding, of self as separate from the other, was a prerequisite for 'real' empathy. This is how I used to think about it too, until data proved otherwise. (The idea may reflect a Western cultural bias about the importance of the individual).

More cognitively-based tests were established to assess the child's ability for self-recognition/self-other differentiation. Because children's ability to pass these tests didn't occur until around 18 months, children were assumed not to show empathic concern until then. Cognitive theories were not the only ones to state that concern for others was impossible in the first year of life. Emotional theories of development made a distinction between primary, basic emotions and secondary, complex, or self-conscious emotions, like guilt, shame, empathic concern, envy and pride. Self-conscious emotions were thought not to appear until the second year of life because younger infants lacked the level of interpersonal awareness needed. Mothers could have told a different story had they been asked.

We had always started our longitudinal studies with infants at the beginning of the second year of life. That's when we assumed empathic concern started. But when I met Maayan Davidov, she said "What about the first year of life?" And that question launched our current work, conducted in Jerusalem. I'm happy that this is now such a vibrant research area now. It stands

in contrast to the views of people who beat up on empathy, calling it a fragile, narrow and parochial emotion. Yes, it can be seen as primitive in one sense due to its early appearance. But it is the forerunner of those qualities that allow us to care for others, stand up to bullies and fight injustice. It can also be seen as a strong emotion.

In large part, theories in philosophy and psychology were developed by males who didn't spend much time around young children and hence were not privy to their rich social and emotional lives (Rousseau abandoned his four children to live in an orphanage). It goes all the way back to Socrates and ideas from Stoicism: passion must be subject to reason, emotions lead one astray. Descartes's proclamation – I think therefore I am – further entrenched this line of thinking, and now we've seen it extended to "I think, therefore I feel." Even on the surface it doesn't make sense.

Shelley Taylor's model of tend-and befriend, rather than fight-flight in explaining social dynamics provides a valuable perspective. It recognizes the role of positive social relationships and dynamics more common to females than males, that are also part of the expression and transmission of caring for others across generations. The model also shines a light on how male dominated theories of social-moral development and caring behaviors have led to constrained, often inaccurate models of prosociality. Sarah Hrdy, an anthropologist, is an important voice here, especially in her book "Mothers and Others" where she talks about the role women play in the development of mutual understanding, empathy, cooperation and collaboration. If we had had more intellectual foremothers, the story might have been different or revealed sooner. As more women entered the field and began to observe infants and young children, we've gained better knowledge of their early social-emotional capabilities. But we still have far to go. I don't mean this as an attack on men. Women also have biases and preconceptions. It's human nature. But we need to recognize how these views affect our theories, how we design our studies, and the overly broad generalizations we often reach based on limited research designs.

There are a number of developmental researchers who take that hard stance that there's a cognitive aspect to empathy and an affective part, and that the two are distinct and in some ways the cognitive aspect is more important.

Well, I've already talked about that a bit. It's just wrong-headed to pit cognition and emotion and then assuming that cognition has primacy.

Just to push back on that. Why would you say that the 3-month old is expressing empathy?

Here's why. We distinguish between cognitive empathy and affective empathy in our codes. Both can be seen as early as 3 months, at least in a few children. Maayan Davidov and I have just completed a longitudinal study in Jerusalem, where we follow 3-month-old infants at several time points through 18 months of age. Both early affective and cognitive empathy (but not self-distress) predict later prosocial behavior, affective empathy being the strongest predictor.

What you're saying challenges some of the prevailing thought in the field of empathic development, namely that the notion that the infant has personal distress and then is gradually able to regulate their own distress and thus attend to the needs of others. And you're saying that it's not that one develops from the other, it's that they're distinct to begin with.

Yes, I think there are two distinct systems. It's true that infants have to be able to regulate their own distress before they can be helpful to others. But that does not mean self-distress represents a developmental stage, i.e. that it necessarily has to precede empathic concern. There are other infants the same age who do not show self-distress. Those who show early empathy are more prosocial later (Davidov, Zahn-Waxler, Roth-Hanania, & Knafo, 2013). We are excited about the evidence for very early origins of concern for others, and how this will alter existing developmental theories.

It's hard to fight the orthodox view that all aspects of human development occur in stages and that cognition plays such a dominant role.

A totem pole outside Carolyn's house in Door County, WI.

How do you start to get alternative views into textbooks? Now I'm more fascinated with the variations among people. Why does someone become a caring person while another is less so, or is indifferent and/or actively uncaring? And why is someone concerned for others in a mature way, where there are healthy boundaries, so they don't get absorbed by another's distress? And if one is drawn in, how does this affect self-development? We've seen this with children of parents whose own emotional needs make it difficult to function as parents, e.g. some children with some depressed mothers. The child becomes overinvolved in trying to comfort the parent, to try to make him/her feel better. We've written a review article about the risk for children and adolescents (more often girls) (Zahn-Waxler & Van Hulle, 2012). We've also written more generally about typical sex differences; and how, at the extreme, they can become seen in different forms of psychopathology seen in males and females (Zahn-Waxler, Shirtcliff, and Marceau, 2008). I never set out to study differences in boys and girls. But they just kept popping up, and I decided to dig a little deeper – that curiosity thing again!

What you're describing really gets at the importance, but also the difficulty, of examining individual differences in development.

Earlier in my career, individual differences were a nuisance. What was left unexplained was an irritant. Now I think they are of utmost importance for understanding why people differ so in their levels of concern and disregard for others. From these differences you can begin to create groups of individuals who are like one another. Then you can compare these groups in a number of different ways using person-oriented approaches. Also, we can construct sophisticated, transactional models that examine both parent and child characteristics related to group differences and developmental outcomes.

When I started working in the field, socialization was viewed as a one-way street. Parents influenced children period. Richard Bell's seminal work on child effects changed all that. It was a revolutionary idea at the time. In hindsight it seems perfectly obvious that parents respond to and treat different children in the family differently – and that we need to consider how these processes interact. My first study of child-rearing practices and prosocial behavior was unidirectional in design. Then JoAnn Robinson used a person-oriented approach to examine continuity and change in concern for others from 14 to 20 months of age in our twin sample. She created groups of children who initially varied in their levels of concern for others. Some infants started high and stayed high over time, while others decreased. For children who started low, some of them increased over time while others did not. Patterns of change were predicted by child temperament, child rearing practices and family climate. The field now studies transactional processes more routinely; gene-environment interactions and analytic models have become more sophisticated. The work of Bakermans-Kranenburg and van IJzendoorn is a good example.

I noticed that even though you're officially retired, you are still publishing empirical research. Can you tell me about your recent work?

It's been 50 years since I first went to NIMH. So yes, it still remains a passion. Longitudinal studies are gifts that keep on giving. Younger colleagues and students take over the reins at later time points, bringing their own talents, interests, and expertise. And this can happen in many different ways. Several years ago, I read about the work of a talented Israeli investigator, Ariel Knafo. I invited him to take the lead on a behavioral genetics' analysis of our large longitudinal study of cognitive and affective empathy in twins. Later he introduced me to Maayan Davidov, which led to a wonderful collaboration on the origins of concern for others that I've described.

What are some articles or books that have particularly influenced your thinking?

Murphy, Lois (1937). Social behavior and child personality (sympathy research). New York, NY: Columbia University Press.

Beers, Clifford (1908). A Mind that Found Itself. New York, NY: Longmans, Green and Co.

This book influenced my decision to major in psychology as an undergrad. Beers was institutionalized with major mental illness as a young man, recovered, and went on to establish the Mental Hygiene Movement in the US. It gave me hope.

Darwin, C. (1872). The expression of the emotions in man and animals.
Incidentally, he reported observations of sympathy for a crying nursemaid in his five-or six-month-old son.

Smith, Adam (republished in 1976). The theory of moral sentiments.

Miller, A. (1981). The drama of the gifted child: The search for the true self (originally published as Prisoners of Childhood) Basic Books
This was a good introduction to more a psychodynamic approach to understanding development.

De Waal, F. (2009). The age of empathy: Nature's lessons for a kinder society.
In this and several of his other books, De Waal does a masterful job of reaching a more general audience on our interconnections with other species.

MacLean, P.D., 1985. Brain evolution relating to family, play, and the separation call. *Archives of General Psychiatry*, *42*(4), pp.405-17.

Is there a specific article or study, either by you or someone else, that you feel deserves more attention than it has received?

The early study by Radke-Yarrow, et al., on learning concern for others is still timely but no longer receives attention. It is exemplary in design and relevant to application/intervention. However, older studies fade as new people enter the field and look for fresh discoveries – as each generation strives anew, part of the past is lost. This is especially true of the work of Lois Murphy, the mother of research on empathy. You rarely see her cited. She observed social and emotional development of preschool children. She did her dissertation on their expressions of sympathy (Murphy, 1937).

I also would like to see the edited volume by Stephen Hinshaw receive more attention. It's relevant for many young psychologists going into clinical or scientific work, or both, for the reasons discussed earlier.

What about research endeavors that you did but failed? I always like to hear about these because I can't read about them because they're usually unpublished. Can you recall a specific research question or study that flopped?

I believe our basic research questions were sound. It's a comfort and relief to see that when I look back. At the time you just don't know, and I often felt uncertain. We were basically on the right track in our longitudinal studies. There has been sufficient replication across studies and reasonably consistent information about development and individual differences in concern for others.

Your recent work has focused on connecting scientific findings with real-world applications. Was this something that were always been passionate about or a more recent interest?

This was not of interest to me early in my career. By temperament and training I was drawn to basic research. We were taught, and so I believed, in science for the sake of science.

Someone else would come along and find a way to use research results that might be meaningful in the real world. There was a kind of loftiness about it all. This was during an era when comparative studies of learning were being conducted with rats, children and adults, done by people like Howard and Tracy Kendler. As graduate students we were enamored with this work. So children, like rats, were simply research subjects.

Social relevance and application became more important to me several years later. I became more attuned to the potential value of our work on child-rearing practices for parenting interventions. For example, we'd identified a subgroup of depressed mothers, who engaged in positive childrearing practices. While maternal depression predicted later behavior problems in children, this was not true for the subgroup of children who had experienced proactive parenting. I wondered if these positive childrearing processes might be taught to depressed mothers in hopes of better outcomes for their children. I also thought more about how we might better educate the public about young children's potentials for caring for others. But I did not work in the applied area.

When we moved to Madison 17 years ago, I connected with like-minded people doing translational research. I also started to practice meditation and learned of the scientific work being done here by Richie Davidson at his Center for Healthy Minds (CHM). I became an Honorary Fellow at CHM. Several years ago, he invited me to present my work at a week-long meeting at the Mind and Life Institute in upstate New York. There was a mix of scientists doing basic and applied work, and it was an eye-opening experience. It was kind of funny because we were in a very peaceful setting, in a beautiful old, large building in the country; originally a church, now with Buddhist décor. West Point was across the river and we could hear artillery in the background while we practiced our meditation. War and peace, separated only by a river.

Later I learned that Lisa Flook, Laura Pinger and Richie had developed a loving-kindness meditation curriculum for preschool children. I was intrigued, but skeptical, as to how meditation practices could be adapted for use with such young children to increase their concern for

Carolyn goofing around with Lorrie Houston, Director of Donor Engagement at the Center for Healthy Minds, celebrating the holidays in 2018.

others. But this simply reflected the narrowness of my vision. When I read the curriculum and saw it implemented, my skepticism turned to wonder at the generalized caring and kindness shown by children. It shifted my mindset and I said, "This. This is what I really want to see happen." I also work with people in the Center for Child and Family Well Being, within the School of Human Ecology (SOHE). Julie Poehlman-Tynan used compassion training with at-risk preschool children and wanted to include our measures of empathy. So, I trained coders to use our observational systems. I also created a legacy of financial support for research on depressed mothers and their children. Larissa Duncan who is with CHM and SOHE conducts research on pregnant woman and their infants; it begins with meditation training during pregnancy. A goal is to help women manage their stress and depression and to have more positive interactions with their children.

Wow, how inspiring. But it sometimes seems like people can't get involved with the translational research until they are more senior in the field. Is this something you always wanted to do but never had the opportunity?

Well, as I've said, I became more sensitive to the importance of translational research as I

continued to work with more risk populations. But I was not in a position to pursue such interests while employed by NIMH, for all of the reasons I described earlier. It certainly was not of interest to the government then.

What's it like being back at the University of Wisconsin? Does it feel like you've come full circle?

I don't know if it is as much about coming full circle, as it is about developing a sense of completion and closure. This interview has allowed me to look back, to reflect on my life and career with greater clarity and insight. So I thank you for your questions! I still work on a number of projects with younger colleagues and that will continue for some time. Last year my husband and I moved to Capitol Lakes Retirement Center in downtown Madison. It is a great place, meeting all of our physical, social, intellectual and cultural needs. We've made a lot of friends here. I do miss being around younger people. The Center for Healthy Minds is one way I can keep that up. It is located just a few blocks from where we live.

In the past we always had people living in our homes. We liked big houses and always had more space than we needed. We filled them with old pieces of furniture that my husband Morris had refinished. His father was an antiques dealer and made fine furniture, so Morris had a good eye and skilled hands for the work. We went antiquing on our first date and it remained one of our shared hobbies. When we lived out east, we housed people from other countries who came to work at NIH. When we lived here in Madison, it was a series of interns, undergrad and grad students, usually in psychology. We enjoyed many of the relationships that developed and still see some of the people. I collaborated with a few of the students, so this was another opportunity for mentoring.

And what non-academic interests are you currently pursuing? Staying busy, I presume?

I decided to retire after 35+ years and we moved to Madison. And we had purchased that second home in Door County, my place of origin. We were within walking distance of Lake Michigan but situated in forest, meadows and

A stone labyrinth outside Carolyn's house in Door County, WI.

farm country. We had 16 acres for trailblazing and sunlight areas for gardening, which was one of my passions. I laid a meditation labyrinth there and we created the vestiges of a Native American Indian Village, complete with totem poles. This was the house that gender equity bought! We went back and forth from Madison to Door County for 17 years and sold the house up north about 3 years ago. I'm by nature a homebody, a nester. This is where I feel fully at peace. When I was active professionally, I learned to enjoy the adventure of travel, meeting new people and experiencing other cultures. But I only felt fully at peace when I returned to home and family.

When we first moved to Madison, I joined different women's groups, mostly through our church, the First Unitarian Society. It was such a joy, because it wasn't part of my life during my professional career. One is a group of Women Writers, where I first dipped my toes into creative writing. It stirs my imagination and provides a means to see life through a different lens. We also have a publication at Capitol Lakes called the Center Post, where I can publish this kind of work. It consists of residents' writings and is published monthly. I joined the editorial board shortly after we moved. When they were looking for a new editor I volunteered. I enjoy this role and the opportunity to get to know more people. I'm also on a committee for successful aging here. One aspect of it concerns depression in older people which is commonplace and mostly ignored. And I must say, I still have my own moments. The tendency doesn't just magically disappear. It requires tending. But the feelings become less raw with age.

I'm in a few groups of women who like to work with fibers (knitting, weaving, spinning, quilting, etc.). It is a time-old tradition and draws us deep into history. I like to design scarves and shawls. One group is a shawl ministry, knitting comfort items for others in the church and in the community. Some items are now sent to the border for migrants and their families. There's something peaceful about knitting in a communal setting. My mother taught me to knit and also shared her love of cats. They've always been an important part of my life. I've developed quite a collection of cat objects over the years and they were recently on display at Capitol Lakes.

A current highlight is that we just celebrated our Golden Wedding Anniversary. We had a big party and had a chance to visit so many friends and family from different parts and pieces of our lives. My mother had never liked my boyfriends. But after she met my husband Morris she would say, "he's a real peach." And that he is. I feel fortunate to have married one of the most kind, compassionate human beings I know. He helped me stay steady through difficult times. I cannot imagine having the career I've had without his support. We have one child, Rebecca, who we adopted from Korea in the early 70's. She was 4.5 months old at the time. We picked her up at Kennedy airport late in the evening and she came

off the plane all smiles. She bounced around on our laps, blowing bubbles and making happy little sounds! She and her husband moved to Madison from out east several years ago. We felt blessed to have them here. Enthusiasm is still a big part of her personality.

This seems like a good place to stop!

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A Dynamic Systems Perspective of Emotion in the Parent-Adolescent Relationship

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I take the view that emotions are inherently social, and that the family is a crucial proximal context for emotional development. My research is informed by the dynamic systems (DS) perspective (Granic, 2005; Lewis, 2000). The DS perspective is metatheoretical in that it can be applied to any domain of inquiry. Indeed, it has roots in the disciplines of mathematics and physics as a set of formal equations to predict nonlinear changes (e.g., von Bertalanffy, 1969). In applying these ideas to emotional development, emotion researchers use generalizable DS principles that describe system dynamics and change over time to investigate emotions at multiple levels of analysis.

In my own work, I conceptualize the parent-child dyad as an emotion system, in which parents' and children's emotions are connected in time. Children internalize the ability to regulate emotions through the real-time dynamics of interactions with primary caregivers. How parents and children together manage the relative emotional upheaval during times of great developmental change (e.g., adolescence) can play a significant role in psychosocial adjustment later in development. My research on interpersonal emotion dynamics in parent-child dyads has recently led to a model of parent-adolescent dyads as temporal interpersonal emotion systems (Lougheed, 2019).

This article will describe my work using a DS perspective on emotion in the parent-adolescent relationship. First, I describe the DS approach I take to my research. Next, I discuss some of my research to date on emotion dynamics in parent-adolescent dyads. Finally, I describe my conceptual model of parent-adolescent dyads as temporal interpersonal emotion systems (TIES; Butler, 2011; Lougheed, 2019) and how it can inform future research.

A Dynamic Systems Approach to Interpersonal Emotion Dynamics

DS approaches are well-suited to the tasks of describing stability and change; nonlinear developmental processes; and complex system dynamics (Granic, 2005). The methods associated with the DS approach also offer a clear mapping between theory-based research questions and statistical analysis. The DS perspective emphasizes dynamic associations among multiple system components, with the higher-order structure of the system emerging from temporal associations among these lower-order components (Lewis, 2000). The principle of self-organization emphasizes the interconnection of multiple time scales, as higher-order structure of the system in turn constrains the dynamics of the lower-order system elements (Lewis, 2000). The result is a self-perpetuating system that evolves over time, perhaps becoming more entrenched in certain patterns and tendencies, or perhaps exhibiting structural reorganization with the introduction of novelty into the system dynamics (i.e., developmental change and major life events).

In my work, I have conceptualized parent-adolescent dyads as systems made of up two individuals whose emotion systems (i.e., within-person fluctuations in physiological arousal, experience, and behavioral expressions; Hollenstein & Lanteigne, 2014) dynamically interact with each other's emotion systems. In line with others (Butler, 2011; Campos, Walle, Dahl, & Main, 2011), I conceptualize emotion regulation as a social process that unfolds in real time. Thus, I measure emotions in parent-adolescent interactions dynamically via multiple time-synchronized measures (e.g., physiological arousal, expressed emotions, self-reported emotional experiences). The overarching aim of my research program is to examine how emotion dynamics between parents and adolescents are

associated with mental health symptoms in the family.

Emotion Dynamics in Parent-Adolescent Dyads

The focus of much of my research to date has been on interpersonal emotion dynamics between parents and children. In one branch of my research, I examined the interpersonal emotion dynamics of one of the most emotionally-intense parent-child relationships: mother-daughter dyads during adolescence. Adolescents gain autonomy within the family and age-typical changes to emotion dynamics (greater emotional intensity and negativity) play out in close relationships (Hollenstein & Lougheed, 2013; Rosenblum & Lewis, 2003). Adolescents—girls especially—also experience an increased likelihood of psychosocial adjustment difficulties (Galambos, Leadbeater, & Barker, 2004).

In two projects, my colleagues and I examined the links between mother-daughter emotion dynamics and psychosocial adjustment. First, we drew on social baseline theory (Beckes & Coan, 2011) to examine the interpersonal dynamics of sympathetic nervous system activity (an indicator of emotional arousal). According to social baseline theory, humans are a fundamentally social species and evolved to be in close proximity to other humans. Thus, the *baseline* of human functioning is social, rather than individual, and our physical closeness to relationship partners—in addition to our perceptions of relationship closeness—will lead to more efficient emotion regulation. We found that in the context of adolescent social stress, high relationship quality had the same buffering effect as physical contact (Lougheed, Koval, & Hollenstein, 2016). This study was the first to demonstrate that the tenets of social baseline theory play out in real-time dynamics. We also found that, in the context of positive mother-daughter interactions, daughters' perceptions of relationship quality (and not mothers' perceptions) was associated with the extent to which maternal emotional arousal was linked in time to daughters' arousal (Lougheed & Hollenstein, 2018). In other words, mothers were more "in tune" with their daughters' emotional responses if their daughters perceived a high degree of warmth and trust in the relationship.

Assistant Professor Jessica Lougheed

Second, we have also examined individual differences in mothers' and daughters' ability to adjust to changing emotional circumstances. One aspect of adaptive emotion regulation involves adjusting emotional responses to situational demands (Hollenstein, 2015). I developed a novel lab-based emotion elicitation task, the Emotional Rollercoaster task (Lougheed & Hollenstein, 2016), to examine how mothers and daughters adjusted to changing emotional circumstances. As expected, emotional rigidity (i.e., dyads did not adjust emotions according to changing contexts) was associated with lower relationship quality and higher maternal internalizing symptoms, whereas moderate levels of flexibility were associated with higher relationship quality and lower maternal internalizing symptoms.

In another branch of my research, I have focused on examining the temporal dynamics of parental responses to children's and adolescents' emotion expressions. Theoretical perspectives of emotion socialization emphasize that parental responses to their children's emotions contribute to shaping youths' tendencies to display and regulate emotions (Eisenberg, Cumberland, & Spinrad, 1998). Youth learn to regulate emotions through these repeated socialization experiences

in the family, and this process predicts youths' psychosocial adjustment (Morris, Silk, Steinberg, Myers, & Robinson, 2007). To date, one of the most common approaches to examine parental socialization of youths' emotion has been to use parental-report questionnaires of their tendencies to respond to their children's emotion expressions (e.g., Fabes, Leonard, Kupanoff, & Martin, 2001). Although this method has resulted in a much-needed body of work documenting parental tendencies to respond to a variety of specific emotions youth might express, it has a few limitations. One limitation is that it obscures the temporal process by which socialization occurs, which—I believe—is an important feature of the process.

I have explored the idea that the *timing* of parental responses to youths' emotions is important by leveraging a statistical approach common in epidemiology: survival analysis. Survival analysis estimates the timing of event occurrences and can be used to examine how time-varying factors, such as children's emotion expressions, influence the timing of parental supportive responses. Using this approach, I have examined how the timing of parental responses to youths' negative emotion expressions varies by youths' psychosocial adjustment. For example, in one study (Lougheed, Hollenstein, Lichtwarck-Aschoff, & Granic, 2015), I found that parents of children with externalizing symptoms did not differ from parents of typically-developing children in terms of the total amount (i.e., total duration and frequency) of supportive behaviors they expressed to their children during a conflictual discussion. However, the results of our survival analysis models—which examine behavioral timing—showed that parents of children with externalizing problems were much less likely than parents of typically-developing children to show supportive regulation *in the moments* that their children are expressing negative emotions. Thus, the effective use of parental supportiveness may depend less on its general use, and more on its contingent use in response to specific emotional expressions made by children. We have also used this approach to examine similar processes in parent-adolescent dyads (Lougheed, Craig, et al., 2016; Lougheed, Hollenstein, & Lewis, 2016), and more recently, I have expanded on this topic with a tutorial for

developmental and emotion researchers to use this analytic technique with data that come from video-recorded behavioral observations (Lougheed, Benson, Ram, & Cole, 2019).

Parent-Adolescent Dyads as Temporal Interpersonal Emotion Systems

My projects to date have led me to consider the role that multiple time scales play in the interpersonal regulation of emotion in the parent-adolescent relationship. My previous research has explored the various ways that parents' and adolescents' emotions are connected in time. Building on these findings, I have put forward a conceptual framework of parent-adolescent dyads as temporal interpersonal emotion systems (TIES; Lougheed, 2019). This framework is inspired by Butler's (2011) assertion that close relationship partners are TIES, and DS approaches which emphasize the interplay of multiple time scales in emotional development (Hollenstein, Lichtwarck-Aschoff, & Potworowski, 2013; Lewis, 2000). As such, I emphasize the need to consider the unique elements that individuals bring to the parent-adolescent dyadic system and highlight the complexity of dynamics within TIES.

Multiple time scales (e.g., momentary dynamics in real time, longer-emerging patterns over developmental time) are focal in my conceptualization of parent-adolescent dyads as TIES. Figure 1 provides a conceptual representation of a parent-adolescent TIES. Dyads consist of two individuals whose own psychosocial adjustment set the foundation of the relationship (e.g., genetic heritability; see Path A in Figure 1). Each individual has their own self-regulating emotion system at the real-time scale, comprised of physiological arousal, emotional experiences, and expressions (represented as "emotion dynamics" in Figure 1). In TIES, each individual's emotion system is interconnected to the other's (Path B in Figure 1)—parents' and adolescents' emotions during interactions are dynamically interconnected (e.g., Amole, Cyranowski, Wright, & Swartz, 2017; Lougheed & Hollenstein, 2018). To Butler's (2011) conceptualization of TIES I add the layer of multiple time scales. Specifically, real-time dynamics can coalesce into longer-term developmental patterns (e.g., psychosocial

Figure 1. The parent-adolescent dyad as a temporal interpersonal emotion system. Figure adapted from Lougheed, 2019.

adjustment, such as internalizing symptoms and relationship quality) through repetition in during real-time interpersonal interactions (Granic, 2005). In other words, moment-to-moment interactions between parents and adolescents simultaneously forge deeper paths of psychosocial adjustment at the developmental time scale, while simultaneously both parents' and adolescents' psychosocial adjustment constrain how emotions are regulated moment-to-moment (Paths C1 and C2 in Figure 1).

To illustrate, consider a mother and her daughter. By the time the daughter has reached adolescence, these two individuals have a shared history of interactions that has forged recurring patterns of emotions during day-to-day interactions (B path in Figure 1). These interactions have been characterized by the mother's dismissiveness of her daughter's negative emotional experiences—the mother tends to respond to her daughter's expressions of sadness by invalidating them. Consequently, the daughter has learned over time to avoid expressing sadness around her mother and to

suppress those feelings when they arise, leading to difficulties regulating negative emotions. The daughter started to manifest some depressive symptoms around the onset of adolescence (bidirectional links between adolescent emotion dynamics and psychosocial adjustment in Figure 1). The daughter's symptoms include increased irritability, which are related to greater conflict during her interactions with her mother. In this manner, the daughter's depressive symptoms constrain the interpersonal emotion dynamics that arise during interactions with her mother—the interactions become more intensely negative, which escalates the mother's dismissiveness of her daughter's emotions. This becomes a cycle whereby the emotion dynamics within this relationship reinforce the daughter's depressive symptoms, which in turn escalate the negativity of the mother-daughter interactions (C paths in Figure 1). The mother-daughter dyad in this way is a system whereby each individuals' psychosocial adjustment and tendencies constrain the unfolding of emotion dynamics moment-to-

moment, which in turn feedback into the higher-order structure of adjustment.

Future Directions

Conceptualizing parent-adolescent dyads as TIES provides a road map for research on parent-adolescent emotion dynamics. It is unlikely that any single study in the near future will comprehensively and simultaneously examine all three paths of the model presented in Figure 1. However, this theoretical framework can help researchers more carefully consider the role that timing might play in their study designs and how timescales map onto developmental processes in interpersonal contexts.

There could be numerous direct and indirect associations among the three paths that inform future research questions. For example, in TIES, do partners' psychosocial adjustment contribute equally to emotion dynamics during interactions, or do either parents' or adolescents' adjustment tend to drive dynamics more than the other? To what extent are there interdyad differences in the interpersonal emotion dynamics observed in TIES, and to what extent are these interdyad differences associated with psychosocial adjustment? Are any of the paths more susceptible to reorganization in response to major life events or developmental transitions than others? The research design best-suited for examining parent-adolescent TIES are multiple burst designs (Nesselroade, 1991; Ram & Diehl, 2015), in which intensive observations of short time scale dynamics (e.g., video recorded observations of behaviors that are then microanalytically coded) are repeated longitudinally over longer time scales such as months or years. Such designs enable the analysis of how processes at long time scales emerge from processes at short time scales, and in turn, how momentary dynamics are constrained by longer-term development.

An example of such a design in the field of emotional development is a study by Lichtwarck and colleagues of parent-child dynamics in dyads who were receiving treatment for children's externalizing problems (Lichtwarck-Aschoff, Hasselman, Cox, Pepler, & Granic, 2012). Moment-to-moment parent-child dynamics during conflict discussions were examined six times during a 12-week family intervention. The results of DS-based analyses indicated that families whose children showed improvements in externalizing symptoms had parent-child dynamics characterized by a period of destabilization and greater variability over the course of treatment. This destabilization is interpreted as the dyadic system becoming more flexible and open to external inputs (such as the objectives of the intervention) rather than remaining stuck in rigid, problematic interaction dynamics. Intervention studies such as these can show how changes in psychosocial adjustment track with changes in the moment-to-moment dynamics of the dyadic system; that as longer-standing structures such as externalizing symptoms change, so too do moment-to-moment interaction dynamics, and changes in patterns of moment-to-moment dynamics may facilitate growth and development in longer-standing structures.

Taken together, emotional development is nested within family relationships and multiple time scales. Conceptualizing parent-adolescent dyads as TIES will help us to better understand the complex processes by which emotion dynamics are implicated in the evolving parent-adolescent relationship.

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Feature article: Anger

Anger and Politics

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Introduction

I have been asked to write about anger and politics. It would seem a good time to do so. In the United States today, in the time of President Trump, the word "anger" is tossed around a lot. People are angry, Trump is an angry man, we are living in angry times. A *New York Times* headline reads: "In a Divided Era, One Thing Seems to Unite: Political Anger." (Peters, 2018) On the one hand, for political scientists who study emotions, these references to anger might be seen as grist for the mill. On the other hand, the various, diffuse, and ambiguous uses of "anger" make the word nearly meaningless. This problem is to be expected. Almost all emotion researchers agree that anger is one of a handful of basic emotions found across cultures. In many negative and intense situations, it's natural that the word anger is commonplace.

The question here is how the word "anger" should be used for students of politics. Can "anger" be defined and conceptualized in such a way to make it useful for understanding variation in political actions and outcomes? How should we separate anger from other intense and negative emotions?

This brief piece on a big subject will proceed along the following lines. I will first outline a framework to break down and define emotions in a way accessible to most political scientists. I will then provide some examples of how political actors use emotions as a resource. With reference to the framework and examples, I will address why anger is central to political conflict and then identify important research avenues. I will conclude with a comment about anger in current US politics.

Defining Emotions for Political Scientists

Until very recently, political scientists have neglected the role of emotions. Most would be unfamiliar with the psychological terminology associated with emotions. Political scientists generally discuss individual political actions in terms of the interaction of preferences, information collection, and belief formation. In terms of decision theory, most political scientists are more familiar with rational choice theory than psychological approaches. Given the nature of this audience, I have borrowed a framework from the political philosopher Jon Elster and used that framework to illustrate the key elements of emotion in juxtaposition with a rational choice cycle.[2]

Figure 1 illustrates a rational action model. Starting on the right side of Figure 1, individuals are seen as holding a short list of stable and ordered preferences or desires. Given these preferences, individuals then collect information about how best to attain their goals. They form beliefs about the most effective means and strategies to gain what they want. An action then results as a combination of desires and beliefs.

Figure 2 incorporates Figure 1 but in this cycle belief also leads to emotion. Following many socially oriented theorists, emotion can be conceptualized as "thought that becomes embodied because of the intensity with which it is laced with personal self-relevancy." (Franks and Gecas 1992: 8). As Ortony et al. write: "Our claims about the structure of individual emotions are always along the lines that *if* an individual conceptualizes a situation in a certain kind of way, *then* the potential for a particular type of emotion exists." (Ortony et al.: 2) As emotion researchers will note, this treatment follows the line of appraisal theory of emotion.[3] Stated another way, beliefs are the cognitive antecedents of emotion. For example, when an individual comes to believe that the present situation is dangerous, the emotion of fear will arise. With

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[2] See in particular Petersen 2001; Petersen, with Zukerman 2009; Much of this section is taken from Chapter 2 of Petersen 2011.

[3] For a review of appraisal theory see Lerner et al. 2015.

anger, an individual believes that an individual or group has committed a blameworthy action against one's self or group.

Anger will be most certain and most intense when the cognitive antecedents that generate the emotion are very clear. In the case of anger, the event creates a belief of a specific, easily recognized perpetrator committing intentional negative actions against a distinct target. There should be no ambiguity about the identity or purpose of the perpetrator. There must be an identified causal agent who can become a clear target for the urge to punish.

In Figure 2, three general effects of emotion may follow, marked as A, B, and C effects. First, and most fundamentally, emotions are mechanisms that heighten the saliency of a particular concern (A effect). This effect is closely related to emotion theorists' idea of action tendency. The emotion acts as a "switch" among a set of basic desires. Individuals may value safety, money, vengeance and other goals, but emotion compels the individual to act on one of these desires above all others. Second, once in place emotions can produce a feedback effect on information collection (B effect). Emotions lead to seeking of emotion-congruent information. Third, emotions can directly influence belief formation (C effect) (Frijda et al. 2000). Emotions can be seen as "internal evidence" and beliefs will be changed to conform to this evidence. Even with accurate and undistorted information, emotion can affect belief formation. The same individual with the same information may develop one belief under the sway of one emotion and a different belief under the influence of a different emotion.

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While emotions are a complex phenomenon that go beyond this simple framework, I developed it in hope of its ability to readily plug into some of the major questions in political science including preference formation, framing and processing of information, and the durability of attitudes and beliefs.

While this framework can address emotions in general terms, it also can be used to identify and specify the components of the specific emotion of anger. As mentioned above, anger forms from the belief that an individual or group has committed an offensive action against one's self or group. Its A effects heighten desire for punishment and vengeance against a specific actor. Under the influence of anger, individuals become "intuitive prosecutors" specifying perpetrators and seeking vengeance (Goldberg et


Figure 1: Action Cycle with No Reference to Emotion

Figure 2: Action Cycle Illustrating Three Possible Effects of Emotion

al. 1999). Anger's B effects distort information in predictable ways. The angry person lowers the threshold for attributing harmful intent; the angry individual blames humans, not the situation (Keltner et al. 1993). Anger tends to produce stereotyping (Bodenhausen et al. 1994). Anger's C effects shape the way individuals form beliefs. Under the influence of anger, individuals lower risk estimates and are more willing to engage in risky behavior.[4] In sum, regarding the key sub-phenomena of anger in relation to political violence, anger heightens desire for punishment against a specific actor, creates a downgrading of risk, increases prejudice and blame, as well as selective memory.[5]

Politics and Anger

At a fundamental level, politics is about means and ends. Political actors consider what means they have to gain and maintain power. Following this line, how would an emotion like anger fit into this means-ends view of politics? Here are three examples involving strategies of provocation.

1. Anger as a means to provoke an opponent into retaliation. How can a provocateur create anger in an opponent? The political actor tries to shape the beliefs of the opponent to fit an anger-inducing narrative. To be most effective, the opponent should perceive a clear perpetrator, perceive themselves as clear victims, and see the act as unjustifiable. If the intensity of anger is high enough, the opponent will be unable to restrain group members from anger's action tendency (A effect) to seek vengeance. In this case, inducing anger in a target is a form of coercion. Under the sway of anger, an opponent can be compelled toward self-destructive forms of retaliation.[6] As mentioned above, under the sway of anger, individuals lower risk estimates (C effect). Because an angry opponent will downgrade the costs and risks of retaliation, they can be easily baited into over-reaction.

Anger-based provocations are a common strategy. Political actors seem to have intuitions about how to employ such strategies even if they have not thought through them in a systematic way. A slogan written on a giant draping mural in Tehran provides a vivid example. The caption reads, "America be angry and let that anger destroy you." (Christia 2007) If the strategy aims for an immediate response, the provocation will have to match the anger narrative more closely. Along these lines, many commentators see Ariel Sharon's visit to The Temple Mount in 2000, despite his claims to the contrary, as a famous example of an effective provocation. As reported in *The Guardian*:

> Surrounded by hundreds of Israeli riot police, Mr. Sharon and a handful of Likud politicians marched up to the Haram al-Sharif, the site of the gold Dome of the Rock that is the third holiest shrine in Islam. He came down 45 minutes later, leaving a trail of fury. Young Palestinians heaved chairs, stones, rubbish bins, and whatever missiles came to hand at the Israeli forces. Riot police retaliated with tear gas and rubber bullets, shooting one protester in the face. The symbolism of the visit to the Haram by Mr. Sharon - reviled for his role in the 1982 massacre of Palestinians in a refugee camp in Lebanon - and its timing was unmistakable. "This is a dangerous process conducted by Sharon against Islamic sacred places," Yasser Arafat told Palestinian television. Mr. Sharon's second motive was less obvious: to steal the limelight from the former prime minister, Binyamin Netanyahu, who returned from the US yesterday and could become a challenger for the Likud party leadership after Israel's attorney general decided not to prosecute him for corruption. But that ambition was overshadowed by the

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[4] See Lerner and Keltner 2001; Gallagher and Clore 1985; Mano, 1994; Lerner et al. 2003.
[5] See Newhagen 1998. Newhagen found that images producing anger were remembered better than those inducing fear, which in turn were remembered better than those creating disgust.

[6] One of the world's most famous incidents of "baiting" an opponent into self-destructive retaliation must be Zidane's head-butting response to taunting during a World Cup final watched by one billion people.

potential for serious violence at Haram al-Sharif, the point where history, religion and national aspiration converge. Palestinian protesters followed Mr. Sharon down the mountain, chanting "murderer" and "we will redeem the Haram with blood and fire." (*The Guardian,* 2000)

Ariel Sharon's provocation was successful because of the predictability of Palestinian perceptions. For many Palestinians the arch enemy of the Palestinian people was going purposely to a sacred Islamic site with a clear intention to insult. In the general terms of the anger narrative, an identifiable agent was intentionally committing a negative act against a specific target. As Sharon undoubtedly knew, anger would result. Under the influence of this emotion, violence could be expected.

2. Anger as a means of creating a spiral of violence. Anger is also a tool for creating spiraling cycles of violence that can transform an entire conflict. In this case, the actor tries to imbue the opponent with a revenge-inducing anger. When that opponent strikes out, perhaps with indiscriminate violence, one's own side responds with anger and retaliation. The cycle turns. Zarqawi's bombing of the golden dome in Samarra in February 2006 provides a prime example. Wishing to ignite a sectarian war, Zarqawi chose a symbol central to Shia identity. No one died in the bombing, but killing in this case was not central to the creation of anger. The action produced anger by the clarity of the cognitive antecedents underlying anger: A Sunni perpetrator group destroyed a sacred Shia site in an act of total disrespect and desecration. The quotations given to reporters after the bombing are textbook responses to an anger–based strategy:

"The war could really be on now," says Abu Hassan, a Shiite street peddler who declined to give his full name. "This is something greater and more symbolic than attacks on people. This is a strike at who we are." (Murphy 2006)

"If I could find the people who did this, I would cut him to pieces," said Abdel Jaleel al-Sudani, a 50-year-old employee of the Health Ministry, who said he had marched in a demonstration earlier. "I would rather hear of the death of a friend, than to hear this news." (Wong 2006)

Within hours of the attack, thousands of Shiites took to the streets in protest, many of them brandishing arms. Over twenty Sunni mosques were burned in retaliation.[7]

3. Anger as a means of drawing in a third party

This tactic has been employed in a wide variety of situations. Some leaders of the US civil rights movement believed that provoking violence from opponents might create anger in third parties who would then be motivated to act. As Doug MacAdam and Ron Aminzade have written:

(t)here is the baiting of authorities into acts of official violence which tends, unless the repression is extreme, to reinforce group solidarity and the shared resolve to "fight again another day." These exercises in strategic provocation may have an additional emotional payoff for the movement. Violence by authorities that is widely perceived to be illegitimate may, as in the case of the U.S. Civil Rights Movement, anger an otherwise disinterested news media and general public, who, in turn, respond with the kind of pressure that proves decisive in producing important movement gains. (Aminzade and McAdam 2001: 44)

Political entrepreneurs use anger to ignite a disproportionate retaliation that serves to clarify, both to one's own group and to outsiders, who is the perpetrator and who is the victim. Disproportionate reactions reveal the "true face" of the opponent.

Why Anger is an Effective Political Resource

Why is the creation and enflaming of anger a commonly used and effective political resource? There is a need for more study on this question,

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[7] Murphy put the number at 29 while Wong provided a number of 25 mosques "burned, taken over or attacked with a variety of weapons."

but several answers come to mind. First, the cognitive antecedents of the emotion are not that complex— "a perpetrator committed a bad action against us." The cognitive antecedents of other emotions are more complicated. For instance, the emotion of resentment requires perception of status hierarchy and reversals within that status hierarchy; the basis of fear can be multiple and diffuse; anxiety is more like a mood than an emotion, with murky origins.

Moreover, for millennia, humans have been creating systems of justice with the identification of perpetrators, victims, and specific crimes, and corresponding punishments. Anger transforms individuals into "intuitive prosecutors." In many societies individuals might not need a big push to take on that role because history and culture have prepared them for it. Today's popular culture has only reinforced the schema. The perpetrator-victim-anger-justifiable revenge plot is perhaps the most common storyline of Hollywood movies.

Additionally, the B and C effects listed above seem especially powerful in the case of anger. When in the grip of revenge-seeking, individuals do not easily process new information, especially evidence favorable to the identified perpetrator or material that provides complicating context.

Relatedly, the counterstrategies to anger-producing strategies are not often effective. To build from an example above, Iraqi leaders recognized the anger-based strategies of Zarqawi. They appealed to their followers to not give in to their anger. A prominent disciple of Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani told worshippers that "Submitting to one's passion and confusion will bring us to domestic sedition and eventually lead us to failure. We must go forward, be patient, and carry on building the new Iraq." (Daragahi 2005) Likewise, political leaders such as Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jaafari called for a "rational, political" struggle. (Associated Press 2005) Leaders also constantly tried to frame the conflict in terms of "criminal terrorists" versus "Iraqis" in their own effort to create or solidify identities and thus prevent polarization and civil war. These appeals had limited effectiveness. To tell others "don't be angry" is not usually helpful.

Future Directions in the Study of Anger and Politics

1. The ability of political actors to create clear cognitive antecedents. The existence and level of anger depends on the clarity of the appraisal of the situation and how well it identifies a perpetrator, motive, and victim. On this issue, I would mention some ongoing research on anger by Aidan Milliff, a dissertation student in the Political Science Department at MIT. Milliff conducted in-depth interviews of 32 family members of homicide victims in Chicago. Were they angry? Did they seek vengeance? Milliff summarizes his findings: "Evidence suggests that cognitive clarity about the identity of the perpetrator, the perpetrator's motive and the nature of the violence as unjust are necessary for an individual to become angry at the perpetrator." All three elements were necessary for anger to take hold. Even when the perpetrator was known, the victim's family member was less likely to become angry if they could not piece together a story that included an understanding of motive. (Milliff, unpublished manuscript)

On a wider scale, this finding suggests that political actors who wish to inculcate anger as part of a strategy of provocation need to provide a convincing narrative that includes all of the cognitive antecedents of the emotion. Which political actors can create and instill such narratives? Under which conditions can they do so? In two of the cases above, unsurprisingly, political actors involved sacred places as part of the provocation. Symbol-rich environments would seem to lend themselves to strategies of provocation and anger. When whole populations are emotionally invested in group sites and symbols it is not difficult to enhance and enflame anger through specific attacks. How can such strategies be blunted? If potential provocateurs do not have such symbols as resources will they be unable to use anger as a resource?

2. Separating anger from other emotions. Some studies have found that anger compels individuals to participate in positive types of political behaviors rather than seeking punishment. It is probably true that many intense negative emotions compel people to act in some way, but we need to establish which emotions are really at work. I would argue that we do possess the knowledge and ability to both operationalize specific emotions as variables and to study the sub-mechanisms (the A, B, and C effects) relating

to information collection and belief formation that define those emotions. We need to build on the insights coming out of the appraisal tendency approaches to emotion rather than lumping together distinct emotions only similar in valence and intensity.

3. Anger is about actions, not the character of the actors. In this concluding issue, I will pick up on both the last point and the introduction's remarks on the current state of US politics.

Mentioned just above, political scientists studying emotion should try to distinguish specific emotions at work as much as possible. One key distinction is whether the emotion is generated by appraisals and beliefs about actions, events, or situations, or by appraisals of inherent qualities. This distinction helps separate anger from contempt. Anger, to repeat, is defined by cognition that an individual or group has committed a bad action against one's self or group; the action tendency is toward punishing that individual or group. Contempt, on the other hand, is not about actions or a specific situation. Contempt follows from cognition that a group or object is inherently inferior or defective; the action tendency (A effect) is toward avoidance.

The B and C effects of contempt have clear political ramifications. Attention funneling prevents the consideration of any positive actions of the targeted group. The fundamental attribution error is prominent. Groups that are the object of contempt become a vehicle for scapegoating. Critically, once one sees an actor as inherently worthless, a change in the situation is unlikely to alter that belief. Contempt does not systematically decay.

For those of us in the United States, we must ask ourselves whether we are living in a time of anger or contempt. Contempt is arguably worse. Contempt can fuel processes of isolation. The action tendency of contempt is avoidance. As noted, in the age of Trump, friends and even family members avoid each other, or at least avoid discussion of politics, so as not to even feel the unpleasant emotion of contempt when views become so polarized. Liberals will not wish to move to the south, conservatives to the northeast. The politics of contempt can create personal and even geographic bubbles. Contempt is usually mutual. Paul Krugman wrote an op-ed before the election about Republican leaders who supported Trump. The title of the piece was "Worthy of Our Contempt." (Krugman 2016) Undoubtedly many more Democrats, and others, see Republicans as more worthy of contempt now than before the election.

One key issue to study is the relationship between anger and contempt. Clearly, if an actor's serial actions are repeatedly seen as negative then anger will transform into contempt. Judgments about action will become judgments about character. Americans are often able to separate actions and character. On the recent passing of John McCain, it was common to hear Democrats say that he was a good man although they disagreed with many of his policies. A world in which citizens can separate their emotions about actions from emotions about character might be a more productive political world, one where compromise is more possible. Unfortunately, it would seem that the current trend in emotion-based politics is to try to transform anger into contempt. This effort underlies the politics of polarization. It is a worthy object of further study.

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Feature article: Anger

Anger is a Positive Emotion – At Least for Those who Show it

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Abstract

In this article, I am discussing the notion that anger can be considered a positive emotion for those who feel it and for society at large. Anger has the ability to motivate people to act against injustice and norm violations in general and it provides the actor with (physical) strength, but also with an optimistic tendency to take risks. However, as a caveat it should be noted that even though anger does this for both men and women, women who show anger are liked less.

One in five (22%) US Americans reported recently having "experienced anger a lot yesterday" (Gallup World Poll, 2019). That surely is a bad thing? Webster's *Thesaurus*' list of synonyms for anger includes animosity, antagonism, embitterment, enmity, hostility, malevolence, and virulence, all of which refer to strife and destruction (Merriam Webster, 2019). Berkowitz and Harmon-Jones (2004) define anger as: "a syndrome of relatively specific feelings, cognitions, and physiological reactions linked associatively with an urge to injure some target" (p. 108). It is in this sense that Gallup adds anger to its Negative Experience Index, together with such states as worry and stress. Interestingly, the question is related to feeling angry – that is, Gallup considers feeling angry a negative experience. But is it? In Gallup's view feeling anger is negative because it signals that there are things out there that cause this feeling – negative things in fact. But is reacting with anger to a negative event necessarily a bad thing? And for whom?

When addressing this question, it is important to distinguish anger from hostility and aggression with which it is frequently confused in common parlance. Hostility is a personality trait characterized by negative beliefs about and attitudes toward others, including cynicism and mistrust (cf. Miller, Smith, Turner, Guijarro, & Hallet, 1996). Aggression, in turn, refers to behavior that is intended to cause harm or pain and is often elicited by fear or dominance struggles (e.g., Berkowitz, 1993). Both hostility and aggression contribute to the negative reputation of anger but they are not what I will be talking about.

I am also not talking about the pleasantness of the emotion. Rather, the goal of the present article is to discuss the idea that anger is a positive emotion – at least for those who experience the right form of anger. That is, even though anger is traditional considered a negative emotion – in view of its effect on the addressee who certainly might feel so, it can be positive for the emoter, at least in its "right" form. That there is a right form of anger – one that a person actually should show at appropriate times, was first noted by Aristotle: "… since those who do not get angry at things at which it is right to be angry are considered foolish, and so are those who do not get angry in the right manner, at the right time, and with the right people. It is thought that they do not feel or resent an injury, and that if a man is never angry he will not stand up for himself; and it is considered servile to put up with an insult to oneself or suffer one's friends to be insulted." (Aristotle, trans. Rackham 1996: p. 101).

From this perspective, anger is a visible sign that a person will take needed action to thwart insult to themselves or close others. This does not deny that anger can indeed, and frequently does, wreak interpersonal havoc and destruction. In what follows, I will discuss the two aspects mentioned by Aristotle - that anger is a force that leads to needed action and one that signals that a person is able to perform such actions.

Anger as a Sign that Needed Action will be Taken

Aristotle points to anger as a sign that a person will stand up for themselves and for others – and that the person will do so in order to not put up with insults to themselves or close others. Research in the domain of person perception and on moral anger addresses these two notions.

Anger as a sign of standing up for oneself. Do others perceive an angry expresser as someone standing up for themselves? There are a number of psychological constructs that relate to this notion, such as self-esteem, dominance and perceived competence. Overall, individuals who show anger are perceived as more competent (e.g., Tiedens, 2001), more self-confident (e.g., Hareli & Hess, 2010), and dominant (Hess, Blairy, & Kleck, 2000; Knutson, 1996).

However, it should be noted that these effects may not be the same for women. Thus, anger expressions when shown by men tend to be more consistently attributed to the event that caused the expression, whereas the same expression shown by a woman will tend to be more strongly attributed to her (angry) character (Brescoll & Uhlmann, 2008). Even though this tendency to attribute women's expressions to character is not specific to anger (Barrett & Bliss-Moreau, 2009; Shields, 2002), it creates specific problems for women who show anger. In addition, even when showing anger, women are often accorded less status (Brescoll & Uhlmann, 2008) and dominance (Hess et al., 2000) than men showing the same emotion. Lewis (2000) found that men portrayed as managers were rated as more competent when they reacted with anger to negative news, but women who did so were rated as less competent – in fact, they only were rated competent when they showed neutrality. Further, women are often rated as less likable than are men expressing the same emotion. Fischer (2002) has called this effect the 'bitch' factor.

Anger and motivated action. Yet, more importantly, does anger motivate action in the service of overcoming obstacles? This notion is inherent in appraisal theories of emotion (e.g., Frijda, 1986; Scherer, 1987).

According to appraisal theories of emotion (e.g., Frijda, 1986; Scherer, 1987), emotions are elicited and differentiated through a series of appraisals of (internal or external) stimulus events based on the perceived nature of the event. A typical anger event can be characterized by a goal obstruction, blamed on someone else, which is perceived as unjust, combined with strong coping potential resulting in a desire to act to remove the goal obstruction (Berkowitz & Harmon-Jones, 2004; Frijda, Kuipers, & ter Shure, 1989). In this manner, anger mobilizes

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energy and focuses attention on redressing the appraised wrong (Roseman, Wiest, & Swartz, 1994). Similarly, Averill (1982) argues that certain levels of anger can be conceptualized as forms of problem-solving, which are generally more beneficial than harmful.

However, it is important to note that the term "anger" really describes a "family" of emotions, which all share core appraisals with anger, but also differ in details (Frijda et al., 1989). Along with anger, Frijda et al. (1989) studied rage, aversion and annoyance, which also overlap to some degree with disgust and contempt as all three have implications for moral judgment (Rozin, Lowery, Imada, & Haidt, 1999). Also, not all anger episodes can be described as "righteous" anger or invoked by a clear injustice. Yet, even the instances of "unreasonable" anger studied by Parkinson (1999) contain elements of goal obstruction, which seems the most common theme for all anger events.

That anger is related to approach – needed to solve the problem that caused the anger - is supported by research on left versus right hemispheric asymmetries related to emotional

states. Early research in this domain led to the conclusion that the left frontal cortical region is involved in the experience of positive affect, whereas the right frontal cortical region is involved in the experience of negative affect (see Harmon-Jones, Gable, & Peterson, 2009). Yet, more recent research supports the notion that left hemispheric activation is related to approach motivation and right hemispheric activation to withdrawal (Harmon-Jones et al., 2009). Carver and Harmon-Jones (2009) reviewed literature showing that anger is also associated with left frontal activation. This is the case both for trait (Harmon-Jones & Allen, 1998) and state anger (Harmon-Jones & Sigelman, 2001). In the latter study only individuals who were insulted showed greater relative left frontal activity and this activity was correlated with both self-reported anger and a behavioral measure of aggression. In sum, this research further supports the notion that anger leads to goal directed action.

Anger as a motivational force for justice. This issue has been studied from the perspective of moral emotions: specifically anger (like contempt and disgust) is considered an other-condemning emotion (Haidt, 2003) shown in response to moral violations by others. The emotions motivate people to change their relationships with moral violators to punish them for the violation. In this context, anger in particular is linked to violations of autonomy, that is, notions of justice, freedom, fairness, individualism, individual choice and liberty (Rozin et al., 1999). In this vein, people report feeling anger in response to an injustice done to someone else (Berkowitz & Harmon-Jones, 2004; Landmann & Hess, 2017). However, anger is not limited to these moral transgressions, but is also reported in response to violations of community or purity (Landmann & Hess, 2018). Thus, anger may not be reserved for injustice but is also a common response to violations of norms. In fact, an angry response is such a clear sign that a norm violation took place that it helps those who witness it to deduce not only that the norm was violated but also the content of the norm (Hareli, Kafetsios, & Hess, 2015; Hareli, Moran-Amir, David, & Hess, 2013).

Anger as a Sign of Strength and Ability

There are two elements to this notion. The first is already implied in the section on anger as a sign of assertiveness and self-esteem discussed above. That is, psychological strength. However, there is also a body of research that focuses on anger and performance, mainly in the domain of sports, but also in other achievement contexts. In fact, Darwin already notes that rage (which he considers a strong form of anger) gives "strength to the muscles, and at the same time energy to the will" (Darwin, 1872/1965, p. 241). Lazarus discussed the possible influence of emotions on performance in competitive sports (Lazarus, 2000) from an appraisal theory perspective. He concludes that constructive anger (maybe resulting in an intention to "show the others") may enhance sports performance, whereas self-directed anger should not. In fact, angry individuals tend to feel more energized and active (Frijda et al., 1989; Shaver, Schwartz, Kirson, & O'Connor, 1987) and tend to make more optimistic judgments and choices about themselves. The latter effect is mediated by appraisals of control and of certainty regarding the situation (Lerner, Gonzalez, Small, & Fischhoff, 2003; Lerner & Keltner, 2001). Berkowitz and Harmon-Jones (2004) add that in fact, once aroused, anger may contribute to this feeling of strength and provide the energy for the resulting action. These elements of anger should indeed be conducive to sports performance or any act requiring strength.

This notion is supported by research on sports performance. Thus, anger increased peak force performance, especially for extraverted individuals, but did not have an effect on a grammar task (Woodman et al., 2009). Similarly, trait anger and an anger-out expressive style were positively associated with performance enhancement on a peak force task whereas an anger-in expressive style significantly inhibited the trait anger–performance relationship (Davis, Woodman, & Callow, 2010). This view is also reflected in athletes' beliefs about anger as facilitative of performance (Robazza, Bertollo, & Bortoli, 2006). This picture is nuanced by Ruiz and Hanin (2011) who found that anger was associated with both best and worst performances in karate. In both cases, anger provided more energy but in worst performances it was used inefficiently.

Yet, even though angry individuals tend to see events as changeable, as anger is associated with appraisals of high coping potential (Scherer, 1987), anger also leads to increased use of heuristics rather than systematic processing in a variety of contexts (see Lerner & Tiedens, 2006). As such, it is less likely that the performance enhancing effects of anger generalize to complex mental tasks or academic performance. This is also the conclusion by Pekrun, Elliot and Maier (2009) whose model of emotional effects on academic performance predicts a negative association between anger and performance which was supported in their study. However, the energizing force of anger can also increase effort in simpler tasks demanding concentration, thereby leading to better performance (Boge, 2011).

Summary

In sum, there is good evidence that Aristotle was right about anger. Anger both signals that the angry other will act with strength in an adverse situation and provides the motivational force for such actions as well as strength if that is required. However, as was typical for his age, Aristotle thought about men when he formulated this idea and indeed, as regards the signal value of anger, the situation is not quite the same for women as for men. Women are liked less for their anger and may appear stronger when staying neutral and remote than when "losing control" even in anger. Nevertheless, in most situations anger can be a positive emotion for both men and women. However, one thing must be noted: anger is a positive emotion for the person who expresses it, but not necessarily for the person it is expressed toward. For the person on the receiving end of righteous anger, the situation may well appear negative.

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On the Ethics of Anger

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In recent years, angry protest and activism has been on the rise. From #BlackLivesMatter to #meToo, social movements have harnessed and expressed the anger of those who feel wronged, oppressed, left behind, and ignored. This rise in angry social protest seems to reflect growing feelings of anger more generally. According to the 2019 *Gallup Global Emotions Report*, Americans' anger increased significantly in 2018, and 20% of US respondents reported that they felt anger "a lot." Younger Americans were more likely to feel angry with 32% of 15-29-year-olds reporting that they feel a great deal of anger. And it isn't just people in the United States who are angry. In some parts of the world, such as Armenia, Iran and Palestine, over 40% of the population reported that they "experienced anger a lot yesterday."

What should ethicists and social philosophers think about all this anger? Is it a lamentable moral and political failure or something that we should admire? Philosophers have taken a variety of positions on anger's value and disvalue, and while I cannot do justice to this literature here, I aim to sketch out a few features of the dominant views regarding the moral and political status of anger before going on to highlight what I see as two preconditions on morally apt anger.

Ethicists have long worried that anger can undermine good judgment and moral sense. The Stoic philosopher Seneca is particularly harsh in his assessment of the ways in which anger functions as a barrier to judgment, describing anger as a "departure from sanity." He writes: "Unlike other failings, anger does not disturb the mind so much as take it by force; harrying it on out of control and eager even for universal disaster, it rages not just as its objects but at anything it meets on its way." (Seneca, 1995,

p.77) According to this characterization, anger is indiscriminate and cannot maintain its focus on its purported target and has calamitous consequences. Within contemporary philosophy, it is commonly argued that anger and other hard feelings inevitably drive away allies and lead to bad social outcomes. Glen Pettigrove (2012), for example, has argued that anger undermines friendships, compromises social utility, makes it difficult to coordinate our actions successfully with others, and clouds our judgment. Martha Nussbaum (2016) has offered similar arguments against anger and has claimed that we ought to instead strive for an attitude of civic love. While their positions are nuanced, we can refer to these philosophers as the "anger pessimists"; they are generally critical of anger and its effects.

Surely anger pessimists are at least partially right in their assessments: anger can have serious negative consequences and experiencing anger may, in some circumstances, be objectionable and count as a significant moral failing. But others have insisted that anger has overriding moral and political value that the anger pessimists fail to fully acknowledge. These philosophers aren't necessarily *optimistic* in their assessments regarding anger, but they do offer various defenses of it, and I will describe this motley group as "anger defenders." But before turning to what has been said in defense of anger, we should get a bit clearer on the nature of anger.

To individuate anger from neighboring emotions, we need to consider how anger presents the world to its subject. In other words, we need an account of what has been termed anger's *evaluative presentation* (D'Arms and Jacobson, 2000).

Aristotle defined anger as follows:

Anger may be defined as a desire accompanied by pain, for a conspicuous revenge for a conspicuous slight at the hands of men who have no call to slight oneself or one's friends. If this is a proper definition of anger, it must always be felt toward some particular individual, e.g., Cleon, and not man in general. It must be felt because the other has done on intended to do something to him or one of his friends. It must always be attended by a certain pleasure—that which arises from the expectation of revenge. For it is

pleasant to think that you will attain what you aim at, and nobody aims at what he thinks he cannot attain (1984b, 1378a-1378b)

For Aristotle, anger necessarily involves the desire for *revenge*, and it is easy to see why some might insist that if anger always involves this desire for revenge, anger is always morally ugly and prudentially counter-productive (Nussbaum, 2016). However, it is not obvious that anger should be identified with this desire (Callard, 2017), and even if anger did always involve a desire for revenge, a case could be made that this desire for revenge is morally innocuous and not socially imprudent in every case. A desire for revenge could be characterized as a desire to see that the target suffer some form of physical injury as a form of payback for the perceived slight, and this desire may well be morally objectionable for it isn't clear what moral damage slights do in the first place, and more fundamentally, it isn't clear how physical violence could ever ameliorate or right this moral damage. But a desire for revenge could be understood simply as the desire that the target *suffer psychologically*, and it isn't obvious that this desire is morally abhorrent. For if the target has done something wrong and recognizes that they have done wrong, they *will* suffer, psychologically, if not physically. Feeling guilt or remorse is a psychologically painful form of suffering, and there doesn't seem to be anything morally objectionable about desiring that the person who has done you wrong come to recognize this and suffer psychologically as a result. Moreover, if this is all the desire for revenge amounts to, it is difficult to see what would be socially imprudent about it.

Whatever we ultimately conclude about the moral status of the desire for revenge, at the most basic level, to be angry is to see oneself as *wronged* or *thwarted* in some personally significant way, and anger is a hostile emotion that is a response this perceived interference. The angry person will also undergo various physiological changes and may be more disposed toward some actions rather than others, but this general characterization of anger's evaluative presentation allows us to distinguish it from neighboring negative emotions. In what follows, I will be focusing on the kind of anger that experienced when one takes oneself to have been

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wronged by another. Philosophers sometimes refer to this subspecies of anger as resentment. I will use the term anger in what follows, but I have in mind anger that is a response to a perceived wrongdoing.

Like all emotions, anger can be assessed as "appropriate" along several dimensions: we can evaluate a token of anger in terms of its prudence, moral value, aesthetic value, reasonableness, and so on. We may describe an emotion that is all-in appropriate as "apt."

For our purposes, *fittingness* is an especially important mode of affective evaluation: if an emotion is *fitting*, then its evaluative presentation is accurate, i.e., it correctly presents the world. To resent a paperclip is to see the paperclip as having wronged you; your resentment in this case would be unfitting because paperclips are not the sorts of entities that can actually do wrong. When one recognizes that one's emotion is unfitting, one has reasons to overcome it.

Contemporary defenders of anger don't usually defend it as a good way of responding to *slights*; instead, it is argued that anger can be a fitting and morally good response to wrongdoing

and oppression. For example, according to Jeffrie Murphy (1988, p.17), resentment is a way of asserting our self-respect; when we fail to resent appropriately, we express "emotionally—either that we do not think that we have rights or that we do not take our rights very seriously."

Aristotle states that an excellent person will feel anger when it is called for; a person who does not respond to significant slights with anger can be criticized as "slavish" and a person who responds with excessive anger or is too quick to anger may be criticized as "irascible":

> The person who is angry at the right things and toward the right people, and also in the right way, at the right time, and for the right length of time, is praised. This, then, will be the mild person, if mildness is praised. For being a mild person means being undisturbed, not led by feeling, but irritated wherever reason prescribes, and for the length of time it prescribes. And he seems to err more in the direction of deficiency, since the mild person is ready to pardon, not eager to exact a penalty. (1984a, 1125b-1126a)

Aristotle contrasts this mild person, whose reason directs him to respond with anger only to those slights which are worth getting angry about, with the person who is deficient in anger, and claims that the latter is open to criticism:

> For people who are not angered by the right things, or in the right way, or at the right times, or toward the right people, all seem to be foolish. For such a person seems to be insensible and to feel no pain, and since he is not angered, he does not seem to be the sort to defend himself. Such a willingness to accept insults to oneself and to overlook insults to one's family and friends is slavish. (1984a, 1126a)

The irascible person goes wrong in a different way. Such a person gets angry at the wrong person, at the wrong time, and so on. Moreover, this person does not "….contain their anger, but their quick temper makes then pay back the offense without concealment, and then they stop." (1984a, 1126a)

For Aristotle, a virtuous person will feel the sting of slights and will respond to significant slights with anger as a way of taking himself seriously and defending his honor. He isn't quick to lash out in anger; the motivational dispositions associated with anger are dispositions, and they can come apart from the anger experience.

Aristotle ties the value of anger to its role in registering and protesting slights. Although contemporary philosophers may reject many aspects of Aristotle's worldview, there is a significant literature in feminist philosophy arguing that anger is valuable as a defensive emotion under circumstances of oppression (philosophers have also explored the role that anger, and more specifically resentment, plays in holding persons responsible [Strawson, 1962] and the role it plays in punishment [Bennett, 2002]). While anger has been defended on a number of grounds, there are four general defenses of anger in this literature. (Bell, 2009)

First, anger is defended as a mode of protesting wrongs done and oppressive structures. According to this line of argument, angry protest registers wrongs as wrong and helps subjects maintain their self-respect under conditions of oppression. To forgo anger when it is merited might be to acquiesce or condone the wrong done.

Second, anger is thought to be valuable insofar as it provides knowledge about the world. Those who stress what we can call the *direct epistemic value of anger* claim that those who experience anger have knowledge that the non-angry lack. For example, Uma Narayan (1988) argues that the oppressed have a kind of epistemic privilege; one aspect of this privilege is the knowledge "constituted and confirmed by the emotional responses of the oppressed to their oppression."(p.39) Those who stress the *indirect epistemic value of anger* argue that people can learn a great deal about their status in society by looking at how their anger is received by others. Marilyn Frye (1983), for example, has argued that women's anger is given uptake (i.e., taken seriously as anger) in areas where women are seen as having authority, such as being a mother or nurturer. As Frye puts it, "anger can be an instrument of cartography" though which women can map out others' conceptions of their status.

Third, some have argued that anger is important insofar as it is a way of disvaluing the disvaluable. Even in cases where protest would be impossible or ineffective, it has been argued

that anger is still morally valuable insofar as it is fitting and bears witness to injustice.

Fourth, some have argued that anger is valuable insofar as it motivates social change. Audre Lorde (1984) writes: "anger between peers births change, not destruction, and the discomfort and sense of loss it often causes is not fatal, but a sign of growth. My response to racism is anger." As Lorde sees it, anger can be morally valuable insofar as it helps to bring about a good end, such as social change.

To sum up, anger's defenders have argued that anger is a mode of protest that can help secure persons' self-respect, that anger has at least two distinct epistemic roles, that it is a mode of disvaluing the disvaluable, and that it can directly motivate social change. Under circumstances of injustice, there will constantly be occasions for anger, and therefore fitting anger may be unhealthy for its subject (Tessman, 2005), but this does not necessarily tell against its aptness (Srinivasan, 2018 and McFall, 1991).

In what follows, I'd like to consider what preconditions need to be met for anger to play these roles. As I see it, anger is morally and politically valuable only if it is regarded as a way of asserting a *claim*. For anger to be regarded as making a claim, two conditions need to be met. First, the anger shouldn't be utterly dismissed by the target or third parties. Second, subjects should be open to assessing the claims being made through it. If we don't think of anger as a way of making claims, it is difficult to see how it can have the value that anger defenders suggest.

While a number of philosophers have argued that we should take the "outlaw" emotions of the marginalized especially seriously because the subordinated are "epistemologically privileged" and are therefore more likely to experience fitting emotions regarding their oppression, we shouldn't misconstrue this claim: While some want to question how we mark the distinction between fitting and unfitting emotions (MacLachlan, 2010) and others question whether bias will infect our anger assessments (Cherry, 2018), it clearly isn't the case that the emotions of the subordinated are *always* fitting. Alison Jaggar, who defends the epistemic value of outlaw emotions, stresses that the anger of the oppressed can be unfitting and inapt, just as the anger of the non-oppressed can be, and often is,

unfitting and inapt: "Like all our faculties, [emotions] may be misleading, and their data, like all data, are always subject to reinterpretation and revision…they are open to challenge on various grounds. They may be dishonest or self-deceptive, they may incorporate inaccurate or partial perceptions, or they may be constituted by oppressive values. Accepting the indispensability of appropriate emotions to knowledge means no more (and no less) than that discordant emotions should be attended to seriously and respectfully rather than condemned, ignored, discounted, or suppressed." (1989, p.169)

In order to determine whether some token of anger is fitting, we need to consider, in detail, the subject's anger, her perceived reasons for her anger, the target's actions, and the relationship between the subject and target. Making these sorts of assessments is something that we do, and in some cases only *can* do, by engaging in certain familiar forms of *dialogue*. Giving an account or justification of our emotions is an important social practice through which people attempt to come to a shared understanding of the fittingness conditions for emotions. To illustrate the kind of process I have in mind, consider a prosaic example: I saunter up to you waiting for me outside the cafe, and you say, "God, I can't believe you! I'm so sick of this!" and I immediately ask, "What's wrong? Why are you mad? What did I do?" In asking why you are angry, I am not asking for a *causal story* of what brought you to this state. Instead, I am asking you for a *justification* for the way you are currently appraising the world; I'm asking you for a justification for your anger. You say, "because you were late! And I've just been sitting here wasting my time!" At this point in our exchange I have a number of options: I may accept that my tardiness justifies your anger and apologize, or I may offer an explanation that excuses my lateness, or I may admit that I was late but question whether I wronged you in arriving late—perhaps we have a tacit agreement that we allow one another a 20 minute grace period, and so on. It is through ordinary exchanges like this that we come to both set and know the fittingness conditions for our emotions. These ordinary exchanges are corrupted in cases of affective dismissal. (Bell, 2019)

To give some emotion uptake is not necessarily to capitulate to it or express one's agreement with its content. I can give your anger uptake even while being skeptical of its fittingness. When an irate student barges in and demands that he be given an A rather than a B+ on his midterm exam, I can tell him that his anger is misplaced and that his exam doesn't merit the higher grade without being dismissive of his anger. I can take the student's anger seriously as anger even as I dispute its fittingness. But when a person's anger is *utterly dismissed*, on the other hand, its content is ignored and its claim is not acknowledged as a claim (Frye, 1983 and Campbell, 1994). When your interlocutor responds to your anger by asking if you are done or with a joke about PMS, then your anger is not being given uptake. The fittingness of your anger isn't being challenged; instead, the claim inherent in your anger, the claim that you have been wronged, is not taken seriously. In fact, it is not treated as a claim at all. In order for anger to do the moral and political work that anger defenders describe, affective dismissal must not be widespread.

Subjects can also fail to treat their anger as a vehicle for making claims if they refuse to be open to the type of dialogic process described above. If a subject will not offer reasons for her anger or is unwilling to consider the views of those who see her anger as unfitting, she is not treating her anger as a way of making a claim. If subjects do not treat their anger as claims, then the anger cannot do the type of ameliorative work that anger defenders describe.

I have not attempted fully adjudicate the debate between the anger pessimists and the anger defenders here. No matter what one's position on the moral and political value and disvalue of anger, all should agree that there are better and worse ways of experiencing anger, and the philosophical literature on the moral psychology of anger can help us understand the pitfalls and promise of this all too common emotion.

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Anger and Anthropology

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Tell me the truth about love, wrote the poet W. H. Auden, in a poem that playfully circles its subject, deferring definition. Is the truth about love to be found in an agony column or a history of Romanticism, a Shakespeare sonnet or the secretions of the endocrine glands? Well, love without biology is certainly missing something. But the sonneteer can, at least, claim to be truer to the *experience*, body and soul. The endocrinologist can't touch it.

The truth about love—or *anger*, our theme—is doubtless complicated. And if we recognize the ontological complexity of emotions, their distribution in words and gestures, social patterns, predicaments, cultural values, faces, voices, bodies, brain functions, and histories, we have to make a strategic choice. It's not about determining causal priority, much less of insanely trying to grasp the whole, but of deciding what kind of account will satisfy our interests as psychologists, philosophers or social scientists. That may mean keeping an open mind about what should count as emotion—a matter of stipulation in any case—and a heuristic willingness to extend categorical boundaries. Where does an emotional episode begin and end? With James's 'exciting fact', the cognition that makes it so, the ego that feels its relevance, or the personal history of similar ego-focused vicissitudes? How far do we need to go back (or forward, proleptically), to make sense of an emotion, or to understand an emotionally inflected episode?

As an anthropologist, I am less interested in the kind of explanation that sweeps away the existential reality—or reduces it to models—than one which places that reality, however fleeting, in a new light. A good explanation, or (as might be) a coherent interpretation, doesn't lead away from the ethnographic field to some higher plane of abstract emotions, but back into it. A persuasive account of love or anger shows us—in terms which respect the integrity of the experience—more about things we assumed we had understood, filling in what had been shadows. Seeing more, instead of seeing through.

In grasping the emotional life, once we admit the possibility that other people have something like the complexity we take for granted in ourselves—with tangled biographies, criss-crossing relationships, an interior life, a past and a future, a certain place in the world—we begin looking for *reasons* rather than causes, personal resonances rather than common denominators. The anthropologist with an interest in emotion has, additionally, to balance particularities—the *sine qua non*, there being no such thing as a generic emotion—with broader historical and social factors.

One way of doing that is through narrative. Not fictional narrative, of course. We can't make it up. Our accounts have to be empirically robust, the dialogue and events real, not merely plausible. Unlike the novelist, we don't have privileged access to the private doings and thoughts of our interlocutors. But we can listen to them, observe them, live among them; and after a year or two in the field we have a pretty good idea of what's going on, how emotions operate in a given society, what stirs a particular individual. Fieldwork has a way of painfully correcting misunderstandings.

Lest this sound like a retreat from science into bad art, I should note that the goal of a narrative account is to achieve an enhanced realism, not just a good story; to restore the significant factors in emotional episodes that neat case histories and typifying accounts leave out (an argument pursued in *[Emotional Worlds](#)*); to rehumanise ethnography. Only narrative can reckon with characters in the round, a time dimension, competing perspectives, unfolding situations, reversals of fortune, dialogue, and the hidden factors that make, say, a jealous man unaware of his jealousy; in fact, everything that goes into a living emotional episode. In contrast, approaches that depend on synchronic analysis, the study of discourse, word sorting tasks, and cultural representations—exercises remote from the flow of events—leave out most of *what matters to particular people*, in other words whatever

generates their emotions and gives those emotions their peculiar quality, their tailor-made fit.[8]

So tell me the truth about anger! Not if you're seeking a quick anthropological fix, for what could that singular truth be? Nothing that anyone in any real society has ever experienced. What would anger amount to, shorn of cultural context and dramatis personae? Definitions and prototypes might furnish a rough orientation; but to penetrate other emotional worlds we need more than the bare essentials. With emotion, the devil is truly in the detail. Who is angry or frustrated with whom? Why? How? To what end? And with what consequences? The answers are culturally and personally specific, resistant to formula. And they call for a more compendious approach, relaxed about definitions and boundaries.

So let's descend to particulars and see how an anthropologist might tackle anger in what, for most readers, will be a very unfamiliar setting. My aim is to sketch a distinctive emotional world: to show how anger-like emotions are performed and exploited in the theatre of formal oratory; and to follow that with a contrasting example of anger at its most raw and unambiguous. Surprisingly, in both cases, considerations of what is natural or authentic and what is culturally constructed are significantly blurred: fieldwork scrambles neat theoretical distinctions. The first part is closer to standard ethnography, with a focus on emotion idioms, meanings in action. The second is straight narrative. The intention here is to braid descriptive density with temporal depth, showing how narrative gives us both structure and history, the warp and weft of the emotional life. Instead of simply reporting on 'anger elsewhere'—a pointless box-ticking exercise—I want to show what makes these examples *anthropologically* interesting: what makes them revealing about social processes and human experience. If they move the reader, or merely intrigue a little, they will have achieved their purpose of enlarging our sense of what anger is.

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Andrew Beatty

The Niha, inhabitants of Nias, a large forested island in Indonesia, have a wide vocabulary for states of the 'heart', some of which refer to anger-like emotions. 'Hot heart' is the commonest, the closest to a broad term for 'anger'; but in the formal debates at weddings and feasts—Niha are avid orators—speakers are as likely to declare their hearts 'scorched', 'swollen' or 'spotted', idioms which convey to their audience, that they are extremely unhappy about *the situation* and expect some redress—ideally the promise of a pig or two—to soothe their tender ventricles.

In Nias, it's no exaggeration to say that all human relationships, especially those deriving from marriage alliances, are conceived as debts—best exemplified in brideprice; and debts, like relations between in-laws, are matters of fervent interest. Oratory is a form of accounting in which not only goods but the provision of labour (in a wife) and life itself (which flows through women given in marriage) are reckoned, and debts rebalanced, the aim of speeches being to exert pressure on certain listeners to give more or accept less. The medium of debate, the register of progress or failure, is heart speech. *In extremis*— and a society of former headhunters and warriors

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[8] Very few anthropological accounts of emotion employ narrative as a method (Abu-Lughod 1993; Beatty 2015; Briggs 1998, 1970; Epstein 1992; Wikan 1992). Lutz (1988) and Rosaldo (1980) are the classic studies of emotional discourse, Levy (1973) of folk psychology and psychodynamics. For reviews of diverse anthropological approaches to emotion, see Beatty (2019, 2014, 2013).

Nias Village Square

is not given to understatement—oratory spirals into mutual emotional blackmail, with anger the biggest lever, the surest way to prise concessions from an obdurate opponent or face down a grasping claim.

Niha heart-speech, it transpires, is not a matter of self-report or introspection. Nor is there a folk psychology or anatomy that would explain the logic of the idioms (or still odder ones like 'having a hairy heart' or feeling 'as though you've swallowed a ball of cat's fur'). The actual physical organ is not in question. Unlike the gall bladder of early modern Europe, the 'hot heart' does not *exude* anger; nor does emotion connect to some wider spiritual or cosmic scheme, as it does in other Asian civilizations, such as Java, where I have also worked.

Given that emotional manipulations guide calculations of claims and debts—pressing an advantage here, conceding there—it's curious that Niha heart speech expresses no core relational themes (in Lazarus's [1994] phrase). Its idioms are not symptoms of predicaments.

Swollen, hairy, or clear hearts fit no specific scenarios. Only a few idioms, like the 'squeezed heart' (voiced by someone pressed between competing demands), define a situation. Instead, cardiac distinctions express degrees of displeasure, pegging dissatisfaction at a certain level in negotiation. The idioms are *emotives* (in Reddy's [2001] term) intended to change the posture of the opposing group, either to win or deny a concession, to extract, mollify or evade.

What, then, of the speaker's actual feelings? No one assumes or even cares what they are, or whether his appraisal of the situation is genuinely conducive to a swollen heart, whatever that may be. At the end of a long passionate speech filled with sound and fury, I once asked a neighbour 'what was *that* all about?' (I was still new to Nias.) 'He's asking for more,' came the blunt reply. In fact, speeches are made by designated spokesmen who, despite the barnstorming manner, the foot stamping, finger-jabbing, and withering tone, may have no skin in the game. The hearts that are swollen are usually '*our

hearts', that is, those of the spokesman's party, which, despite internal differences, usually shares a common interest. But 'real feelings' are not the issue. As the target of a speech, auditors respond to the implied threat—of a lowered offer, a break in relations, or an ancestral curse—not to the unused currency of harboured feelings.

Here a striking aspect of the stagecraft needs mention. As he struts the boards, building his passion, the speaker never directly addresses his intended audience but hails a confederate across the room who croons confirmatory cries of 'Goooood sense!' or 'Truuuue!', his voice overlapping, sometimes drowning, the speaker. The effect can be electrifying; but seldom are people actually frightened. Despite the vehement gestures and coruscating tone, the 'hot heart' (let's call it anger), is never discharged on its target. Instead the speaker offers a heart-on-sleeve *commentary* ('your words impale our hearts', 'my heart tells me this', 'our scorched hearts urge refusal'). The objects of the parade listen quietly, unruffled, ruminating on quids of betel, perhaps wagging their heads in appreciation at a particular shaft, before *their* man (it's always a man) rises to reply. Correct procedure ensures that strong feelings, even great anger, can be expressed without risk of violence.

Evidently, this is anger of a qualified kind, more than *pretended*, but never less than *performed*: a skittish, sometimes dangerous horse, taken through its steps then put back in the stable. It would be a mistake to see it simply as acting. The stakes are too high for mere pretence to succeed; auditors could feel safe in ignoring it. But the imprecision of reference, the careful staging, and the indirection of oratory—the separation of putatively angry sponsors from visibly angry speakers—combine to create a dynamic quite unlike ordinary everyday emotions. Anger is co-opted, channelled, and mercurially expressed in a score of vaguely-referring heart terms to achieve a certain end.

If the angry words of the orator are chiefly performative, a matter of persuasion not folk psychology, it follows that they cannot serve as neutral descriptors of behaviour. Nobody acts 'scorched-hearted' or is ever described as such in ordinary life. There is no way of *being* scorched-hearted. Proclaiming anger is, in fact, a way of limiting anger's impact: it puts down a marker

and allows for a response. Reference to the 'hot heart' might *imply* a follow-through, a dangled threat, but listeners typically bend with a dodge of their own ('we are shrivel-hearted'), counter-attack, or pacify antagonists with a gift. The naming of hearts is a game of diplomacy, with notional emotions as counters in a debate whose ideal outcome is to bury differences in a state of 'one heartedness'; or at least, to soften resentment with a down payment—balm for the heart.

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Though it often feels otherwise, even Niha sometimes have to stop wrangling; the duelling ends and everyone goes home, whether satisfied (*with* pig) or disgruntled (*without*). Away from the debating chamber, anger of a rather different kind, mostly unnamed and unmediated by discourse, occasionally breaks the peaceful surface of everyday life. Here we find something closer to that universal Anger dear to many emotion scientists, an apparently raw response, prior to the work of culture. And for this a different ethnographic approach is required. While a focus on language and subject positions might do for the set-piece debates, a narrative approach better brings out the complexity of what might otherwise appear to be a straightforward instance of a 'basic emotion'.

A particular example is branded in memory. One dark rainy night, a year into our fieldwork in the gaunt hilltop village of Orahua, my wife and I were alerted by panicky voices carried by the wind across the square from one of the great clan longhouses. We joined the streams of people converging hurriedly on its feintly glowing doorway, entry to the roar within. Inside the cavernous wooden hall, hazily lit by a pressure lamp and crammed with more than hundred excitable villagers, a woman of thirty-five lay dead on the floorboards, her stricken family bent over the shrouded corpse. She had died in a fieldhut a mile downriver after falling ill. Her two brothers had foolishly given her a herbal purgative which had killed her. They had carried the corpse home to Orahua and a posse was sent out into the night to fetch her husband from a hamlet upstream where he had gone to sell a pig. Now, pressed and jostled by the noisy crowd, in postures of frozen fear, the guilty men — outsiders, if not strangers — sat trembling on a

Niha villagers in front of a clan house preparing pigs for feasting.

bench, awaiting their fate, hardly glancing at their sister.

Until the instant of his arrival, the messengers had kept the truth from the husband. The grimy figure that now burst through the doorway, with mud-spattered face and blazing eyes, was our first sight of his first reaction. Not pausing to look right or left for his wife, wading through the startled crowd, he dived into a rear apartment to grab a weapon, pursued by his fellow clansmen. In the hall, above the clamour, we could hear muffled cries from within. 'Where are they?' he bellowed. As brothers-in-law, 'wife-givers' with the exalted status of 'Those who own us'—an epithet shared with God—*they* could not be attacked. Wife-givers are the source of life and prosperity: they bless your crops, provide you with heirs; their curse is lethal. Yet givers of life had become life-takers. The incalculable debt betokened by brideprice now ran the other way. A debt of blood. Collective anger, urging revenge (to 'repay', in Niha parlance) and embodied in the raging husband, competed with everything that Niha held sacred: the reverence due to wife-givers, the decrees of the ancestors, life itself.

In the enclosed rear apartment, lit only by firelight, a struggle ensued, punctuated by dull thuds and groans as bodies buffeted the wooden walls. It took half an hour before the desperate man could be led docilely out by his minders, their shirts torn and an expression of sour triumph on their faces. For the next hour or so, he sat stupified by the corpse until the whole episode was repeated with the entrance of his younger brother, who ran to the body and threw himself full length upon it. Then he too dashed to the rear for a weapon. Again the sounds of struggle as bodies bounced off the walls. After he had been brought under control (one thought of a wild horse broken), he emerged tearing his hair and groaning piteously, which set up a general commotion of wailing and keening. He lay down beside the body, peeled back the sheet and began stroking his sister-in-law's thin hair, pressing his face to her grey cheek. 'Ah sister, they've killed you. Ah, my sister! Where are you? Where are you?'

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One hesitates to turn such tragedy to any use other than that of a plain record, an eye witnessing

of a great and terrible moment. I have written a fuller account in *After the Ancestors*, an ethnographic narrative which is also a kind of memorial. I revisit the scene here, after a lapse of thirty years, with a lump in my throat for people I had become close to, but also in the consoling knowledge of how things later turned out. When I returned in 2011 I found the bereaved man happily remarried with a second clutch of children, and eager to host me for a meal. We stood side by side for a photo in the exact spot where we had stood for a similar picture in 1987, shortly before the tragedy.

What can one distil from this recitation? Here was anger elicited, enacted, expressed, tamed, and extinguished. At no stage was it named or discussed; indeed, it would have been pointless to do so, the tactical manipulations of debate over reparations still unthinkable in the volatile atmosphere of the hall. My friend's turbocharged anger looks as close to raw unmediated passion as you can get, a maximal response to a maximal offence. Yet what seemed like unstoppable, single-minded fury—a raging bull—did not convert into a direct assault on the guilty men. As he must have expected, he was held back, disarmed, neutralised. Deflected from its true target, his anger expended itself in the unseen struggle. And the same pattern was repeated with his brother: anger diverted and drained of power, giving way to grief. In the days that followed I saw no trace of anger in either man, only sorrow.

There are crucial social and cultural factors pervading—not merely framing—the whole episode. The vital relation between affines—the central institution of Niha social structure—was a decisive factor, both in the construal of offence (the terrible paradox of the life-taking life-givers) and in the indirection of response. No less culturally shaped was the drama within the drama—the harsh imposition of control by seniors, the assertion of authority and correct form. And not least, one must recognize the personal bond between the husband and the mother of his five children. The dead woman had been the mainstay of a three-generation extended family, her loss all the greater.

So if there are instantly recognisable symptoms of anger (as *we* conceive it), they do not take us far in appreciating the layered meaning of the emotion in context, the cultural

elements that are woven into its texture and realisation; indeed, into every moment of the sequence—from appraisal, affect, action, reverberations, management, through to the possibility of recovery and renewal, for which the whole episode must be depicted, the crisis placed within the larger scheme of interwoven lives. In short, to take us beyond a painting-by-numbers approach to emotions that can only confirm what we already know, we need a *narrative* account, fleshed out with biographical and cultural detail, a history of persons.

O Tell me the truth about anger! The truth, as ever, is in the telling.

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