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Emotion Researcher

Editors’ Column

History and Beyond

Carolyn Price & Eric A. Walle

Emotions (you may not be surprised to hear!) have a past. For one thing, our emotional capacities have an evolutionary history; and, of course, the emotional traits and habits of individuals are shaped by their particular developmental and personal stories. But emotions have a social and cultural history too. At different points in the past, emotions have been described and understood in quite different ways; and the social norms that have governed emotional experiences and expression have changed quite markedly. Conversely, understanding the past is partly a matter of understanding how earlier societies understood and regulated people’s emotions.

For this issue, four scholars representing three Humanities disciplines – History, Classics and Philosophy – have been invited to consider how we might investigate the history of emotion from the perspective of these disciplines, and what we might gain by doing so. As some of our contributors note, the study of emotions – once a neglected topic among historians and philosophers – is now a flourishing and increasingly mature area of inquiry. At the same time, Humanities research and teaching is coming increasingly under pressure – at least in some parts of the world. For both these reasons, it is timely to focus on the contributions from the Humanities on emotion research.

We begin with Professor Ute Frevert, who Director of the Centre for the History of Emotions at the Max Planck Institute for Human Development, who provides an overview of studies in the history of emotion. She emphasizes the multi-disciplinary character of Humanities research and in particular how work on emotions in other Humanities disciplines has helped to draw historians’ attention to emotion as an important topic of inquiry. She explains how historians investigate emotion, by exploring how emotional experiences, and the norms and practices surrounding them, have reflected broader social and political contexts. Finally, she emphasizes that the history of emotions continues on into the present: historians can throw light on contemporary assumptions and practices, not only by revealing their history, but also by identifying the kinds of social processes and pressures that help to produce them.

Our second contribution is by Barbara H. Rosenwein, Professor Emerita of History at Loyola University Chicago, and Riccardo Cristiani, a medievalist by training and an independent scholar. They focus on the methodologies of historians working on emotion and describe how these have been shaped by theoretical approaches in other disciplines – both cognitivism in psychology and social constructionism in sociology and philosophy. As a case study, they explain different ways in which historians have recently studied the body and its variable relations to affective experience. They conclude by noting the close linkage between not only the practices that historians study, but also of historians’ own assumptions and methodologies.

Our next contribution is by a classicist – David Konstan, who is Professor of Classics at New York State University and has a particular interest in classical philosophy. His piece explores the different ways in which ancient thinkers, from Aristotle onwards, conceptualized emotions. Aristotle, he explains, understood emotions both as involving sophisticated cognition and as being particularly concerned with ethical and social values. He considers the different ways in which Aristotle’s account was questioned by later thinkers, who took issue, not just with the details of the account, but even with the boundaries of the subject under investigation. One way in which we can make sense of these different viewpoints, Konstan suggests, is by relating them to the different social conditions that prevailed when these thinkers were writing.

We conclude with a contribution by Sean Greenberg, an Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of California, Irvine, who studies early modern Philosophy. Philosophers writing at this time include Descartes, Hobbes, Malebranche, Spinoza, Locke, Hume, and Smith – among many others As Greenberg points out, the works produced by these philosophers continue to be a prime focus of attention for
philosophers working on emotion, whether or not they take a historical approach. Greenberg uses the example of Descartes to argue that historical accounts of emotion can still provide insights for emotion researchers today.

**ISRE Spotlight**

Our Spotlight article in this issue has also highlights the work of a philosopher – Alfred Archer, who is an Assistant Professor at Tilburg. His timely article brings us sharply back to the present day. Archer is concerned with the attitude that we should take to artists, film-makers and others who have produced artistically valuable work, and yet behaved in morally obnoxious ways. The ethical challenges posed by the lives of some artists and writers has long been of interest to ethicists. For example, Bernard Williams’ book, *Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy* (1981), examined the case of an artist (loosely based on the life of Paul Gauguin) who decided to abandon his family in order to pursue his art. Williams’ chief concern was whether the artist’s decision could be justified by artistic success. Archer uses the example of Roman Polanski to pose a different question: is it fitting to admire the work of such a figure? Some theorists have argued that the answer is ‘no’, and have claimed, too, that this has something to tell us about what kind of attitude admiration is. Archer agrees that the answer is ‘no’, but argues that the reasons have nothing to do with the nature of admiration. Rather, this kind of case tells us something important about the ethics of admiring.

**ISRE Interview**

In this issue we are also delighted to present an interview with Joseph Campos, Professor Emeritus of Psychology at the University of California, Berkeley. Campos shares intimate insights into his upbringing as a first-generation immigrant from the Dominican growing up in New York City – from his mishaps learning English, to overcoming racial challenges during childhood, to his serendipitous path to attend college –the first in his family to do so. Campos also shares his thoughts, and critiques, of different theoretical and empirical approaches to the study of emotion, including the Functionalist perspective for which he is known. His interweaving of personal and professional stories provides us with an unguarded look at the life and work of a founding member of ISRE.

**Announcements**

Finally, we are excited to include a message from the ISRE Early Emotion Researchers Section. The committee describes some initiatives that will be rolling out in the coming year, including web-based seminars, mentorship opportunities, and early researcher awards. The initiative displayed by this group is exemplary and will hopefully set the stage for ISRE to continue to thrive and serve all of our members, from senior colleagues to those just embarking on the study of emotion. Please feel free to contact this great group to join the Early Emotion Researchers Section or volunteer to help with the programs that they plan to implement.

We are already working on our next issue, due out in Summer 2018. With the present issue looking back at the study of emotion across history, we will next turn to the topic of emotional development. Contributors for this issue are being contacted and we look forward to bringing an exciting collection on this topic to the readership of Emotion Researcher in the coming months.

With the new year now in full swing, we wish everyone a pleasant and productive 2018 and look forward to continuing to be a voice for ISRE and its membership.

Warmly,

Carolyn & Eric
Carolyn Price is Senior Lecturer in Philosophy at the Open University (UK). Her research addresses a broad range of questions about emotions – what they are, what they tell us about the world, the norms by which we evaluate them, and (most recently) their relation to the self. She is also interested in particular types of emotions, such as love, grief and regret. Her book Emotion (Polity) appeared in 2015.

Eric Walle is an Assistant Professor of Psychological Sciences at the University of California, Merced. His theoretical research emphasizes the functions of emotions, particularly in interpersonal contexts. Empirically, he examines emotional development, principally in infancy and early childhood, as well as how individuals perceive and respond to emotional communication.
Reflections from Reviewer #2

Arvid Kappas

Department of Psychology
Jacobs University Bremen
a.kappas@jacobs-university.de

February, 2018 – My tenure as ISRE’s president will end in a few days, so I will permit myself to delve a little into my complicated relationship with the history of psychology, and specifically, the history of emotion research. And now, a little time travel: I remember watching the Muppet Show as a youngster. I loved the characters and couldn’t wait for Saturday, when the show aired. Some of the characters were of course familiar to me, having migrated from Sesame Street, and some were new, like Waldorf and Statler, the two grumpy old men who would criticize everything they saw in a more or less funny way. I must say, I did not like them very much. Not at all.

Much to my dismay, something terrible seems to have happened to me in recent years. I worry that I might have turned into Waldorf and Statler. Yes – both of them. I have turned into a grumpy old man commenting on conference presentations and articles. Am I a habitual reviewer #2? In the light of Jamie Pennebaker’s findings on the beneficial effects of writing a journal, I have decided, in this edition of ISRE matters, to write down some of my pet peeves – to confess. Perhaps it will do me some good. Please don’t think less of me: hidden somewhere underneath, there is hopefully still a reasonably good person…

The past matters

I admit, history was never my strong suit in school or university. When my first departmental chairman told me that I should teach History of Psychology, Epistemology and The Scientific Foundations of Psychology, I was flabbergasted. To this day, I do not know how his demand was supposed to fit with my wanting to teach Social Psychophysiology (I had been hired to teach the biological bases of human and animal behavior). I still suspect he was a victim of prejudice and believed that Germans have a knack for philosophy and the like. Whatever the reason, I was thus transformed into a new person who became a little bit obsessed with the history of psychology. However, I think when it came to the history of emotion research my obsession definitely started earlier. In the preparation for my PhD thesis, my supervisor, John Lanzetta, had me write an introduction to emotion theory that turned into a massive chapter of 100 pages or so, which I then had to dump. (Quote: “Now I know you know. But leave it out of the thesis. Nobody likes long theses.”)

I started to look more carefully at the beginnings of emotion research, using Charles Darwin’s The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals (1872) as an anchor point. While I was aware of the importance of, say, ancient Greek philosophy for much of western emotion theory, Darwin is a good starting point for a psychologist. I enjoyed the book very much, and in the courses on emotions that I have taught over the years, if there was enough time, I had students read some Darwin in the original prose. That seems important because many people speak about Darwin and The Expressions without actually having read it. Contrary to the belief of many researchers, Darwin does not talk about a small handful of basic emotions, let alone five, six or seven. He does not talk only about facial behavior, but also vocal and postural changes. He talks about psychophysiology and how these things combine, such as the acoustic changes in certain emotions due to a change in salivation – pretty fancy stuff. There is blushing and turning pale, there is piloerection and also some stuff that is weird (hair turning white in a moment, for example). In contradiction to the summaries of his position in some emotion texts, he rarely talks about the communication of emotion and he makes the point that emotional displays did not evolve for communicative reasons. He writes (briefly) about the facial feedback hypothesis. He is not in favor of a readout of emotions in the normal adult, but instead argues that upbringing affects what is shown and how.
I could tell a similar story about William James, the James-Lange theory, Cannon, and other key positions and theories in the early history of emotion research. I believe that in order to stand on the shoulders of giants, we should at least be aware what they actually said. I find that some of the scholarly standards that I see both with early career researchers and with experienced, yes, even well-known, researchers sometimes appear somewhat lacking. (Please read this with a voice effect of reviewer #2 in your mind). Do I sound snobbish? Yes I do. I know.

So if someone misrepresents Darwin, or James, or some of the other classics in emotion research and theory, I transmogrify into Statler and Waldorf and start to complain. Why is this such a big thing? What are the side-effects of emotion history blindness that actually matter?

1) Bruised Ego
Perhaps it has happened to you that you hear a talk or read a paper and think, “This is not new! I said that before in (insert obscure publication here).” This is, of course, unpleasant and should not happen. I am actually aware of colleagues who have written to other colleagues, or even editors, pointing out that they had raised a point earlier, had identified an empirical effect before, or published a similar theory in the first place. Experiencing this is unfortunate and aggravating, but it will not impact the progress of the science as a whole, as long as findings and ideas are useful regardless who said it first. Clearly, explicit plagiarism or mobbing does have negative impact, as it might lead some researchers to withdraw from academia, not wanting to deal with stuff like that, and the community loses the benefit of the creativity and insight of these researchers.

2) Unjustified Career Boosting
It is more than unpleasant if researchers claim they were the first to have found X when X was already known and then use this alternative fact to advance their career, get coverage in mass media, obtain grants, and so on. A variant of this is to argue that X is wrong and Y is better, when X is indeed misrepresented and has never been stated in that way. Do such things happen in the real world? Yes they do. Mass media, university administration, and funders are often not interested in the details, and suddenly stars are born. In this connection, it is a curse that every person who experiences emotions apparently feels like being an expert on the matter. This false belief downgrades the actual experts in emotion research. I bet string theorists rarely have to deal with that.

Emotions – the way that most of us researchers think of this concept/construct – are complex things. Grasping emotions involves the interplay of different disciplines from anthropology to neuroscience. After all, understanding the importance of multidisciplinary interaction and collaboration is a raison d’être of ISRE. Unfortunately, in the short term, whatever we do as a community of researchers is a zero-sum game, given limited resources. I take money that you won’t get. I take time on the podium you won’t get. I am the expert, you are not. If there is solid scholarship at all levels of academia, then the emperor’s new clothes can be quickly identified for what they are. This one annoys me more and I wish that colleagues would speak out more often if there are misunderstandings regarding the origins of ideas or representations of what is and was known.
3) Bad Science

In the early 1980s in Giessen, where I was a student, one of the favorite books Klaus Scherer discussed in his introductory class on emotions was Robert Plutchik’s Emotion: A Psychoevolutionary Synthesis (1980). At the beginning of the book, Plutchik gives a brief overview of classical emotion theories that is rather delightful to read. He tore apart the Schachter and Singer (1962) experiment in wonderful ways. If there were university courses on “how to become Reviewer #2” they would use part of Plutchik’s section as mandatory reading. (At least this is how I remember it – I have not gone back to check.) Together with Rainer Reisenzein’s wonderful review The Schachter theory of emotion: Two decades later (1983), there was enough material (for simplicity, I am not mentioning all critical reviews of the classical study or the theory) to clarify once and for all that the Schachter and Singer experiment did not show what their article claimed it did, that the design and the analysis were flawed, and the results were not replicated. Boom. There you have it. Complete devastation. One would assume that was the end of it. However, much to my surprise, for decades afterwards, you could take any random introductory book in psychology, or more specifically, social psychology, and you might feel you were in a parallel universe. Not only were the criticisms not heeded, but the reporting of design and results were extremely shoddy. Basically, authors wrote fantasy versions of the real deal. I am not making this up. In my courses, I love to take random introductory books and show how they fail the reader because the level of scholarship is shoddy. This does not help to advance emotion science. This is of course the big thing. This neutralizes decades of good research by simply ignoring the fact that the state of emotion science has moved on.

In full Statler and Waldorf mode, I would argue that emotion researchers have to keep up-to-date on these things and, again, identify bad and faulty research if they see it. Let me be clear. It is not the case that all theories are equal. Some have empirical evidence going for them; others do not. If we do not care about empirical evidence, then we should just abandon the enterprise of trying to understand how emotions work and join the ranks of pseudosciences. We must take care that our students are well trained. We must avoid people feeling they are accomplished emotion scientists after reading a couple of books and a few articles on a specialist field. Could you imagine this working in chemistry? How many skills must an engineer master to get an advanced degree? I truly believe we need to upgrade what we consider to be the common pool of knowledge that we expect an emotion researcher to have. I am not talking about a single course in a semester – I am talking about a curriculum. If we do not get our act together, the pendulum will swing back and emotions will be again and again relegated to the fluffy, fuzzy, and funny cream on top of cognitive science.

The present matters

There are always new things in emotion-land. Neuroscience happened a decade ago; recently, there was a lot of interest in media; and now there is affective computing. There are complex systems approaches to emotions in the context of computational social science and other things that are perhaps beyond my horizon. As emotion researchers, we must try to stay abreast of developments that help us to understand emotional processes and also take chances if a particular context provides the possibility for good research. A few decades ago, that might have been clinical psychology and psychiatry – now it may be engineering. This does not mean that one can be an expert in all fields, but one should have an idea what people in these areas are doing. To me, this is one of the important things that our conference can provide. It is not only a place to meet old (and young) colleagues; it is potentially a good place to get overview of what is happening. The interdisciplinary nature of the meeting is truly important. This also means that we must strive to keep our eyes open, invite people to the meetings, get them involved. This does not happen on its own. It requires members to get involved.

At the last meeting, I hosted a President’s symposium where I raised the issue of the methodological challenges that are currently rampant in psychology and other fields. Massive
replication efforts are being undertaken and they are showing that some of our beloved studies do not replicate. This need not be the end of a purported effect or phenomenon, but it is clearly enough of a wake-up call to check what is going on. Much of our research is underpowered and does not hold up to what we know today about statistics. Hence, there are efforts to improve the validity of empirical studies, for example via preregistration of designs, hypotheses, and so on. Do you know about these things? If not, it is something for the to-do list, for sure.

The future matters

We do not know the future. But we do know who is going to deal with the future. It will be our young colleagues and their students. Much has changed in the society since Ronnie de Sousa’s “Let them all in” appeal. And still, the society can do better. “Junior” groups are always difficult to maintain because of the necessarily transitional phase that the young researchers are in. Some might drop out of the field in a couple of years and so it might be difficult to create the organizational continuity required. But it is possible. We need to find ways to facilitate participation at conferences for early career researchers; enable exchanges to visit other groups; provide mentorship; create structural links between our board and young researchers; foster interdisciplinarity and internationality. Now this might sound terribly pompous, but I do believe that academics, regardless of their field, should strive to provide examples of good practice and to inspire, because that is a key element in making sure that the future has the brightest minds work on the things you find the most interesting and relevant.

So there you have a meandering collection of thoughts on the science and our research society. And now I can drop the Statler and Waldorf routine (or Scrooge as it were) and go back to being a reasonable Kermit 😄.

P.S. Apologies to all those in the past who I may have forgotten or misrepresented in my work…
ISRE Early Career Researchers Section

ISRE Early Career Researchers Section: Driving Forces and Initiatives

Tanja S. H. Wigenbach, Michael Boiger, Melina West, Claire Ashley, & Heather J. Nuske

The Early Career Researchers Section of the International Society for Research on Emotion (ISRE) is a committee founded by Peter Lewinski and others in 2013, which aims to support and advance career development in early career emotion scientists (students, postdocs, junior faculty).

The early career emotion researchers currently chairing the ISRE Early Career Researchers Section are representative of the diversity among ISRE’s early career researchers. The current committee consists of five members, from graduate student to postdoc, located across four continents.

We are all proud members of ISRE and are committed to shaping and advancing the society’s early career emotion scientists. Specifically, we will be implementing three major initiatives from this year onwards:

(1) Web-based mid-year seminars on topics relevant to emotion researchers in conference off-years, starting in 2018,
(2) A mentoring programme that brings together early career emotion researchers and established emotion researchers, and
(3) Early career awards (publications, posters, dissertations) for excellence in emotion research.

(1) Web-based Seminars on Emotion Research

We are working on implementing 1h online seminars on relevant emotion topics to keep the members of the society engaged even in the year that no conference is taking place. Thus, these webinars are planned to take place over a period of six weeks during the months July/August 2018, and in future conference off-years (2020, 2022, etc.). The online seminars will be implemented using online video web conferencing software, allowing easy audio and video conferencing across the globe. On a weekly basis, one established emotion researcher from the ISRE society will give a talk on their specific area of expertise and allow for questions and discussion afterwards. Those ‘webinars’ will be open to all ISRE members free of charge, but also for non-ISRE-members to promote ISRE as a society and potentially gain new members. Since ISRE is an international society, the problem of people being located in various time zones cannot be overcome. However, the seminars will take place at an appropriate time for the speaker and hopefully include speakers from different time zones to allow for maximum global participation. We will arrange for each webinar to be recorded and made available to all ISRE members as a video file, and to archive the webinar videos on the Facebook pages, and, if possible, through the ISRE website, so that they are available to interested researchers that were not able to attend. Recruitment of speakers is currently taking place.

(2) Mentoring Programme

It can be crucial for early career researchers to have contacts that can offer help, insights, or guidance on a theoretical level as well as on challenges that might be faced at this career stage. The mentoring programme is intended to facilitate establishing these helpful contacts. We believe that it is of tremendous value to assure a connection and strong bonds between researchers at early career levels and those that are more established. Ideally, mentors will be at an Associate Professor level and upwards. With the mentoring programme, established researchers get the opportunity to help shape the future generation, while early career researchers can learn from the experience and knowledge of their mentors. It has become clear at the ISRE 2017 conference that this is a need by early career researchers and senior researchers are willing to be in closer contact to early career researchers. The initiative of a mentoring programme creates a platform allowing for this to take place explicitly. Interests and abilities of mentors and mentees will be compared and matching will take place accordingly. Mentors are able to decide on
their limit of mentees (e.g., 1 or more), for how long they are able to meet with their mentee (e.g., for a semester or year) and the format of the mentoring experience. Formats may include advice/instruction on specific topics (e.g., research themes, analysis methods), involvement on specific projects (i.e., the student may be able to help out on research projects of the mentor’s choosing), or an unstructured meeting-type format. The recruitment of mentors is currently in the works.

(3) Awards

For early career emotion researchers, there is currently little formal recognition of scientific excellence. Awards play a crucial role in helping young outstanding researchers achieve recognition, increase chances for competitive funding and thus improve career opportunities outside their established networks; awards recognise scientific excellence independent of university affiliation or advisor’s recognition in the field. We are working towards implementing three possible awards that differ in scope, and target different stages of early research career: Early Career Publication Award, Student Poster Award, and Dissertation Award.

We are excited to implement these new initiatives which are aligned with the interests of ISRE, in that they support and extend the interdisciplinary core of ISRE. We are grateful of the generous support of ISRE in implementing these initiatives.

Are you a faculty-level emotion scientist that wants to support early career scientists through our new initiatives? Fill out this short survey to express your interest: https://upenn.co1.qualtrics.com/jfe/form/SV_0IYPjxd1QR959r

Are you an early career emotion scientist or faculty that support early career emotion scientists? Join our Facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/groups/ISRE.JRS/?ref=br_rs

For any other questions or comments, please email Heather Nuske (hnuske@upenn.edu) or Tanja Wigenbach (tanja.wingenbach@bath.edu)

Tanja Wingenbach
Postdoctoral Research Fellow
Mackenzie Presbyterian University, Brazil
Research Interests: Emotion processing, particularly facial emotion, in typical and clinical populations

Michael Boiger
Postdoctoral Research Fellow
University of Leuven, Belgium
Research Interests: Emotion dynamics in social and cultural contexts

Melina West
PhD Candidate
University of Queensland, Australia
Research Interests: Emotion processing; child development
Claire Ashley  
Masters Candidate  
University of Sussex, UK  
Research Interests: Emotion processing; mental health

Heather Nuske  
Postdoctoral Research Fellow  
University of Pennsylvania, USA  
Research Interests: Emotion regulation development; autism
ISRE Interview

From Goats to Aardvarks: The Journey of a Functionalist Researcher of Emotion

Joseph J. Campos

An interview with Eric Walle
(November 2017)

Joseph Campos is Professor Emeritus in the Department of Psychology and Professor in the Graduate School in Psychology at the University of California, Berkeley. He was a co-founder of the International Society for Research on Emotion, and past President of the International Society for Infant Studies. He has published more than 120 articles and chapters on emotion, emotional development, and developmental transitions, such as the onset of self-produced locomotion. Campos’ research advocates for appreciating the underlying function of emotions, referred to as functionalist emotion theory, and emphasizes the study of emotion in interpersonal contexts.

What was your childhood like, where did you grow up, what did your parents do, what was your family like? What were those early years like for you and your family?

They were all interrelated and powerfully effected by World War II. My first 5 years were spent in the Dominican Republic and we were a typical Dominican, middle-class family. My father was in the importing/exporting business, and that business was involved with Japan and Czechoslovakia. So, he couldn't have picked two worse countries. With the opening of WWII that ended. Moreover, during the beginning of WWII my father was in New York being treated for ulcers. When WWII began, U-boats were hanging around the Cape Hatteras area, which was the way that ships went from New York City to Puerto Rico to the Dominican Republic. The end result was that my poor mother had to survive by selling samples of the goods that my father had in storage as part of his business.

Finally, he and my mother were able to gather enough funds to fly when airplane flights began between Brazil and Miami with a stopover in the Dominican Republic. And so, we flew. We were one of the early passengers to go to Miami from the Dominican Republic. Then we took the train to New York City and our family shifted from middle class in the Dominican Republic to working class in New York City. My mother, who wasn't working in the Dominican Republic, became almost like the prototypical Jewish immigrant working in the garment district of New York City. She was called a cutter and had to mold fabric and cut it. And she worked her butt off. My father tried to re-establish his import/export business, which was very profitable in the Dominican Republic, but he couldn't get it off the ground in NYC. So, I grew up in a tenement. As a matter of fact, if anyone wants to see the block was that I grew up in was in the opening scenes of Westside Stories; when they showed the tenements and the playgrounds that had covered in cyclone fencing, that's exactly what I grew up in.

And you know you asked what was my reaction going to New York City as a 5-year-old and I have two that I can vividly remember. One is that I thought all the people in the United States spoke gibberish. And the second was that where we initially lived didn't have a refrigerator, so you had to put the milk on the sill outside the window. And one of the interesting features of leaving a
quart container of milk there was that every so often in the course of opening the window you knocked the container over. It never hit anyone in the head, thank God, but quite a few people were surprised to see this white bomb explode in front of them as they walked down the street. So those are the two important memories.

But I also trace my interest in emotion to two experiences I had that first year in New York City. One had to do with extreme embarrassment. I was learning to read in English and the first-grade teacher goes around and says, “Okay, it’s your turn to read pages 4, 5, and 6.” And when it came to my turn, I encountered a word that I could not identify. And a kid behind me whispered the word, except that it was the F-word and it burst the class into laughter and made the nun who was the first-grade teacher furious at me. And I will never forget my emotional reaction to that explosion.

The second experience was being absolutely furious at the school because I got left back when I was in first grade; I was left back! I was furious! And I think it affected me profoundly trying to understand emotion. And it also motivated me to prove that I could cut the mustard. And subsequently, year in and year out, I became the number one student in each class I was in, without exception.

I’m curious about your ambitions as a child. It sounds like you struggled initially with those early years in the US.

My ambition as a child was to become a teller in a bank because I thought that that was as close as I would ever get to having piles of money in my hand. I kid you not! My father at one time was a bank manager, so I had the banking connection. But I had no other aspirations than to be a bank teller.

When did that change? Were you always curious in terms of science?

I had the curiosity of a piece of granite. No, I was not curious. I was very fortunate because having done as well as I did academically, I received a 4-year scholarship unexpectedly to Manhattan College, which is a college run by the religious order had educated me all along. So, I went to college instead of becoming a bank teller and that made all the difference in the world. That was just a serendipitous chance. I didn't even know that this high school had a 4-year scholarship to college. I didn't even know what a college was.

I think you had a question in there about did your ethnicity affect you? And it sure did!

Yeah, both in terms of your schooling, as well as your career.

Well, the schooling first. When I got out of school I would walk home with everyone else. And when it was my turn to peel off to go back to my apartment building, the kids would say, “Well, enjoy your rice and beans dinner.” And they said that with the utmost contempt, which, of course, profoundly affected me.

And the other thing is that because I really started to excel academically; that was something that you did not do in those days. Mediocrity was rewarded! Oh, if you were a brain, you were the source of scorn and contempt. But fortunately, I was very good at athletics and playing cards. Everyone assumes that growing up in a tenement in New York City must have been terrible… in fact it was fantastic! It was fantastic because you just went out. You didn't have play dates; you just went out and saw a whole bunch of kids and said, “Do you want to play box ball? Do you want to play stick ball? Do you want to play stoop ball? Do you want to play football?” And you know there weren’t enough cars to be in the way, so it was fantastic. So, sports were very important for me. It was very exciting and it was also interesting because the police would come by and confiscate your sticks because stick ball was associated with broken windows. So, you had that thrill of violating the police.

And then after you played two or three games after school, you sat on the stoop and played cards well into the evening, and I was good at cards. We played a game called casino, which I don’t know if it exists anymore, we played bridge, and a variety of poker games. We didn't play for money, but we played for chips.

Interestingly people did not go into other people’s apartments. I think I went only 2 to 3 times in my life to a friend’s apartment. We just played out in the street. But it was fantastic. I
Interview: Joseph Campos

Bobby Thompson's "shot heard round the world" on October 3, 1951 to win the National League Pennant for the New York Giants.

never felt like I was bored. I never felt like I was underprivileged. On the contrary, growing up in New York City was actually fun and I missed it when I left New York.

Another thing that affected my interest in emotion – I was always very interested in sports. I've been a Giants fan since 1949! Listening to games was really funny to me: why would you give a shit about whether your team won or lost? So, I became curious about that. One of the great highlights in my life, ranking with my wedding day and the birth of our three children, was Bobby Thompson's homerun against the hated Dodgers; the famous “shot heard round the world.” That was euphoria cubed. And I still, to this day, ask myself the question, “Why?” I didn't make any money on it. I didn't have personal goal, but you know it was definitely something that ultimately related to the importance of goals in creating the context for emotions.

Tell me about your time at Cornell? What was your experience like? What was your early research?

Well, I wanted to study emotion and went to Cornell to work with a man who had an international reputation for studying emotion from a Pavlovian view. Remember, those were the days of behaviorism. His name was Howard Lydell.

And two things. First of all, when I went to Ithaca from NYC I had the culture shock of my life! To go from a bustling metropolis that had the best of everything, the skyscrapers, the New York Yankees, the Dodgers, and the Giants (who were always #1) and the Giants football team, and then the theatre, symphony, and opera… all were tops. To go to this dinky little town of 25,000 people… I got on a greyhound bus and went back to New York City. That was my introduction to Cornell. I hated it. I despised it. And of course, I started going to classes only to find out that the teachers in the Psych Department at Cornell were selected for their pitiful teaching skills. I mean they were terrible! And I hated the classes.

But a student at Cornell, who eventually became my best man at my wedding, was two years ahead of me and he linked up with me and we'd go for walks and I told him about how much I hated Cornell. And just in talking to him I found out that he was a totally different person than I. And I liked the intellectual content of our discussions, so I decided that I'd give it a try. And slowly I grew to love Cornell. And also, it was a co-ed school – even though it was 3 to 1 men, it was hell of a lot better than the catholic schools that I went to which were 100 to 0!

So, the first study that I did was to test the hypothesis from Professor Lydell. And that was that goats waiting to be conditioned, in other words the period between a conditioned stimulus and unconditioned stimulus of shock, was very stressful to the goat. In fact, according to Lydell, it was more stressful than the shock itself, and I said, “Well if its more stressful to expect the shock than to get the shock then why doesn't the animal just learn to get it over with by bringing it about?” And that was the equivalent of my master’s thesis. The project was subsequently called, “Masochism in Modern Goats,” which was a play on a book on psychoanalytic theory that was very popular at the time, “Masochism and Modern Man.” And the goats actually did learn to bring about the shock earlier, which was a violation of the law of effect.

Did you actually have goats in the lab? I’m picturing you like a Shepherd.

Professor Lydell had what was called the Behavior Farm, which was in the town next to Ithaca. You took a bus to go there, walked up to the lab, and there were a bunch of goats. You chose your subjects out of this herd of goats. I
would hook them up, measure their heart rate, and put on the electric shock device and record their behavior. That was my first publication.

And then on the day that I was supposed to take my qualifying exam, which was the first step for getting your doctorate and was really stressful, Lydell died that day. So, I was an orphan at work, as it were. I had nobody; there was nobody interested in emotion!

Finally, a year and a half later, somebody was appointed by the department who was from Illinois. He was interested in psychophysiology, which was the closest thing to emotion that you could get, and I started to work on psychophysiology. There I met another brilliant student, Gary Schwartz – he and I were real buddies and we were able to generate one idea after another. In fact, he and I were among the first to concoct the idea of operant conditioning in automatic functions and that laboratory did the first human studies on the topic. So that was how I got into the study of emotion.

My dissertation had to do with the physiological differentiation of emotional states. In those days, you gave your perspective to everyone in the faculty. James Gibson was one of them, and Gibson saw me in the hallway and said, “Hey Joe, I have something to tell you. You know, I read your perspective and all I got to say is you’re wasting your time. You’re never going to find what you predict.” And I was furious at him because, he was in perception; what the fungool did he know about emotion? But you know, he was right.

So now I’m a new PhD, but I always wanted to be a teacher. I always lusted to be a teacher at City College of New York, which at the time, was the number one school, undergraduate school, for creating future PhDs in the United States. It was the school where brilliant immigrant, first generation students went to school. And I wanted to get a job there. And I got an offer. I couldn't believe it – that they would chose me to be a teacher. But, the bug... the research bug had hit me. And I thought about a post doc in New York City at Albert Einstein College of Medicine on psychophysiology. And I went to work there and I rejected the offer from city college. So, as a post doc at Albert Einstein there was an infancy laboratory – not that I participated in it – but I certainly heard about work on infants. And the topic was testing the psychoanalytic hypothesis about activity level and temperament. So, I got infused with an interest in infancy, as a post doc I never saw an infant.

That is interesting because you’re so often linked with developmental psychology, but you really didn't get into studying child development until later in your academic development.

I got into child development when I got a call from Denver and they said, “We got an opening on infant psychophysiology and we would like to interview you.” I remember going into the bathroom so that I could talk in private so that I could tell them, “You know, if you want someone in psychophysiology, I’m your man. But if you want someone in infancy, I don't know an infant from an aardvark.” And as it turned out they invited me anyway. I hated the thought of going to Denver because I hated snow; I imagined Denver was the southern part of the North Pole, which it’s not.

So, I went there fully expecting to spend a nice weekend in a strange city and then say no. But they did something brilliant. They let us use a car for free over an extended weekend, and Rosemary and I went into the Rocky Mountains, and wow. If ever there was a seductive means for getting someone to sign on the employment chart, that was it. Both Rosemary and I fell in love with the Rocky Mountains. It turns out that Denver’s climate is very weird. It’s very mild… Fluctuated by blizzards. They offered me the job right there that Tuesday afternoon, right as we got back from the Rockies. The department chair offered me the job right then and there.

But then I had to actually teach a class in infancy and that was horror. It was absolute horror! I couldn't think of anything! I do not know how I managed to survive that first year.

Tell me about starting out as an assistant professor. What was your life like at the time? What struggles did you face getting your research off the ground?

Oh! You should have heard what the students would tell me. They were essentially my age – I
was 27 and they would say, “Joe, I don't know how you can pass yourself off as a professor of infant development when you and your wife haven’t even had a kid yet.”

But I was fortunate. The person who I was sort of replacing had a laboratory that was a former grocery store. They had essentially taken out the shelves of the grocery store and built booths for testing infants and that became the infancy laboratory. And it already had the equipment there. We had a form of transportation called the baby buggy that went from the University of Denver campus in southeast Denver to northwest Denver where the laboratory was located. And the lab was also across the street from the Catholic charities place where infants were awaiting adoption from shortly after birth to six months.

Perhaps most importantly, the department paid for a research associate and I wound up working with Charlotte Henderson. She was the most significant person in my professional life. She was tremendous because she was superb at getting babies, testing, and being supportive. She was an older adult supportive of me... I mean I was a little kid! I looked so young! I went to the library to check out a book and I would have to show them my grad cards because they wouldn't believe that I was a professor. I really did look very, very, very young. I probably looked about the typical age of a college senior and I was 27. And so having her as a right-hand person was very important because mothers are suspicious of letting their kids be handled by someone who didn't seem to be any older than their kid.

But the most important benefit of them all was that I was about 1 out of 5 people who started the experimental study of infant development. Before then there would be an occasional experimental study but nothing systematic. The only people who studied babies systematically were physicians who were interested in taking the age of norms. And what I found was that the field was wide-open! There was hardly any literature, so you didn't have to keep up with the literature. It was just wonderful to have a field entirely for yourself.

One thing that the graduate program at Cornell did was to show you the significant issues in the field. So, it was easy to identify significant
issues to study in the infant because generally those issues had been studied with animals, but in the mid-60s people realized that the human being is not a more complicated cat dog or rat or even an ape. And so, infancy was the royal road to understanding the origins of phenomena.

When you don't have competition, it means that anything you choose to do has an impact. One of the first dissertations that I supervised had to do with the role of the father and attachment figures. We did a study for a dissertation that showed attachment to the father as well as to the mother. However, the mother was typically preferred if you had a choice between the mother and father. That study was accepted by Boyd McCandies, and he accepted it without even sending it out for review (Cohen & Campos, 1974). And this is what I mean: when you don't have competition, you're bound to have an impact when you hit upon something that clashes with people’s opinions. Working with infants was a Godsend. Meanwhile, had I been in psychophysiology, I would have spent my time figuring out whether to use this kind of paste or that kind of paste in order to accurately measure the electrodermal response.

So it sounds like the infancy work pushed you more towards studying behavior rather than physiology.

Well initially my method of choice was physiological response. And I did an awful lot of studies on the psychophysiology of the infant. But eventually, as I learned more about babies, I started to have more trust in the behavior than in the psychophysiology, so I left psychophysiology behind.

One of the topics you're well known for is social referencing, and particularly social referencing in infancy. However, you have told me that you initially struggled getting that research accepted for publication. Can you share some of that experience?

Well, that research is really founded on my early findings that there is developmental shift on the visual cliff. Everybody thought that the visual cliff was a phenomenon, and that babies would be afraid of heights from the get-go. And thanks to Bonnie Bunsen, an undergraduate, who said that my ideas sucked, we found that there was a developmental shift between 5 and 9 months of age towards fear of heights. It took a lot longer to confirm that, but that study was ready for publication in January of 1970. But what happened was that people did not believe the results. They said, “all you’re showing is that heart rate deceleration means fear in the young baby and that changes the heart rate acceleration later on. So, go fuck yourself.” I submitted to four journals and all four rejected it. The fourth submission had a review from someone who was very helpful. He said, “You know, I think this paper is sufficiently original that I would submit it to Science.” So, I did submit it to Science and they accepted it (Campos, Langer, & Krowitz, 1970). What it taught me is don't believe the asshole reviewers because they have their biases.

Now in terms of social referencing, people used to think up until the 1970s that you could not measure emotion with precision. And even if you could measure it with precision; it didn't matter because emotion did not affect behavior. But no one had done any research on how emotions influence behavior. So, we figured that if facial expressions are such a powerful indicator of emotion, shouldn't it be a powerful regulator of behavior? And that's what we did on the visual cliff. But nobody believed at the time that emotions could impact behavior, and that was a fundamental criticism. And so they kept asking for more emotions than the original study had, or asking what happens if there is no depth on the visual cliff? And this and that, and the other thing... Each one of those studies took a really long time to do and synthesize with the earlier studies.

So, the study was originally completed in 1981 and it was not published until 1985 (Sorce, Emde, Campos, & Klinnert, 1985), and you know how it was published? A reviewer wrote to the editor and said, “I refuse to comment on this paper. It is way overdue for publication. People are now citing this paper and doing follow up work on social referencing. And yet the mother paper was never allowed to be published.” And the paper was accepted as a result of that reviewer’s comments. That's how most visual cliff studies published in 1970’s and the social referencing paper were published – despite
Interview: Joseph Campos

Can you tell me about the progression from going from Denver to Illinois and then from Illinois to Berkeley?

Denver was at the top of its game in developmental psychology. In 1984, it was tied for #1 with Minnesota for impact in developmental psychology. Denver had a history of taking students who were good and making them into first rate researchers, turning out first rate studies. That is what made Denver so strong. I had a 4,400 square feet laboratory and I could do research on so many different areas because there was no problem with one study getting in the way of another study. I had Charlotte Henderson who was helping coordinate everything. It was fantastic, but Denver ended up in financial difficulties and the university was going to sell the building with my 4,400 square feet lab. If I was going to have to move my laboratory, I said to myself, then I'm going to move to go somewhere else.

Once I threw my hat in the ring I had job offers, and I favored the offer from Illinois for two reasons. First, Illinios was where I wanted to go as a graduate student. Second, my post-doc advisor, who I owe so much to, came from Illinois. So, it was a place that I thought very highly of and I loved the research that they did. However, Illinois had so much strength at the time in developmental psychology that I felt like the .300 hitter who was sitting on the bench. There was no room for me to play an essential role. That was a weakness with my stay when I was at Illinois. When I learned that Berkeley was looking for a position for the Head of Institute of Human Development, I didn't reply. They kept coming after me and eventually I said “Well, okay. Let me throw my hat in the ring after all.” The rest is history.

I'm curious, arriving in Berkeley you were coming to a place that's often referred to as a hot-bed for emotion researchers. Did that transition impact your research? Were there any discussions that were influential in your theory and research of emotion?

The very reason that I decided to major in psychology was a paper that I read in a course in experimental psychology called “Subception.” It was a paper written by Dick Lazarus on unconscious processes and classical conditioning on emotion. I absolutely loved that paper. I loved..
reading about Dick Lazarus’ work in his 1966 book (Lazarus, 1966) and his work on what is now being used on studying emotion regulation. I loved Dick Lazarus’ work but I never studied with him.

It turned out that my first teaching assignment was with Lazarus and Phil Cowan. And the three of us had – without knowing each other – such a similarity of approach to the topic of emotion that there was there was tremendous affinity. And then Dick took an early retirement and he was a bit down in the dumps; he lost his role. And I said, “You know what your problem is Dick? You aren’t using your strength. Instead of having teaching, why don’t we have a weekly seminar in which we’ll discuss articles of emotion, invite whoever wanted to come and go as they will with one proviso: that you are forbidden to have anyone read your papers.” And that's what we did for 12.5 years together, and that was a significant event.

In the meantime, the Social Area started to hire one emotionologist after the other. So, the department that consisted of Bob Levenson and Dick Lazarus, and then joined by me, had emotionologists coming out the ears. My job was to make emotional development into a powerhouse and build up Berkley’s reputation and productivity. Both things were accomplished.

You are a founding member of ISRE. Can you share a unique perspective on what led to the forming of the society and what was it like early on at meetings and interactions?

Well, remember the huge shift in the zeitgeist about emotion? That took place in the 1970s. Zeitgeist is the right term to use because this was something that was seen in lots and lots of fields in philosophy, in neuroscience, in social psychology, and somewhat less so in developmental psychology. Across the board there were these changes, but they were disorganized. And Paul Ekman, Klaus Scherer, Ricky Davidson and I met frequently for one reason or another. And the four of us more or less coalesced into a solar system where we thought it would appropriate to have a society, the purpose of which was to foster the integration of research and emotion. And the crucial point for me is integration. They needed somebody who was good at talking to sociologists, anthropologists,
neuroscientists, and so forth. Whether by reason of already reaching capacity in their own work, Klaus and Paul were not inclined to take on the role of the major organizer, and Ricky Davidson was very junior at the time. And so I was asked to become the Executive Organizer, and I was very excited by it because my view of the society was to use my connections to tap into the interests of the NIH in studying emotion. My vision was to establish a society that not only met bi-annually, but a society that created spin off meetings that fostered new directions and that also met regionally. And so long as I was the Executive Officer, I founded 5 different regional meetings. This is going to sound a little bit archaic in the year 2018, but one was to study the topic of cognition and emotion in the Rocky Mountains. It was a fantastically successful meeting having anybody and everybody that had any relation to cognition and emotion independent of discipline. There was another meeting on emotion and aging at the study of behavioral sciences, which at that time was a revolutionary idea – so far ahead of its time that it flopped. We had one to do with temperament that was held at Clark University. And there were others as well, and the point was for ISRE to be the sporting ground of new directions of research.

What were those early biannual meetings like? Were they relatively small?

They were exciting because it consisted of introducing members of these different, autonomous, celestial bodies to one another. We learned an awful lot. Of course, in future meetings after we had learned what others had done, that excitement abated somewhat. The first meeting was at Harvard. I submitted a grant application that was shot down. But after talking to the head of the behavioral sciences program we got a contract that fully funded our travel expenses. There was an executive committee and a very good one. Excellent people on it. They suggested individuals’ names and then after debating on them, the group decided to extend an offer of charter membership. We had something like 80 charter members. They were charter members for free, for life, so they had no reason to turn us down. It was a very exciting period in my life.

Joe Campos, surrounded by Japanese school children.

It’s always fun to hear stories of what those early days were like. Are they any instances that you can recall from the first couple ISRE meetings?

One early memory was work presented by Candice Perch that examined neurotransmitters. At the time, very few people outside of psychopharmacology thought about neurotransmitters. So, she opened up that area of interest in her talk and was a highlight of the meeting.

But more broadly, I had never been to a meeting in which there were people from so many different countries – France, the UK, Italy, China, Japan – it was unbelievable. I would say that the cohesion that took place as a result of that first meeting opened up the possibility of emotion research that was cross cultural and international. Not necessarily following the footsteps of Paul Ekman in his cross-cultural work, but more modest that led to the work we did in our lab on
collaboration with Harriet Oster and Linda Camras on facial expression and basic emotion in Japan, China, and the US. That cohesion fostered our work and I’m sure the work of others. Very exciting, too, is the opportunity to meet different people, like Bob Solomon. He’s a philosopher of emotion whose ideas were similar to the emerging cognitive appraisal approaches of Phoebe Ellsworth and Dick Lazarus. And again, the excitement resulted not so much somebody telling you this is the way things are; it was just in having people come together whose ideas rang true to you but were different.

It was very exciting. There was a lot of creative and constructive tension. And the people were not afraid to talk to each other, so we had anthropologists, sociologists, and psychologists of all persuasions able to talk to each other. The period between 1984 and 1988 was a period of great intellectual excitement in ISRE. And I think ISRE has been partly responsible for, if not for creating but certainly maintaining, that excitement and making that excitement cross-national and interdisciplinary.

You brought up some aspects relating to your own thinking of emotion. I was hoping that you could lay out and describe your functionalist theory of emotion. Especially because there may be people who may not be as familiar with that theory. What does the functionalist theory say about emotion, how does it compare and contrast with other emotionalist theories, and what do you see as its merits or limitations?

Yeah, as a matter of fact, it’s interesting you should bring up limitations. The functionalist theory of emotion emerged from discussions I had with Karen Caplovitz Barrett in writing a chapter of socioemotional development in the Handbook of Child Psychology (see Campos, Barrett, Lamb, Goldsmith, & Stenberg, 1983). We were trying to figure out what to say about what was essential about emotion. And it was a major transformation of thinking where initially we thought emotion depended on the self, but the more we thought of it the more we realized that emotion had to be relational. It is not the study of the presentation of an event and then measuring the consequences of the presentation in the responses of a person. The construal of the event mattered. And at that time, Ira Roseman wrote his dissertation and helped create a basis for moving into what would become appraisal theory of emotion.

But the functionalist approach differs in many ways from appraisal theory. First, it does not say that emotions are in the service of one’s concerns and motivations. We did not think that motivation was the only source of this person-event relation because we looked at it from the standpoint of social referencing work, and what we studied there was the missing half of what Ekman was studying. Ekman studied how people recognized or made attributions about emotion. We studied how the visual expression made a difference in the behavior of others. And so, we thought that the social signals of others were every bit as primary as the needs something that Dick Lazarus and I argued at length. The second difference of a functionalist approach is hedonics. In other words, people are motivated to have emotional reactions in the presence of hedonic events - pain and pleasure. This was a throwback to the original approach to emotion, but it was a forgotten aspect of emotion in the 1980s. And lastly, from attachment theory came the very important idea that emotions, in part, result from one’s past interactions with others.

And so, the difference between a functional approach and a classic appraisal approach has to do with the addition of these three other primitives: the social signals, the hedonics, and the past history. Those were not given any major play in appraisal theory. I see the functionalist
Interview: Joseph Campos

approach to be a branch of the appraisal theory, but unlike appraisal theory it is committed to studying what difference does a person-event transaction make in the behavior of the individual. Studies of emotion beforehand tended to be studies of attribution of facial expressions, as if that was the most important thing to do. And to this day that's what people; they give people questionnaires, but they don't really try to study the people. Real people in real situations with different person-environment relations, yet the physical nature of the person and the event in the environment can be the same. The functionalist approach tries to correct that by studying the person-event interaction. And some of the research in our lab, not all of it, but some, is an instantiation of the functionalist approach even though some appraisal theorists would have assimilated it into their own dossier of phenomenon. I don't have any difficulty with functionalism being called appraisal theory, but it’s different from appraisal theory in significant ways.

What are five articles or books that have been influential on you?


I consider this book to be the equivalent of Chomsky's book criticizing behaviorism in 1957 and producing the psycholinguistic revolution and the book by Ulric Neisser that produced the cognitive revolution in 1967. This book launched the Emotion Revolution that continues unabated to this day. It is beautifully written, convincingly argued, and corrective of the inferential and methodological errors that led researchers to conclude that emotion could not be measured with specificity. One weakness is the lack of acknowledgement of Ellsworth's contribution to the volume.


This book is what I turn to when I need inspiration about the study of emotion. It is startlingly original, thorough in correcting misimpressions about the nature of emotion and theoretically profound. It is a trailblazing book, but one that suffers from terrible editing by the publishers.


This book is the masterpiece of the author of Appraisal Theory. It has the clearest explanation anywhere of the difference between cognition and appraisal which proved to be very different processes. Its description of patterns of appraisal that produce different emotions is subject to considerable debate and some sections such as its treatment of esthetic emotions are weak and other sections such as culture and emotion are also subject to debate. However, it is much more legible than Frijda's book.


Music undeniably generates emotions, sometimes powerfully so. Yet, there are few persuasive attempts at explaining the processes by which music generates affect. This book gives the most persuasive and thorough treatment of this ineffable topic I have encountered and poses challenges to both Ekman and Appraisal Theory approaches.


This is an excellent compendium of generally well written reviews of the facets of Appraisal Theory. It is equaled, but not exceeded in thoroughness in my experience.

Joe, I’m curious – as an emotion researcher, do you feel that researchers have gotten lazy in wanting to use questionnaires rather than the more elaborate and dramatic experimental paradigms used previously?

Yes.

How’s that for a cogent answer?
Haha. Well, one of the things I wanted to ask you was what are some aspects of emotion that you feel need to be studied more or have been studied in inappropriate ways? What directions should future researchers adopt? What paradigms or philosophies of science are important for the field?

Well, I am immediately reminded of a contribution I made with you, Audun Dahl, and Alexandra Main regarding the study of emotion regulation (Campos, Walle, Dahl, & Main, 2011). You all did a lit search and discovered that some 88% of the studies on emotion regulation, perhaps the most central topic in the field as of today, were conducted with a single person in a solitary context. That the most important aspect of emotion regulation is not can you suppress your emotion, but can you suppress your emotion in a way that is relevant to your interaction with another person and that enables you to have a more successful interaction with the other. You cannot study emotion regulation meaningfully by studying a single person, in a single room with physiological sensors attached to the individual. You can have physiological sensors the way Bob Levenson uses them, but like Bob Levenson study the couple or the small group. And that I think is what’s needed. Not more individual contexts – contexts when the individual is interacting with no other human being. That is a major implication that you all pinned beautifully with that graph in the Emotion Review article.

Are there other topics for research? You mentioned that emotion regulation seems to be you know in vogue right now. Are there particular topics you’ve always felt have gotten short shrift or warranted greater attention than they have received?

For me one big issue is music. There’s probably no single event – I’m using the word event as a stimulus complex in this case – that can so reliably elicit emotion as can music. Appraisal theorists like Dick Lazarus say, “Oh, well that’s just because the music reminds you of a present encounter you had in Paris with your lover” blah blah blah. And that is partly true, but it misses much of the boat. No one that I know of, with the exception of Sloboda, has really articulated the importance of studying the relation between musical generation as an event and then the emotional reaction of the individual. I think that there lies a major challenge for appraisal theorists and discrete emotion theorists. You’re not going to get far studying discrete emotions by playing music. Yet, I would say interview 100 undergraduates and ask them how important is music for feeling emotion and I would say 90-95% of them would say music. And yet we don’t study it. So, I would say that is a gigantic gap. A fertile gap, and a challenging gap because I think that appraisal theory has gone far but not far enough.

What do you mean by that?

That they have ignored phenomena that don’t readily fit into an appraisal context. Because I do not think that music fits an appraisal context. Some aspects do, but not all. And that’s it. Music is very rich in how music generates emotion. Sloboda has done a superior job in his book, *The Musical Mind* (1985), in trying to disentangle what aspects of music are related to what aspects of emotion. There’s a little corollary that may come as a surprise to you. For years I have poo-pooed the importance of feeling. And I still believe that feeling is not the core of emotion, but it’s a facet and an important facet. I think that we’ve got to struggle with the issue of how feelings are generated. By feelings I don’t mean physiological arousal; I’m talking about the context of consciousness.

How do you think researchers can study that?

We study how salt, sugar, and vinegar lead to different sensations from the tongue, so we have made some progress on that, but we haven’t with regards to feelings. It’s too complicated. But we eventually do have to struggle with it, and the people who have struggled with it do not have much of an impact. So, if you’re going to examine a topic that is novel, then I think that one candidate choice would be examining pharmacology and the study of feeling. And that of course subsequently leads to the question of what are the bounds between feeling and
behavior? But that's a separate and more complicated issue. Let's take it one step at a time.

So, I've just given you what I consider to be weaknesses of not just the functional approach but appraisal approaches and discrete emotion approaches that say nothing about these topics, though at least appraisal theorists can try to make some statements.

This is very interesting for me to think about because you've typically stressed to downplay the role of feeling. But I think that you're right in the sense that it's downplayed because it's difficult to understand and to study.

Also, that it's secondary to more fundamental processes like the event-person relationship.

But it's interesting that its secondary for researchers, because I would say if you talk to the man on the street it's probably primary for what they conceptualize emotion to be.

Right. And you know I only know one treatment of feeling and that's the book by Laird in 2007, which is well done; it's a good book. But it it's a glancing treatment of feeling; it's William James revived. And William James' theory – don't get me started! He has misled the study of emotion terribly. I don't think feeling is as essential as people make it out to be, but it is a facet, just like facial expression, vocal expression, gesture, even the selection of words. We don't study how emotion involves the facet of feeling. And I think that is an omission; if we are trying to reconstruct a diamond that facet would be missing. So, you wouldn't have a very pretty diamond. It's not a change in my thinking, but it certainly a change in the direction of steering of the emotion ship.

Are there any articles or studies that you or others have written that you feel deserved greater attention by researchers in the field?

Well, you know, at the risk of being classified as a neo dinosaur, the clear answer for me is the work of John Dewey. In the same issue that William James (1894) wrote one aspect of his theory, the Psychological Review, Issue 1, Volume 1, John Dewey (1894) took a very opposite view. That view of John Dewey and a follow up paper he wrote in Volume 2 of Psych Review (Dewey, 1895) together are totally ignored. I rarely see it cited anywhere. And yet, it contains the core of appraisal theory. I think that represents, in my judgement, a significant omission in the education of emotionologists. Because everyone reads William James, or at least about William James, but there was a contrary article written that essentially challenged William James centrally, and that was the work of John Dewey. Those two papers, I think, are the ones that I would say should be part of the education of anybody in emotion.

In terms of individual papers, I’ve been doing a lot of reviewing recently and the paper you published 4 years ago (Walle & Campos, 2014) on the ability of the infant to detect authentic emotion signals in the other has not been cited. Yet, it’s central in the thinking, or lack thereof, of papers I’ve been reading. So, that one is a recent example from 2014. We still don't know if others would try the same thing or find different methods in which the findings are challenged, but nobody’s going to challenge something without citing the work.

Are there any studies that you did that were particularly memorable or fun but people may not immediately think of when they think of your work?

Oh, there’s a lot! There’s a lot of those! And they’re very timely. We did several studies on discrete emotions. One study published in 1979 was designed to test aspects of discrete emotion theory (Hiatt, Campos, & Emde, 1979), and discrete emotions theory came out quite well. In 1983 there was a study that I did with Craig Stenberg on anger in 7-month-old infants (Stenberg, Campos, & Emde, 1983). That paper was important because it led to a study that I published with Stenberg in 1990 (Stenberg & Campos, 1990). It was a very important paper because it showed that anger was more than just a facial expression. That was the beginning of the study that emotions can be manifested in many different ways -- equipotentiality. Maybe because it was published in a book it has not been cited despite the fact that it should be cited by people writing about discrete emotions theory. That
study confirmed aspects of discrete emotions theory. And the reason that that 1990 study is so important is that it revealed that the emotion of anger can be manifested in a lot more ways than just the face. And that for us was a pivotal shift.

No one talks about failures. Is there a study or paradigm that you attempted to do or thought it would work, and for one reason or another, it just didn't?

Everything I have done has been a flop! Most every prediction I have made has turned out to be false. But in the course of doing the study, if you pay attention to the behavior of the baby, you will get something valuable. Consider the visual cliff. That was the very first baby study that I did. The whole idea was to get the baby to show heart rate acceleration at the very earliest testing opportunity – at 1 month of age. And it flopped! The baby didn't accelerate, it decelerated. But what did that reveal? It showed that at 9 months it did accelerate. There was a developmental shift and the rest is history. It revolutionized our understanding of motoric processes in psychological development and it revolutionized our view of development of emotion, whereas fear in Watson’s theory was considered to be innate, here we’re finding it to hardly be innate where it should have been innate.

The other one is the social referencing study. We thought it would work and the baby didn’t do shit! Then one day I walked in and saw Jim Sorce and I said, “You know what the problem is? The babies aren’t gonna show any reaction to the face that you can measure because you have a 4-foot drop off. And they’re going to be afraid of that intrinsically no matter what the mother expresses. Shorten the drop off to ten inches.” And that was it. So, the first study was a flop, the visual cliff fear study was a flop, and as a matter of a fact I welcome flops because I think you can learn more from a flop than from a positive finding.

What are you up to these days? You recently retired from your formal faculty appointment at UC Berkley. How are you filling your time? What are your current interests? What do you look forward to doing?

Well, first of all I retired only a few months ago. It’s too early to tell. To this day I think that having a role to play is absolutely crucial. In retirement you lose a lot of roles. But as of right now I don't see anything different than before. I’m still working on thinking and planning studies on psychological and motor development – number one. And number two, studies on emotion, broadly construed. Those continue.

What are the differences? The differences are from resulting from the loss of eyesight. Had I not fallen victim to aggressive glaucoma I would not have retired. In fact, I just finished teaching a pro seminar on emotion and it was difficult to teach, but it can be done. I’ve been very fortunate that UC Berkley, given all of its fiscal dilemmas, has graciously and generously contributed funds to help me continue to be a conductive researcher to the best of my abilities. And I am eternally grateful to Berkeley for its support; they’re doing that for someone whose retired! That’s unheard of!

Joe officiating the marriage of his former graduate students, Alexandra Main and Eric Walle (9/3/17).
Interview: Joseph Campos

It sounds like you haven’t slowed down much at all! Are there any non-academic things that you’re looking forward to?

Well, I love watching movies and have been learning to use audible.com to enjoy books. But to be honest things are pretty much the same as before.

References
ISRE Spotlight

Admiring the Immoral

Alfred Archer

Department of Philosophy
Tilburg University
a.t.m.archer@tilburguniversity.edu

I am currently working on a project on the nature and value of admiration, funded by The Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research. This project investigates the nature, ethics and value of admiration. Information about this project can be found here: https://alfredarcher.weebly.com/research-projects.html

This piece is based on a paper co-authored with Benjamin Matheson entitled ‘When Artists Fall: On Admiring the Immoral’. A draft of the paper is available here: https://www.academia.edu/35377684/When_Artists_Fall_On_Admiring_the_Immoral

Roman Polanski is one of the world’s most admired filmmakers. He has received more than 80 international film awards including, in 2003, an Oscar for best director for his film The Pianist. In 2010, a poll of film critics for The Guardian and The Observer declared his film Chinatown to be the greatest film of all time. Actors who work with him regularly praise his talent as a director.

Polanski is also a self-confessed rapist. In 1977, Polanski was arrested for the sexual assault of 13-year-old Samantha Gailey. Polanski was indicted of six counts of criminal behaviour, including rape. Polanski pleaded guilty to unlawful sexual intercourse but fled the country. Four more women have subsequently accused Polanski of sexual assault. Of course, Polanski is far from the only high-profile celebrity to have acted immorally. The recent #meToo campaign has led to a number of high profile artists – including Louis CK and Kevin Spacey – being accused of immoral behaviour. Is it appropriate to admire these artists for their artistic talents despite their immoral behaviour?

This issue was at the centre of a recent dispute about the decision to name Polanski the president of the César Awards. Claire Serre-Combe of Osez le féminisme (Dare to be feminists), said that, “We cannot let this pass. Making Polanski president is a snub to rape and sexual assault victims.” On the face of it, this claim may strike some people as odd. After all, Polanski is being celebrated for his artistic talent, not for his immoral behaviour. In what way then, is it a snub to victims of sexual assault to admire his artistic achievements?

I will investigate two different ways of defending the claim that admiring immoral artists can be morally problematic. First, I will investigate an argument based on the view that admiration involves an evaluation of a whole person. I will argue that this kind of argument is unconvincing. I will then propose an alternative argument that is able to explain why admiring immoral artists can constitute a snub to their victims.

The Nature of Admiration

What is involved in the emotion of admiration? While emotions are notoriously difficult to provide precise characterisations for (Ben-Ze’ev, 2000: 6), there are a number of features emotions are thought to possess that can be used to distinguish different emotional categories. According to Deonna, Rodogno and Teroni (2012: 10), we can differentiate different emotions according to the following seven dimensions: phenomenology, intentional object, evaluative component, the developmental path of acquisition, typical eliciting situations, manifestation and associated action tendencies. For the purposes of my discussion, I am interested in the intentional object and the evaluative component.

The intentional object of an emotion is the object that the emotion is directed towards. For example, if I feel fear because I
see a grizzly bear approaching me then the bear is the intentional object of my fear. The evaluative component, meanwhile, is the positive or negative judgement the emotion contains towards that emotional object. My fear of the bear, for example, involves the judgement that the bear poses a threat to things I value, such as my life.

In the case of the bear, my emotion fits its target. By this, I mean that it represents its object properly. My fear represents the bear properly, as the bear is a danger to me. There are also times where an emotion does not fit its target. Koumpounophobia is a fear of buttons. People who possess this phobia are afraid of buttons on clothing. But this fear is not fitting, as buttons are not dangerous and so are not fitting targets of fear. An emotion can also be fitting but not be on balance an appropriate emotion to feel. For example, when confronted by the bear, fear may not be the most useful emotion to feel. This could lead me to scream or run away which will increase my chances of being attacked. This shows that an emotion can fit its target (represent it accurately), without it being the emotion that we have most reason to feel.

What kind of evaluation does admiration involve? It is widely accepted that admiration involves a positive judgement of its object. According to Adam Smith, admiration just is “Approbation heightened by wonder and surprise,” (1759/ 2007: I.i.4.3). Similarly, Ben-Ze’vev claims that admiration involves, “a highly positive evaluation of someone,” (2000: 56). Finally, William Lyons claims that admiration involves, “an evaluation of [its] object which can be classed as a pro-evaluation or approval,” (1980: 90). It should not be surprising that this claim is so widely endorsed. Unless someone is judging an object positively then she cannot be admiring the object. Given that admiration involves a positive evaluation of its intentional object, it will only be fitting when the object warrants that positive evaluation.

What kind of positive evaluation does admiration involve? According to Macalester Bell (2011; 2013) admiration always involves a global evaluation of a person. In order to evaluate this claim we must first reach an understanding of what exactly it means. A globalist emotion is one that targets a whole person rather than an individual action or trait. Some philosophers claim, for example, that shame is a globalist emotion, as it targets a whole person (Nussbaum, 2009: 207; Williams, 1993: 89). Guilt, on the other hand, only targets particular actions a person has performed. Similarly, some philosophers claim that while contempt is globalist, resentment is not (Bell, 2011; 2013; Mason, 2003). In both cases, the globalist emotion is said to target the whole person, where this refers to a person’s various psychological elements – for example, her emotions, dispositions, values, cares, and commitments.

There are though at least two different ways of understanding globalist emotions. According to Doris (2003) global emotions target global traits. These are traits that fit with her other traits. Someone can only be worthy of shame on this account if she possesses some character trait that is worthy of shame and all of her traits cohere with this shame-worthy trait. This means that if someone possesses any traits that are fitting targets of pride, then that person cannot be a fitting target of shame. To apply this view to admiration, someone could only be worthy of admiration if they possessed some admirable trait and all of their other traits cohered with this trait. According to this view, someone who possesses a trait for which they are worthy of contempt could not be admirable.
This view has important implications for the question of whether we can admire immoral artists. If we accept this view then the claim that admiring Polanski is a snub to victims of sexual assault makes sense. After all, this admiration could only be fitting if Polanski were not a fitting target of indignation and claiming this involves not taking his crimes seriously.

Bell (2011; 2013) defends a weaker account of globalist emotions according to which they involve an evaluative prioritization. On this account, a globalist emotion still responds to a whole person. However, a globalist emotion need not cohere with all of a person’s traits. It is enough that the traits the globalist emotion targets are prioritized over any incompatible traits. This means that someone can be admirable even if they possess some traits that are worthy of contempt, providing the admirer deems the admirable traits more important than the contempt-worthy traits. If we accept this view then immoral artists can only be fitting targets of admiration for those for whom the artistic virtues they possess are more important than their moral vices. Again, if we accept this view of admiration then it is easy to see why admiration for Polanski may constitute a snub to victims of sexual assault, as on this view this amounts to saying that his filmmaking abilities are more important to the admirer than the crime he has committed.

If either were true then both the stronger and the weaker version of globalism about admiration would explain why admiring immoral artists could constitute a snub to their victims. So far, though, we have seen no reason to think that either offers a plausible picture of admiration. We can find out whether this is a plausible view of admiration by looking at the arguments offered in support of the claim that contempt and shame are globalist and seeing whether similar arguments would work for admiration.

One argument offered in support of the claim that shame (Lewis, 1971: 30) and contempt (Bell, 2013: 40; Mason, 2003) are globalist is that these emotions attach to whole persons, both linguistically and in how they are experienced. I have my doubts about these claims with regards to shame and contempt but for now I simply wish to show that this kind of argument will not work for admiration. While admiration can attach to whole people, it can also attach to actions or local traits (Schindler et al., 2013: 99). We can admire someone’s dress sense without admiring his whole person. Likewise, we can admire a footballer’s spectacular goal without admiring her whole person. This form of argument then gives us no reason to think admiration is globalist.

Another way in which people defend globalism about shame and contempt is by appealing to action tendencies. Shame is claimed to involve a desire to improve one’s character, while guilt involves a desire to make amends for a particular act (Williams, 1993: 89-90). To see whether this applies to admiration let us consider the action tendency commonly associated with it, namely emulation. If admiration targets the whole person then it ought to be the whole person who is emulated rather than some trait or action. While it is possible for admiration to motivate someone to emulate a whole person, it seems more common for admiration to motivate someone to emulate a particular trait or action. This is why both philosophers (e.g. Zagzebski, 2017: 33) and psychologists (e.g. Algoe & Haidt, 2009) connect admiration with a motivation to emulate another person for her admired trait or action.

Neither of these arguments provides support for the claim that admiration is globalist. Rather, both suggest that admiration may target actions, local traits or whole people. This means that we cannot appeal to a globalist view of admiration to vindicate the claim that admiring immoral artists can constitute a snub to their victims.

The Ethics of Admiration

We might think that the failure of the argument examined in the previous section shows that admiring immoral artists does not constitute a snub to their victims. However, in this section I will propose an alternative way to defend this claim.

To begin let us consider a very public form of admiration, such as the offering of
awards such as an Oscar or an honour such as the presidency of the César Awards. What do these public expressions of admiration for Polanski communicate? It is tempting to think that this simply communicates admiration for the recipient’s admirable qualities, in this case his filmmaking talents. However, choosing to express admiration for an immoral artist involves choosing to express it over other emotions that are also fitting. While they may be a fitting target of admiration, they are also fitting targets of indignation. By expressing admiration in these cases, we are prioritising this emotional reaction over indignation. Doing so effectively condones the action. When we condone a piece of behaviour we are communicating that while we don’t think the behaviour is morally good, we are willing to accept or tolerate it (Hughes & Warmke, 2017). Those who prioritise the expression of admiration over the expression of contempt communicate that they can accept or at least tolerate this behaviour.

The decision to prioritise the admiration for the artist for their art over indignation for their moral failings can be problematic in itself, as it may signal a lack of respect for the immoral artist’s victims. The problem with this prioritisation becomes more pressing when we consider that, alongside their own emotional prioritisation, admirers often also communicate that this is the right way to prioritise these emotional expressions. Sometimes this message is explicit. Take for example, Whoopi Goldberg’s claim that Polanski’s sexual assault of Gailey “wasn’t rape-rape,” (Kennedy, 2009). While Goldberg does not claim that Polanski’s behaviour was morally permissible, she does suggest that it is behaviour that can be tolerated.

Many who have publicly admired Polanski have not condoned his behaviour so explicitly. However, these public expressions of admiration may still communicate that the immoral behaviour should be condoned. This is particularly the case when we consider the background in which these awards take place. The film industry, for example, has been accused by many of having a particular problem with sexism, both in the way it represents women on screen (Cummings & Glossing, 2017) and in the way it treats women working in the industry (Jones & Pringle, 2015). According to Sophie Hennekam and Dawn Bennett (2017) sexual harassment is a particular problem in this industry. In this patriarchal context, expressions of admiration for an the aesthetic talents of an artist who has committed sexual assault or sexual harassment are likely to be understood as condoning their immoral behaviour. This is problematic, as it sends the message that immoral behaviour can be ignored when the person performing it is a sufficiently gifted artist.

A further problem with public expressions of admiration for immoral artists is that it risks making its target unduly credible. This can lead to an indirect form of injustice when a victim contradicts an admired figure. Consider how celebrities are often taken to be authorities in areas for which they possess no expertise. Kyrie Irving, a basketball player, claimed the Earth is flat (Shanahan, 2017). This has apparently led to some schoolchildren believing that the Earth is flat, leaving their teachers baffled. In this case, the schoolchildren give Irving’s testimony greater credibility than it merits. Note that it is not just children who give undue weight to the testimony of those they admire, many adults do so as well. This is likely one reason why politicians seek to recruit celebrities to endorse their campaigns and why celebrities “use their platform” to advocate for moral causes.

This tendency to give the testimony of those we admire greater weight than is merited can be problematic. Suppose the testimony of a celebrity conflicts with the testimony of someone who lacks this status. In this case, the celebrity’s testimony is likely to be given greater weight. Our admiration for a celebrity leads those who challenge the celebrity’s assertions to be seen as less credible in comparison. This is a form of what Miranda Fricker (2007) calls an epistemic injustice (an injustice committed against someone in her capacity as a knower). By inflating the credibility of an immoral artist
then, we in turn deflate the credibility of those who accuse them of wrongdoing. Admiration, then, gives its target a kind of power. By itself, this power need not be morally bad. However, it becomes problematic when an immoral person wields it, as this may increase their credibility at the expense of that of their victims.

The final problem with admiring immoral artists is that it can serve to silence the artist’s victims and the victims of similar crimes. It does so in two ways. First, the greater weight given to the testimony of those we admire discourages victims from speaking out because they suspect that they will not be believed. Second, the message that the immoral behaviour is condoned discourages victims from speaking out because victims think that even if they will be believed, people will not treat the issue as a serious wrongdoing.

Public expressions of admiration can therefore constitute a snub and indeed a harm to their victims in three ways. First, by prioritizing the expression of admiration over indignation this can send the message that the immoral behaviour should be condoned. Second, these expressions of admiration can inflate the credibility of the immoral artist at the expense of the victim. Finally, these expressions of admiration can serve to silence the immoral artist’s victims.

**Conclusion**

To sum up, I have explored two ways of vindicating Claire Serre-Combe’s claim that honouring Polanski constitutes a snub to victims of sexual harassment and sexual assault. I argued that the argument based on the view that admiration involves an evaluation of a whole person will not succeed. Instead, this claim can be supported by looking at public expressions of admiration. In particular, we need to examine what messages such public expressions communicate and the harmful effects of these messages.

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Admiring the Immoral

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Feature article: Emotions in History

Historicizing Emotions

Ute Frevert
Centre for the History of Emotions
Max Planck Institute for Human Development, Berlin
sekfrevert@mpib-berlin.mpg.de

The Emotional Turn

The history of emotions has been experiencing an upsurge of academic interest lately. Research centers of various forms and scopes have been established, focusing on this new and burgeoning field; major historical journals have engaged in debates about its potential gains and expectations. Publishers are eager to include relevant literature in their programs and series, thus inviting further research.

Historical science is by no means the only discipline that has directed its focus onto the study of emotions. Unsurprisingly, philosophy took the lead. Already in Antiquity philosophers attempted to describe and explain affects and passions and to define their relationship with what they perceived as reason. Moreover there is no point in talking about an ‘emotional turn’ in Psychology, since it had been genuinely interested in emotions and emotion regulation since its emergence as a discipline in the late nineteenth century. Yet the advent of neuroscience and the improvement of neuroimaging techniques helped to boost research on emotions and how these interact with various modes of cognition. (See Plamper, 2015, chapter 3.)

In the humanities, literature and theater studies scholars were fast to join the growing community of researchers working on emotions. This was not difficult since their main ‘material’ concerned emotions. According to Aristotle tragedy was supposed to arouse pity and fear in order to eventually restore emotional balance through katharsis. During the late eighteenth century, the stage was considered to be the best instrument for imparting moral values and improving the public, by instilling ‘good’ emotions and uprooting ‘bad’ ones. Literary texts, above all the new (epistolary) novel, had always centered around (more or less passionate) feelings. It was not only the ‘Age of Sensibility’ that inspired a veritable wave of sentimentalism and tearful emotional soul-searching among readers. Several decades later, in his 1869 seminal novel L’éducation sentimentale, the French writer Gustave Flaubert embarked on writing “the moral history of the men of my generation; the history of their feelings to be more precise” (Flaubert, ed. Bruneau, 1991, 409). There was a widespread assumption that novels, good or bad, were about people having, following, discovering, hiding, repressing, and shying away from strong feelings. It was therefore a matter of course that literature scholars researched emotions and analyzed their meaning, function, and expression.

The literary language of emotions is also relevant to historians, who are less concerned about the poetics of emotions, but do take an interest in how emotions were produced, experienced and practiced by means of writing and reading about them. In this vein, Robert Darnton studied readers’ responses to Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s bestselling novel Julie, or the New Heloise from 1761 and found multiple evidence in contemporary letters about women and men being moved to tears by the heroine’s unhappy fate (Darnton, 1985, 215-256). Lynn Hunt suggested that reading sentimental novels actually taught people to feel empathy and embrace the new gospel of human rights (Hunt, 2007).

Neither Darnton nor Hunt would consider themselves as historians of emotions. Yet their work has a lot to tell about how certain people felt about certain things at a certain time and how such feelings were encouraged or even intentionally elicited by new media. Hunt even went to great lengths to defend her claim that “imagined empathy” served as the foundation of human rights. And she harshly criticized her “own discipline of history [that] has for so long disdained any form of psychological argument” (Hunt, 2007, 32; 34). However, this was only partly true. Biography, as a standard genre of history writing, had always made use of ‘psychological’ reasoning, in direct or indirect...
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ways. To explain great men’s actions historians often resorted to popular psychology, referring to happy or unhappy childhood experiences as well as deep emotional moments to interpret a hero’s motives. Some even attempted to introduce psychoanalytical concepts. But the new creed of ‘psychohistory’ deeply suffered from an overdose of dogmatic Freudianism and thus failed to gain a wider appeal.

Hunt’s criticism of her discipline still finds plenty of evidence, especially if one substitutes ‘psychological’ with ‘emotional’. Academic historiography, founded and crafted in the nineteenth century, was not particularly keen to explore emotions as a topic of serious research. Although many history books (above all those written during the period of strong nationalism) overflowed with passionate language, authors hardly ever reflected on their own use of emotion words and images. They also refrained from systematically searching for emotions in their sources and analyzing them in terms of functions, modes and causes. Only those who had become interested in cultural history or were exploring the mechanisms of historical understanding became interested in “mental structural contexts”, in “passions and pains” or in the development of national feelings and sensibilities (Jensen & Morat, 2008; Frevert, 2014). These interests, however, remained largely marginal in the profession. Even when in the late 1930s the eminent Annales historian Lucien Febvre (1973) urged his colleagues to pay more attention to sensibilities and start a broad investigation of human emotions, his advice was not followed. It took until the early 2000s that historians warmed up to the idea and started to participate in the ‘emotional turn’, first through individual research (see, for example, Reddy, 2001; Frevert, 2011; Boquet & Nagy, 2015), later with more collaborative and institutionalized efforts.

In January 2008 a new research center was inaugurated at the Max Planck Institute for Human Development in Berlin, Germany. Under the guiding assumption that emotions matter to and in human development, a team of historians set out to explore the hows, whens and whys.¹ The Queen Mary Centre for the History of the Emotions in London and the Australian Research Council Center of Excellence: History of Emotions followed suit in 2008 and 2011 respectively.² Since then, major historical journals have initiated debates about the potential gains and promises of the approach (Eustace et al., 2012; Biess, 2010). Conferences are being organized at a pace and frequency that both testify to and nourish the fast-growing interest in the field.

How to do the history of emotions

There are multiple ways of “doing” the history of emotions, and there is more than one reason to focus on emotions as a field of historical inquiry. Some historians are interested in emotions from the perspective of historical anthropology that concentrates on the human body and practices related to the life cycle (childbirth and childhood, health and illness, family relations, death etc.). As much as such practices have a history and change with history, emotions are equally perceived as historically variable. In as far as they are regarded as connected with bodily processes they are supposed to be influenced by the body’s changing appearance and function over space and time. At the same time cognitive elements of directionality and appraisal link emotions to social contexts and


material environments that also undergo historical change. In this vein, to historicize emotions means to analyze how emotions change over time, due to societal influences, economic forces, political interventions, and religious framings. Thus love among family members, for instance, should not be considered as an eternal or universal feature of human life, and nor should compassion for other people’s or animals’ suffering. Both emotions and their practice depend on certain institutional settings and incentives, in whose absence other emotional—or non-emotional—practices prevail.

Anthropological studies have already contributed greatly to highlighting the cultural plasticity of emotions. They have also sent a warning that scholars should refrain from using their own emotion knowledge in order to interpret other people’s feelings. The way that people feel (and about whom and what) follows culturally specific trajectories that eschew timeless generalization. Emotion knowledge and emotional practices are embedded into multiple layers of cultural meaning. Like anthropologists, historians are thus well advised to carefully dissect those layers and work towards a contextualized notion of emotion that takes into account temporal, spatial and social differences.

Within—and beyond—the broader range of historical anthropology, historians of emotions have taken a keen interest in the social construction of subjectivities. As much as the concept of ‘self’ (defined as a way to perceive oneself as part of one’s world) has undergone multiple revisions and re-framings since the early modern period, emotions have attracted more or less attention as conscious or unconscious assets of that perception. Working with first-person accounts (diaries, letters, autobiographies, memoirs) can bring these emotions under the spotlight and allow them to be investigated as factors that motivate people to social action at certain historical moments.

At the same time, emotions are not a person’s exclusive property. As human beings have come to rely on feelings in order to communicate, these feelings have to be identified and interpreted. The language of emotions, so to speak, has to be a common language—common, at least, within the social environment to which an individual belongs. Depending on its main content, whether religious, magical, economic or political, the language of emotions carries a specific form and fulfills different functions, in speech and writing as much as in bodily gestures and mimics. This invites historians to direct their attention to social groups and, in modern times, to institutions in order to uncover their (more or less hidden) emotional curriculum. How social groups and institutions define their emotional style is bound to have repercussions on how their members feel and express emotions and what kind. Being a soldier, for instance, exerts different emotional pressures and expectations compared with being a factory worker or a chamber maid. Being a soldier in a conscripted army demands different emotional qualities compared with being part of a mercenary or professional army. The same holds true for women who serve as professional or voluntary military nurses, in campaigns either related to the honor of the nation (as an all-encompassing concept), or to the interests of a local warlord.

Quite evidently, there is no automatic link between the emotional style of an institution or social group and the feelings of a member of that institution or group. As much as the social and institutional framing of individual emotions should not be underestimated, it should not be overstated, either. Historians interested in the dynamics of change might actually find it challenging to explore processes of divergence and its consequences. The history of state socialism in Eastern Europe serves as a case in point. Imbued with strong emotional messages of political cohesion and historical telos, youth organizations, student associations, trade unions and the like all worked incessantly towards aligning their members’ emotional make-up to objectives set by the ruling party. Although these organizations reached and included millions of citizens they were ultimately unsuccessful in enlisting and commandeering their emotions. What had worked for several decades, failed once the state’s emotional appeals lost credibility and clashed with individual disappointments and expectations on a massive and publicly visible scale.

Why do emotions matter, and what for?
In a nutshell, the current boom in emotion studies—not just in history, but also in the social
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sciences at large, including behavioral economics as well as affective computing and neuroscience – reflects the contemporary surge in emotional politics, both in the private and public sphere. In personal relations, be it among lovers, friends, colleagues, or peers, emotions are increasingly used as a major communicative code. The salience of emoticons is a case in point, and only one of many. Furthermore, emotions are ubiquitously addressed when it comes to selling commercial products and services as well as political messages. This surge is due to many factors, among them and most prominently the shift in systems of governance that can be observed in Europe, North America, and Australia. As these systems target the self and enhance the quest for self-optimization and self-management, they have become aware of emotions as main motivators and switch mechanisms that spur people’s actions and non-actions. At the same time, emotions seem to be the last hidden continent: knowledge is in scarce supply, while demand increases exponentially, in politics, business, management, health industry, and interpersonal relations.

In the contemporary ‘Western’ world of advanced capitalism and democratic rule, emotions have come to enjoy a high status, both in the private sphere and public arena. In people’s private lives, emotions play a pivotal role, and they are generally regarded and appreciated as something radically subjective. It is claimed that a person’s feelings are perfectly and only theirs. They belong to their inner self, and they are what make them lively, human, authentic, and unique. When the self was reinvented in the 1960s and 1970s as the site of multiple forces striving for hegemony, one thing was beyond doubt: that the self is, above all, an emotional self. Emotions thus appear and are valued as prime markers of individuality.

This does not mean that they have to be expressed in the same way as they are felt. There might be situations in which someone prefers to hide their feelings and pretend. One might then put on a face, seem ‘cool’ – without forgetting that this is nothing but a façade. At the same time, people expect others to respect their true feelings. Hurting someone’s feelings has become a major offense. Some self-help manuals suggest a different strategy. Their message is: No one can hurt your feelings unless you allow it to happen. You are the master of your own feelings and can use your freedom to feel as you like. (See, among others, Illouz, 2008; Maasen et al., 2011.)

As descendants of the therapeutic age, contemporaries happily receive the message and start ‘working’ on their emotions to make them even more their own, immune to external interventions or infringements. They have learned to ‘listen’ to their emotions (assuming that they tell them how to behave and live their lives) and be ‘good’ to themselves (fostering positive emotions and general well-being). Thanks to Daniel Goleman’s bestselling book on ‘Emotional Intelligence’, many individuals have become better at reading their own as well as other people’s emotions and using their allegedly ‘natural’ faculty of empathy. Goleman based his arguments on research conducted by two US psychologists. In the late 1970s, they measured people’s ability to “perceive emotion, integrate emotion to facilitate thought, understand emotions and to regulate emotions to promote personal growth” (Salovey & Mayer, 1990; Goleman, 1996; 1998). Published (and hidden) in scientific journals, this research saw a surge of interest once it was popularized and turned into didactic advice in the mid-1990s. Goleman’s success – his book was translated into forty languages and sold five million copies - prompted him to set up counseling agencies and training labs that have become multi-billion-dollar enterprises. Emotional intelligence has since been incorporated into management techniques and is widely used by human resources staff in many countries.

It is also used by commercial businesses, above all in advertising. Expanding and flourishing from the early twentieth century as part of fast growing consumer societies, advertising has been, from the start, closely linked to psychological research. Selling goods is synonymous with selling emotions: this is the mantra that governs the world of Mad Man Don Draper and his more or less inventive followers. Some advertising campaigns like Benetton’s invade people’s emotional landscapes in an unusual and surprising manner. Other campaigns take a much more direct approach when goods themselves are simply labeled ‘emotion’ (for instance cars, salads, cosmetics, or cat food). A
more sophisticated and far-reaching approach is currently undertaken by means of affective computing. While online media companies such as Netflix or Amazon already assess real-time consumer sentiments by closely monitoring people’s individual choices and preferences, the M.I.T. Media Lab and its spin-offs aim to train computers in recognizing human emotions. These new technologies aim not only to improve “human affective experience with technology” but also to make computers emotionally intelligent and offer new inroads into people’s feelings that can (and will) be used for commercial purposes (Affective computing http://affect.media.mit.edu/, accessed 29/01/2018; Wortham, 2013).

Apart from online businesses, there are many more institutions that try to appeal to or instrumentalize emotions. Even politics – long since perceived as a highly rational affair – has increasingly put emotions to use: politicians grieving, embracing each other, giving enthusiastic speeches, eliciting feelings of pride or disdain. Citizens become their witnesses and targets by reading or watching them, sometimes face-to-face, more often on TV or YouTube. Media, however, not only mediate between the sender and the receiver of messages: Mediation itself is fraught with emotional content. Personal interest stories dominate newspapers and TV programs. With his impassioned coverage of Hurricane Katrina in 2005 CNN’s anchorman Anderson Cooper was appointed the face of ‘emo-journalism’, and he has kept to this new style ever since. Emo-journalism manages to invoke and engage viewers’ emotions, as much as it confronts them with other people’s emotions, tapping into their empathizing abilities. The public seems to like this according to opinion polls and sales figures.

‘Private’ emotions are thus converted into public emotions: emotions ‘felt’ and communicated in public, expressed in a language that is highly formalized and universally applied. Even individual emotions like love are increasingly acted out and performed in a collective and publicly negotiated idiom. According to cultural sociologists ‘emotional capitalism’ as it developed during the 20th century has hijacked and reshaped inner feelings by aligning them with emotionally coated commodities. Love thus is associated with emotionalized and emotionalizing objects (flowers, jewelry) and practices (e.g. cinema or restaurant dates). In the same vein, individual emotions and emotional settings are used in order to market ‘unemotional’ commodities such as oil or gas (Illouz, 1997; 2007).

This development lies in the background of what has been discussed as the current boom of emotion research. It inspires interest in emotion knowledge in many scientific fields, applied or theoretical. History forms part of that knowledge production for it caters to people’s need to define the present in relation to past expectations and experiences. To trace today’s surge of emotional politics back to former times, means to highlight their peculiarities and to investigate the contextual forces responsible for such tendencies. Yet historians are not only experts in diachronic analysis. They are also well versed in comparative perspectives. The fact that emotional politics currently seem to flourish in ‘the West’ more than in other regions of the world, might raise questions regarding potential limits or structural obstacles to such politics. It thus draws attention to the many diverse histories of perceiving emotions, allocating a certain place for them in private and/or public life, and valuing certain emotional practices over others.

References


Feature article: Emotions in History

Old and New in the History of Emotions

Barbara H. Rosenwein and Riccardo Cristiani

Department of History
Loyola University Chicago
brosenw@gmail.com

In her contribution to this issue, Ute Frevert writes, “To trace today’s surge of emotional politics back to former times means to highlight their peculiarities and to investigate the contextual forces responsible for such tendencies.” But how exactly have historians of emotions accomplished this task? What methods have they used? And what are their newest approaches? These are the topics we essay in this brief survey (for a fuller discussion, see Rosenwein & Cristiani, 2017).

Original approaches

There is a centuries-long “prequel” to the current ferment in the history of emotions (see Plamper, 2015; Boddice, forthcoming 2018). Nevertheless, it is fair to say that the modern field began in 1985 with an article written by Peter and Carol Stearns. According to them, historians had to shift their focus from people’s “real” feelings to people’s changing “attitudes or standards […] toward basic emotions and their appropriate expression.” (Stearns & Stearns, 1985, p. 813.) The Stearnses termed the study of changing standards “emotionology,” and they proposed to investigate it mainly through advice manuals and other normative sources.

In the wake of this article, the field took off, as witnessed not only by this special feature in Emotion Researcher, but also by an avalanche of new books and articles on the topic each year. These are supported by a number of academic centers and other institutions, which sponsor important initiatives to foster research in the field. (Rosenwein & Cristiani, 2017, pp. 110-11.)

Among the reasons for the “big bang” represented by emotionology were changes in psychological theories of the emotions. Early theories made emotions bodily phenomena, unrelated to thought, and inborn (Darwin, 1872; James, 1890). In the 1960s these assumptions were challenged by a newly vigorous cognitivist view, which conceived of emotions as kinds of judgments or assessments that something was--or was not-- for one’s wellbeing. Here is a simple example from Magda Arnold, a pioneer of this theory: “If I see an apple, I know that it is an apple of a particular kind and taste. This knowledge need not touch me personally in any way. But if the apple is of my favorite kind and I am in a part of the world where it does not grow and cannot be bought, I may want it with a real emotional craving” (Arnold, 1960, 1:171). We call that particular emotion “desire.” Even though cognitivists maintain that emotions are mental, they agree that they produce bodily alterations; in the case of the apple, such changes might include a throbbing heart and salivating.

Cognitivist (or appraisal) theories generally focus on the individual, pointing out that “if two people differ in their appraisals” of the same event, they will have different emotions, with the corollary that “the same appraisals lead to the same emotions” (Moors et al., 2013, p. 121). But in the 1970s, philosophers, sociologists, and psychologists turned the spotlight onto the ambient environment, proposing that society itself constructs emotions, which are produced and managed by social rules and norms. Thus, the social constructionist (or constructivist) position contends that some societies may value an emotion that other societies do not, or even avoid. One example is amae, a Japanese emotion that cultivates a feeling of dependency and childlike love that Westerners tend to eschew. (Morsbach & Tyler in Harré, 1986).

The social constructionist position formed an important backdrop to the Stearnses’ article in 1985, which was in effect a call to revive the history of emotions. Although their formulation of emotionology spoke of “basic emotions” (inborn and universal), nevertheless it was also social constructionist in that the Stearnses considered social needs the primary determinant of emotional standards. For example, Americans decried the expression of anger among family
members during the period before 1850 or so; but, from the 1920s on, responding to the requirements of the anger-free workplace, they made their homes the *only* context for acceptable outbreaks of rage (Stearns & Stearns, 1986, p. 11).

Soon after the Stearnses wrote, William Reddy saw a way to put both cognitive and social constructionist theories together (Reddy, 2001). He hypothesized that emotions were assessments of what was for or against one’s well-being (in that sense cognitivist); that those assessments were fluid and changeable (he used the word “emotives” to describe their chameleon-like character); and that “emotional regimes” determined which emotives would be permitted (in that sense social constructionist). By “emotional regime” he meant the emotives that were explicitly or implicitly mandated by those in power. Under restrictive regimes, people were boxed into feeling certain ways. Under free regimes, people were allowed greater liberty to change their assessments and goals. Reddy saw history as the unfolding of reactions against regimes too emotionally controlling.

The work of medievalist Barbara Rosenwein came in the wake of Stearns and Reddy. (Rosenwein, 2006). Her approach was cognitivist because it, too, anticipated that emotions would change with assessments of well-being; it was social constructionist in assuming that co-existing groups (she called them emotional communities) might value differing emotions and express them in disparate ways. More than Stearns and Reddy, she attempted to draw up lists of the emotion words that people used, as well as to see which ones were emphasized, which deplored, and how they were expressed. In that sense, she adopted the idea of emotionology, but without using advice books to reveal the standards. Unlike the other approaches, she highlighted the great variety of emotional communities in every society, even those living side-by-side during the same period of time.

Finally, like Stearns, Reddy, and Rosenwein, medievalist Gerd Althoff, too, considered emotions to be largely cognitive. (Althoff, 1996.) Unlike Stearns, Reddy, and Rosenwein, however, he stressed the role of the body, focusing on the emotional displays of medieval rulers. His point was not that the body was the seat of emotions, but rather that in the Middle Ages people in power used their bodies to communicate their policies, their religious piety, their favor and disfavor.

**The bodily turn**

The foregoing has briefly summed up the ideas of what we might call the “original school” of the history of emotions. More recent directions may be styled as a *turn to the body*, a turn that rejects cognitivism’s sway. Not that the newer work is right back to Darwin and James. Rather, it considers the body itself to be socially constructed. Of course, the human body has consisted—and no doubt always will—of nerves and muscles, hearts and stomachs, skin and bones. But how those elements are understood, shaped, experienced and assessed have never been stable. They are subject to the same social, environmental, and epigenetic factors as every other element of human life and behavior.

It is impossible to cover here the many and diverse ways in which historians have explored the topic of emotions and the body. We have instead chosen four issues: a) the body in pain; b) the practices of the body; c) the affective body; and d) the gendered body.

The body in pain is among the things that modern scientists and clinicians tried (and try today) to objectify. At the doctor’s office, people are asked to assess their pain on a scale of 0 to 10, as if a number could measure the feeling and as if the lower number were always better. Yet, historians know very well that pain has had many meanings and has been valorized as well as avoided (Moscoso, 2012; Boddice, 2017). In the Western Middle Ages, Christian religious discourse made pain and suffering desirable because they recalled and imitated the tormented body of Christ. In their recent book on the history of emotions during the medieval period, Damien Boquet and Piroska Nagy make Christ’s body the stable element of an otherwise changing emotional landscape (Boquet & Nagy, 2015). It is as if Christ’s body—or, rather, changing perceptions and interpretations of it—determined the emotionology of the entire period. Beginning with the “Christianization of emotions,” their book continues with the monastic communities that institutionalized what Jean Leclercq famously termed “the desire for God” (Leclercq,
Monks exercised the right emotions in the right ways and for the right purposes. The practices of the monastery then opened out to the rest of society at large, creating “a Christian society” that was continually reinforced by the values and emotions of newly invigorated religious groups, such as the twelfth-century hermits and the ecclesiastical courtiers who surrounded the German emperor. A sort of call and response among lay aristocrats and princes, town citizens, and specialists of prayer, theology, and medicine allowed for enriched emotional possibilities.

The body in pain involved in histories of emotion such as this is not the physiological body of James nor the posturing body of Darwin. Joanna Bourke points out that “the body is never pure soma: it is configured in social, cognitive, and metaphorical worlds.” (Bourke, 2014, p. 17.) Today we tend to separate the mind and the body, though for centuries these were seen as a unified whole. Bourke finds a way around the current mind-body dualism by conceptualizing pain as a “type of event,” as a “way-of-being in the world” (p. 8). The meanings of such pain events changed historically. “From the moment of birth, infants are initiated into cultures of pain. What [...] infants in the 1760s learnt about the cognitive, affective, and sensory meanings arising from the interface between their interior bodies and the external world was very different to what their counterparts in the 1960s learnt” (p. 17). Bourke notes that what they learned was often political, for learning is determined by those in power, whether parents or rulers. Even the names of various pains, says Bourke, lay bare the exercise of power. Today “hunger,” for instance, is less serious than “being in terrible pain,” and it calls forth less sympathy, less money, and less social organization (p. 19).

Thus, although her focus is the body, Bourke is very much a social constructionist. But in her hands, it is not just thoughts and emotions that are socially constructed but the very ways in which people experience and use their bodies. Further, while not speaking of emotional regimes per se, she is very much interested in how the powerful determines what we will feel. Here she pays careful attention to words, in this instance not so much for how they express emotions as for how they are used to elicit them.

Bourke’s conceptualization of pain as a “way-of-being in the world” takes us to the “practicing body.” Already Althoff’s interest in performance was compatible with this view. But Althoff did not go as far as practice theorist Monique Scheer, for whom emotions are generated and enhanced by the very practices of the body, not just expressed through them. Scheer faults the old schools for removing the emotions from the body. Feelings are “felt” not by following ideal emotionologies or by saying emotion words such as “I am angry,” but rather by the experiences of the body as it acts. In turn, the body is not a biological given but is shaped by its very practices. Scheer gives the example of the religious rituals of the German Methodists who followed Christoph Gottlob Müller (d.1858). (Scheer, 2013.) Müller spent some time in England, where he became a Methodist, and adopted the bodily practices mandated by the religion—constant singing, sitting, standing, and kneeling. These, along with emotionally intense sermons, implied a particularly strong affective commitment. When Müller returned to Germany, he introduced this style of worship to people who already had some of this “bodily knowledge” as it had been shaped by their local Pietism. But the Methodists had forms of pious practices beyond Pietism—at church meetings penitents wept, sighed, groaned, fell to the floor—and Müller attempted to make those behaviors habitual and thus automatic.

Studying the practices of the body depends less on texts than the older approaches. This is especially true in the modern period, when visual sources (such as photographs and movies) became abundant. Taking up the Bollywood film Veer-Zaara (2004), for example, Margrit Pernau and Imke Rajamani explore the emotional message of the final scene, “love in the rain.” (Pernau & Rajamani, 2016). Here the lovers, after long separation and much self-sacrifice, meet in a song sequence. They do not say a word, and that allows Pernau and Rajamani to critique the earlier historiography for its emphasis on texts and words: “The scene would be lost for a history of concepts that focuses only on language” (p. 64). Practice theory entails listening to the melancholy music and the words of the Hindi song (here there is admittedly a reliance on words) and looking at the close-ups of the lovers’ happy, tearful faces.
Finally, it involves considering the symbolic meaning of the reunion context: “the monsoon [is] a season of erotic love”; its heavy rain—or anything else that surrounds a person—shapes bodies and is itself a sort of physical body.

Historians of emotions are increasingly interested in the ways in which a different conception of the body may redefine their research. They rely on affect theory, which was and remains a reaction against cognitivism, as a way to bring back emotions’ automaticity and irrationality. The affective body is “contagious,” open and unbounded, constantly sharing itself with the world of things, people, sounds, and smells around it and absorbing them in turn. It is so involved in the world that the boundaries between “you” and “I” are erased. Yes, we have a biological body; but it is nothing without its surroundings, which shape it, just as it shapes the environment in turn. Think of a Rubin vase: a vase that is defined by two faces and at the same time consists of two faces that are defined by a vase. This is how affect theorists—at least some of them—see the body’s interaction with the world around it. The affective body feels and acts before it thinks and before any words are sounded. Thus, affect is ever-present in everything that we do. It is what George Bernard Shaw called the Life Force that makes us do one thousand things—and all unconsciously. As Silvan Tomkins, a key affect theorist, wrote: “I view affect as the primary innate biological motivating mechanism, more urgent than drive deprivation and pleasure, and more urgent even than physical pain” (Tomkins, 1984, p. 165). Yet affect theorists must use words, and when it comes to describing the affects, those words are hard to distinguish from what others call emotions. Tomkins’s list of affects include excitement, joy, terror, anger, shame, contempt, distress, surprise. Other affect theorists have added to the list: for example, boredom, comfort, discomfort, and despair.

If bodies are bounded and isolated, they come in genders. But if they are defined in relation to others, as affect theory has it, they are more complicated. Perhaps they are gendered only by their differences from those with whom they have relations. Perhaps their gender is simply a kind of performance. The key question for the historian of emotions is whether gender determines, changes, challenges, or is irrelevant to emotional life. But what is gender? Is it the same as sex? Are there two genders or more—or less? Historians have different takes on the topic, and it must be said that notions of gender are changing very fast: it is not just historians who are of different minds about it.

Until the 1970s or so, historians—and scientists as well—made the male subject the standard. This changed with the women’s movement. Studies of women in history appeared, and, as a sort of parallel, the American Psychological Association set up a division on the Psychology of Women. The most straightforward historical studies of the gendered body and its emotions ask quite simply whether the emotional lives of women were different from those of today. For example, Carroll Smith-Rosenberg wrote about passionately affectionate female relationships in nineteenth-century America. “My darling how I long for the time when I shall see you,” wrote one woman to a dear friend, using language that today we might associate with erotic love. Smith-Rosenberg rejected that interpretation. She thought that amorous feelings between such women was socially constructed and served the important social function of ratifying the “rigid gender-role differentiation within the family and within society as a whole” (Smith-Rosenberg, 1975, pp. 4, 9).

The problem with this sort of history is that it tends to code emotion female and reason male. The solution is to research male emotional life alongside female: to see both as interdependent and constructed together. Susan Broomhall, who has edited numerous books touching on this issue, speaks of the ways in which hegemonic groups—usually male—assert their authority by “ordering” and “structuring” different emotions for boys and girls, men and women (see, for example, Broomhall, 2015). But, inevitably, some of the articles in her edited books problematize that approach, showing similarities in the emotions fostered in men and women; or they suggest that class may be more important than gender in the socialization process.

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Where, then, is the history of emotions today? And what does the future hold? The answer to the first question is quite clear: the body currently predominates, though for a variety of reasons and in different ways. Some of the reasons have to do with the frisson of automaticity, irrationality, of emotions out of control and overwhelming us. Others are connected to the revolution in gender and gender relations taking place today. Finally, there is the undeniable importance of the body in determining our birth and our death, as well as much of what is in between. Yet, as historians, we cannot but note that Western thought has tended to oscillate between privileging the mind and giving primacy to the body. Historians of emotions, with their vision over the long haul, are well-positioned to point out—and this is our hope for the future—that emotions are (and have always been) a compound of both.

References

Feature Article: Emotions in History

Emotions in History: The Beginnings

David Konstan

Department of Classics
New York University, New York
dk87@nyu.edu

Despite the intensive study of emotions across a variety of disciplines over the past three decades, it still seems difficult, if not impossible, to define precisely what an emotion is. We may take as illustrative a disagreement over the nature of anger. Whereas some investigators insist that “Anger is associated with justice concerns, or the protection of individual rights, fairness, and autonomy” (Horberg, Oveis, & Ketner, 2011), others maintain with equal conviction that “Neither personal anger nor empathic anger is a truly moral emotion or source of truly moral motivation” (Batson 2011). Such differences in the interpretation of specific emotions are reproduced at the level of the nature of emotion itself. Thus, a prominent student of emotions to lament: “Emotion researchers face a scandal: We have no agreed upon definition for the term — emotion — that defines our field. We therefore do not know what events count as examples of emotion and what events theories of emotion must explain” (Russell, 2012). A study of the history of emotion, which is itself a sub-discipline of the comparative study of emotions across cultures, may help explain why emotions seem to resist definition.

It is, I think, fair to say that the most influential ancient account of the emotions is to be found in the second book of Aristotle’s Rhetoric, where Aristotle surveys a set of emotions, or as he calls them, pathê (plural of pathos), that includes anger and the remission of anger, love, hatred, fear, shame, envy, gratitude, pity, indignation, and a competitive passion that he calls zēlos (the ancestor of the English words “zeal” and “jealousy”), along with mentions of a few others, such as over-confidence (the opposite of fear) and contempt (see Konstan, 2006). What is striking about this list is that it bears a plausible resemblance to what we today (writing in English, at all events) might subsume under the general category “emotion.” There are some outliers, to be sure: gratitude does not always make it into modern inventories of emotion, and pity, oddly enough, is also largely missing; in turn, some modern classifications include rather basic or semi-automatic responses such as disgust and surprise, or what we might think of as moods or states such as happiness and sadness, that are not registered by Aristotle as pathê. But given the range of variation in modern classifications, Aristotle’s itemization seems reasonable enough.

In his treatise on rhetoric, Aristotle provides a precise definition of each pathos, along with advice on how to arouse or assuage it — this is, after all, a handbook for orators, whose job it is to manipulate the passions of their audience. His definition of anger, for example, runs: “Let anger be a desire, accompanied by pain, for a perceived revenge, on account of a perceived slight on the part of people who are not fit to slight one or one’s own” (Rhetoric 2.2, 1378a31-33). Of course, Aristotle was speaking about the Greek term orgê, not “anger,” and we must be on our guard against an uncritical equation of emotion terms across different languages; as Anna Wierzbicka has observed, psychologists of the evolutionary school tend to “absolutize the English folk-taxonomy of emotions” (1999: 171). But allowing that the Greek term, as Aristotle defines it, comes reasonably close to the English “anger,” we may still note some specific features. First, Greek anger is stipulated to be a desire of a certain sort, namely for revenge; it is thus described basically as what we might call an action tendency. Second, Aristotle attends primarily to the stimulus to anger and neglects, in this context at least, either bodily states or facial expressions that may accompany it. This again is natural, perhaps, in a treatise on rhetoric. Third, and most remarkably, Aristotle restricts the causes of anger to a slight or belittlement; anger is not a response to mere aggression or pain, such as an attack by an enemy or stubbing one’s toe. Finally, there is the curious qualification that not all insults arouse anger, but only those coming from people who are somehow unsuited to deliver them.
Taking these several factors together, it is clear that for Aristotle, anger involves high-level cognition. Recognizing a slight or putdown involves an appraisal of another’s motives and intentions, as well as social status; revenge, in turn, is not simply striking back but presupposes a notion of reciprocity. This is why Richard Lazarus could observe that “those who favor a cognitive-mediation approach must also recognize that Aristotle's *Rhetoric* more than two thousand years ago applied this kind of approach to a number of emotions in terms that seem remarkably modern” (Lazarus, 2001: 40; cf. Hinton, 1999: 6). Aristotle would seem, then, not only to have been the first thinker to specify the gamut of emotions in a modern way, but also a forerunner of the cognitive interpretation of emotion.

Aristotle offers a similarly cognitive account for the other *pathê* he treats. For example, he defines pity as “a kind of pain in the case of an apparent destructive or painful harm in one not deserving to encounter it,” and which, he adds, “one might expect oneself, or one of one's own, to suffer, and this when it seems near.” Pity, then, involves a notion of one’s own vulnerability as well as a judgment concerning desert. Indignation is the reverse of pity: we experience it when we see others prospering undeservedly. We feel shame, Aristotle says, when an action reveals our vices: if we flee in battle, for example, it shows that we are cowards, and if we wrong another is a sign that we lack the virtue of justice. Envy is a response to the perception that our social equals are faring better than we are—an assessment based on comparative worth. Fear too is not just an irrational desire to avoid harm but depends on an assessment of one’s own strength relative to that of one’s antagonists, and so depends on calculation. This is why the Stoics, who were heirs to Aristotle’s classification though they introduced some important changes, denied that animals other than humans can experience emotions in the full sense of the term. They may instinctively flee predators, for example, but since they do not make judgments concerning impending dangers their reaction is not strictly speaking a sign of fear. In one of his consolatory letters the Roman Stoic Seneca affirms that animals do not experience sadness or fear any more than stones do (Consolation to Marcia 5.1).

So too, in his essay *On Anger*, Seneca affirms: “Animals have violence, rabidity, ferocity, aggression, but do not have anger any more than they have licentiousness.... Dumb animals lack human emotions, but they do have certain impulses that are similar to emotions” (*On Anger* 1.3).

But on Aristotle’s view, the emotions involve more than bare intellect or reason. His accounts of the several *pathê* indicate that the judgments or evaluations by which they are elicited have a specifically ethical or social quality. Pity and indignation depend on an assessment of whether the other is suffering or prospering undeservedly, and envy, of which Aristotle disapproves, nevertheless involves social ranking. Shame presupposes a sense of virtue and vice, and the best kind of love, according to Aristotle, is elicited by an appreciation of a person’s character. Fear may be the least moral of the passions, since it is concerned primarily with one’s own security, but Aristotle notes that we tend to fear, according to Aristotle, people who are unjust or arrogant, who fear us or are our competitors, and those whom we have wronged or who have wronged us (2.5, 1382b8-9). Thus fear too is embedded in the world of social competition and ethical evaluation. And so too is anger: we are angry when we are treated in a way that is incommensurate with our social standing, by those whose status is inferior to ours. For Aristotle, emotions are not just isolable states of excitation but are essentially products of social interactions, and presuppose sensitivity to social status, merit, and morality.

It may seem, then, that Aristotle can be enlisted in support of the thesis of Horberg, Oveis, and Ketner, according to which anger “is associated with justice concerns,” even though
we would have to substitute for “individual rights, fairness, and autonomy” alternative values such as honor and status – the morality of another time and place. But this may be to put the question the wrong way round. The word pathos in Aristotle’s time signified broadly any reaction to an external stimulus (it is related to the verb meaning “suffer” or “experience”), including physical conditions such as pain or disease, and by extension it could also denote “misfortune” (compare the English “pathetic”). As the first to narrow down the range of the term so as to refer uniquely to what look like emotions in the modern sense, Aristotle – writing in the context of a rhetorical treatise – selected just those affects that were relevant to the courtroom or the assembly, where one attempted to sway the judgment of the jury or the citizen body by argument and demonstration. This is in part why Aristotle’s analyses have such a cognitive cast: he was thinking of public disputations, not laboratory experiments, as the context for emotion. By the same token, the sentiments that Aristotle picked out for his catalogue of pathê were naturally of an interpersonal and evaluative nature. If Aristotle’s inventory of the pathê became the dominant model for what counts as an emotion today, influencing (at least indirectly) Latin treatments such as those by Cicero and Quintilian and via them, in turn, such eminent theorists of emotion as Thomas Aquinas, Descartes, and Adam Smith, it is not because Aristotle had correctly intuited the natural lineaments of the emotions, as though they were species awaiting their Linnaeus. Rather, we would do better to say that Aristotle produced what looks like the modern class of emotions, but did so for the wrong reasons. His pathê are cognitive and moral because those characteristics were the attributes or differentiae on which he based his selection.

I wish to suggest that the controversy over whether anger is a moral or non-moral emotion is an effect, however distant the cause, of the way emotions as a class first came upon the scene in classical antiquity, when morality was built into the very concept of a pathos thanks to the context in which it emerged. What is more, already in antiquity the complex cognitive and ethical conception of emotion was challenged in a variety of ways. For one thing, Aristotle himself had recognized the physical correlates of emotion, and it was no great leap to define emotions in biological terms, as functions of the blood or, in the prevailing medical view, of the dominance of one or another of the four basic humors. More interestingly, the Stoics, who went so far as to define pathê as conditional upon voluntary assent, also introduced the notion of pre- or proto-emotions (the Greek term is propatheia) that were instinctive reactions, independent of any judgment. These reflexes, which Seneca, in his treatise On Anger, calls “the initial preliminaries to emotions” (2.2.6), are defined as “motions that do not arise through our will,” and are therefore irresistible and do not yield to reason. Seneca provides a lengthy and, at first sight, rather puzzling list of these proto-emotions, which include such responses as shivering or goose-pimples when one is sprinkled with cold water, aversion to certain kinds of touch (presumably slimy things and the like), hair rising upon hearing bad news, blushing at obscene language, the vertigo produced by heights, responses to theatrical spectacles and narratives of historical events, songs and martial trumpeting, horrible paintings, and the sight of punishments even when they are deserved – note the specifically non-moral nature of this last reaction, which is presumably something like raw empathy. Although irrational animals are not capable of all these responses – as Mark Twain observed, Man is the only animal that blushes. Or needs to” (in Following the Equator, Pudd’nhead Wilson’s New Calendar) – giddiness and shivering are within their repertoire and presumably the ferocity and aggression they manifest when provoked, and which human beings too can experience, are pre-emotional reactions. The reaction of a human being to a sudden shove, for example, is not quite anger, at least until we judge that we have been belittled by whoever administered it, and in this respect is no different from that of a dog or cat to a similar incitement. We may see here, I believe, an intimation of the distinction that some theorists today draw between emotion and affect, with the latter understood as more elementary and universal reflexes as opposed to ostensibly higher-level cognitive responses. Here too, however, the Stoics’ motivation for positing the category of proto-emotions is very different from
today’s arguments. The Stoics maintained that a sage was immune to passions such as anger and fear, since she or he knew that the usual reasons for taking offense or worrying about harm were inconsequential: only one’s own virtue really matters, and the wise were proof against the loss of that. But even a sage might turn pale when caught in a storm at sea, or tense up when jostled; ergo, these reflexes were not true pathê but something more primitive.

Aristotle’s works soon became the object of study in schools and academies, and extensive commentaries were written to explain and interpret them. Of these, the earliest to survive in something like a complete condition was composed by a certain Aspasius, who composed a commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics sometime around the mid-second century AD. When he comes to discussing Aristotle’s conception of the pathê, which he says neither Aristotle nor other of the Peripatetic school adequately defined, Aspasius both documents a controversy among earlier Aristotelians and offers an original interpretation of the pathê in his own right. Aspasius divides the pathê into two broad genera or classes, pleasure and pain, under one or the other of which he subsumes all the specific pathê, such as anger and fear but also the sub-classes of pleasure and pain themselves. According to Aspasius, the pathê may arise prior to any supposition (his word is hupolêpsis), directly as a result of perception, though in other cases a supposition may come first, in line. Either way, the pleasure and pain that are the generic features of any pathos, whatever the differentiae that distinguish them, take the form, Aspasius says, of motions in the non-rational part of the soul, and such a change is accompanied in turn by a corresponding motion in the body. Aspasius has a problem with the notion of appetite or desire (the Greek term is epithumia), since, he says, it may seem to partake of both pleasure and pain (we feel pain when we are hungry but pleasure at the anticipation of eating), and thus require a higher genus under which all pathê fall. But he finally concludes that desires too are either pleasant or painful, and not both. Indeed, he offers anger as an example of the painful kind, since it is defined by Aristotle as a desire for revenge, accompanied by distress. There is more to say about Aspasius’ theory (for those who are interested, I have translated the entire commentary into English), but we may note several features. First, it would appear that even though he was a loyal Aristotelian, Aspasius seems to have departed from the master’s account of the pathê by emphasizing what today is called emotional valence, that is, the positive or negative quality or feel. Aristotle had affirmed that the pathê are accompanied by pleasure and pain, and indeed he offered anger as an example, inasmuch as the anticipation of revenge is pleasant. In Aspasius’ account, however, pleasure and pain are the primary categories (we may note that the Stoics had posited four classes of pathê: pain, pleasure, fear, and desire). Coordinate with this new emphasis, the role of judgment, with its attendant moral and social presuppositions, was at least partly diminished. This, at least, is how I understand Aspasius’ insistence that the pathê may arise independently of supposition or belief. Although I am not unreservedly given to social determinism in respect to intellectual developments, it may not be irrelevant given to social determinism in respect to intellectual developments, it may not be irrelevant to observe that Aspasius proposed his theory when Greece was under the sway of the Roman Empire, as opposed to the freewheeling Athenian democracy where Aristotle wrote his treatises. Perhaps, as the law courts and political assemblies declined in importance, thinking about emotions moved away from an emphasis on merit and social position and began to look more to the way emotions feel – more in line, it may be, with modern approaches.

There were other developments as well in the way emotions were conceived in classical antiquity. The rise of mystical thinking, associated with revivals of Platonism and Pythagoreanism under the Roman Empire, brought about a new concern with such sentiments as wonder, awe, and ineffable experiences of joy and amazement or even shock (the Greek word is ekplêxis, from which “apoplexy” is derived), along with the contrary feelings of gloom and despair. Both these extremes were further accentuated in Christian texts, with their radical division between the saved and the doomed. The Byzantine statesman and scholar Theodore Metochites, who lived into the fourteenth century AD, enthused about the pleasures of gazing at the heavens, “and how, when the sky is clear, each sight everywhere
brings not only wonder but also joy to the roaming eyes, not only inspiration but also a mood that gladdens and sweetens the heart” (Sententious Remarks 43). Once again, it seems that not only did the theory of the emotions change and evolve, but the very conception of emotion and the nature of the items included under this description altered and, in the process, left their mark upon future thinking about this elusive and historically malleable category.

We cannot look to history to resolve today’s dilemmas concerning the emotions, and the extent to which they are moral or cognitive in nature, although earlier theories may provide illuminating insights. What the history of emotion reminds us of is that the very term is variable, and subject to some degree to the prevailing social conditions of any era, including our own. There are doubtless certain constants over time in the sentimental repertoire, such as (perhaps) some of the primitive reflexes that the Stoics called proto-emotions, although one must be careful not to assume that even such elementary responses, not to say more complex pathē, can be mapped precisely onto their ostensible modern equivalents (to the extent that these are uniform). Perhaps the problem with emotion theories today, to which James Russell called attention, is not that we have “no agreed upon definition” of the term, but that we have many, each of which is suited to a particular context and purpose. This is not a bad thing, so long as psychologists and others are aware of the way in which the theory constitutes the object, at least in large measure. This is one of the lessons that the history of emotions can teach us, as it invites us to observe changes in approach and indeed the very object of investigation, and to test our own presuppositions about what constitutes an emotion.

References
1989 marked the publication of the first complete English translation (Descartes, 1989) of René Descartes’s final work, *The Passions of Soul*—originally published in 1649—since the Earl of Monmouth’s 1650 translation. (Despite the more recent publication of Descartes 2015—especially valuable for its translations of all the letters exchanged between Descartes and Princess Elisabeth that led up to and continued through the writing of *The Passions of the Soul* — Descartes, 1989 remains the gold standard English translation.) Descartes 1989 also signaled the beginning of a boom in English-language scholarship on the accounts of the phenomena today called ‘emotions’ advanced by early modern philosophers—i.e., philosophers working in the period from roughly 1517-1789—that continues to this day. In what follows, I make some general remarks on this boom and then, taking Descartes’s *The Passions of the Soul* as my example, consider various ways in which scholarship that has emerged from this emotional turn in the history of early modern philosophy might contribute to the present-day understanding of emotions.

I need first to register a caveat. Early modern philosophers used diverse terminology to characterize the phenomena today called ‘emotions’, including ‘affects’, ‘affections’, ‘emotions’, ‘passions’, and ‘sentiments’. This terminology signals theoretical and conceptual affinities with treatments of the phenomena by earlier philosophers and also embeds implicit assumptions about the nature of the phenomena; when reading early modern texts careful attention must therefore be paid to the terminology used to characterize the phenomena now called ‘emotions’. (The terminology and its significance has received scholarly attention: for different approaches, see Dixon, 2005, Rorty, 1982, and Schmitter, 2015; for an argument for resurrecting the concept of passion, see Charland, 2010.) For ease of reference, however, in what follows I ignore the terminological distinctions and refer generally to early modern approaches to the passions.

The boom in English-language scholarship on early modern accounts of the passions parallels the increasing embrace of a contextual or historical approach to the study of the history of early modern philosophy. (On the contextual or historical approach to the history of early modern philosophy, see Hatfield, 2005.) The chief aim of a contextual or approach is the understanding of texts on their own terms. Contextual scholarship has expanded the canon of early modern philosophers, stimulated interest in ‘minor’ predecessors, contemporaries, and successors of canonical philosophers, and opened up new topics for scholarly treatment. One topic opened up by contextual work on the history of early modern philosophy is early modern conceptions of the passions, whose study is now a thriving subfield of the study of the history of early modern philosophy, just as the study of emotion is a thriving subfield of the related fields of problem-oriented, i.e., non-historical, philosophy (Goldie 2010: 1-3), psychology (Lewis, Haviland-Jones, & Barrett 2008: xi), as well as history, among other disciplines. (It is, I think, a nice sociological question just why the study of the emotions has flourished in different disciplines at roughly the same time: I leave its investigation as a topic for future research.)

The study of early modern conceptions of the passions wasn’t always a thriving area of research, however, as is manifest in the opening sentences of two of the works published near the beginning of the emotional turn in scholarship on the history of early modern philosophy. Paul Hoffman begins his pioneering article “Three Dualist Theories of the Passions”—a discussion of the views of the passions advanced by René Descartes (1596-1650), Nicolas Malebranche (1638-1715), and Baruch Spinoza (1632-1677)—by trying to justify his topic by analogy.
Descartes, Spinoza, and Malebranche each devote a significant amount of attention to the passions of the soul.... Commentators, especially English-language commentators, on Descartes and Malebranche, often do not. I think their discussions of the passions deserve more attention. Commentaries on ancient Greek theories of the soul...would surely be considered deficient if they ignored the passions. (Hoffman, 1991: 153)

On the first page of the body of *Passion and Action: The Emotions in Seventeenth-Century Philosophy*, Susan James apologizes for her topic:

Nowadays, the place and analysis of the passions in seventeenth-century philosophy needs, perhaps, to be steered in with some preamble, since its value...has darkened with time and grown opaque. We tend to forget that philosophers of this era worked within an intellectual milieu in which the passions were regarded as an overbearing and inescapable element of human nature, liable to disrupt any civilized order, philosophy included, unless they were tamed, outwitted, overruled, or seduced. (James, 1997: 1)

Such prefatory remarks are now no longer necessary.

Despite the considerable work that has been done in the past three decades on accounts of the passions developed by early modern philosopher, no overarching narrative has yet emerged to organize them. This may be due to the heterogeneity of early modern approaches to the passions, which include approaches to the passions influenced by the philosophical outlooks of Epicureanism, Stoicism and Augustinianism; medical, moral, and natural philosophical approaches to the passions; and combinations of these approaches. A preliminary starting point might be to organize early modern approaches to the passions in relation to Descartes’s *The Passions of the Soul*, which directly influenced the accounts of the passions advanced by Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679), Spinoza, and Malebranche, and, via Malebranche, the accounts of the passions of Frances Hutcheson (1694-1746), David Hume (1711-76), and Adam Smith (1723-90). (I take the aforementioned philosophers’ treatments of the passions to be canonical for early modern philosophy, in light of their scope, significance, and influence.) This is, however, only an organizing principle that might serve as the basis of a narrative: the narrative of early modern philosophical treatments of the passions remains to be written. (For an overview of general issues concerning early modern approaches to the passions, and discussions of all the aforementioned philosophers with the exception of Smith, see Schmitter, 2016.)

Although English-language scholarship on early modern accounts of the passions has a relatively short history, early modern treatments of the passions have long been, and continue to be, used as benchmarks in problem-oriented philosophical and general work on the emotions. (See, *inter alia*, Damasio, 1994; Damasio, 2003; Deigh 1994: 824-828; Kenny, 1963: 1-19; and Plamper, 2017: 17-25.) While this use of the texts of the history of early modern philosophy is independent of the historical and contextual approach to the history of early modern philosophy that I have claimed has given rise to the boom in scholarship on early modern philosophical theories of the passions, the fact that early modern accounts of the passions are used in this way provides all the more reason for attending both to early modern accounts of the passions and to the scholarship on them that has
resulted from the emotional turn in the history of early modern philosophy.

It’s not, I confess, altogether clear to me why early modern texts are used in this way, although it seems generally to be believed that present-day approaches to the nature of the emotions—like so many other topics—have been and continue to be shaped by the early modern period. Plamper, for example, maintains that “emotional thinking during the Middle Ages…has little influence on subsequent centuries; the Scholastics, and in particular Thomas Aquinas (1225-74), are usually treated as an appendix to Aristotle and Augustine. It is always said that René Descartes (1596-1650) is the real innovator” (Plamper, 2017: 17). While it seems to me to be somewhat historically short-sighted to reduce more than a thousand years of philosophy to “an appendix to Aristotle and Augustine,” this is certainly in keeping, for better or for worse and bearing in mind the thesis of Bloom (2007) regarding the anxiety of influence, with the way that early modern philosophers understood their relation to the past. Descartes, for example, begins The Passions of the Soul by maintaining that

the defectiveness of the sciences [i.e., bodies of knowledge—SG interpolation] we inherit from the ancients is nowhere more apparent than in what they wrote about the Passions. For even though this is a topic about which knowledge has always been vigorously sought, and though it does not seem to be one of the most difficult—because, as everyone feels them in himself, one need not borrow any observations from elsewhere to discover their nature—nevertheless what the Ancients taught about them is so little, and for the most part so little believable, that I cannot hope to approach the truth unless I forsake the paths they followed. For this reason I shall be obliged to write here as though I were treating a topic which no one before me had ever described. (Descartes, 1989: 18-19)

In light, especially, of Plamper’s remarks, in this instance of the dispute between the ancients and the moderns, the moderns certainly won the day. Whether the palm of victory is rightly given to the moderns with respect to the topic of the passions is, however, a matter for another article.

Given that Descartes is taken to be a “true innovator” with respect to the passions, and given that Descartes’s “little treatise” (Descartes, 2015: 74) on the passions, The Passions of the Soul, has given rise to by far the most scholarly literature on early modern accounts of the passions, from anthologies (Williston & Gombay, 2003), to monographs (Brown 2006; Hassing, 2015) to too many articles to list (as is generally the case, for better or for worse, with respect to English-language scholarship on the history of early modern philosophy)—in what follows I give two examples, derived from scholarship on Descartes, of different ways in which historical or contextual work on Descartes has been or can be brought to bear on present-day work on the emotions precisely insofar as it is historical. (For an overview of philosophical and scholarly issues in and literature on The Passions of the Soul, see Shapiro, 2006.)

A natural place to start is the well-known characterization of ‘Descartes’ Error’ in Damasio, 2007.

It would not have been possible to present my side of this conversation without invoking Descartes as an emblem for a collection of ideas on body, brain, and mind that in one way or another remain influential in Western sciences and humanities. My concern…is for both the dualist notion with which Descartes split the mind from brain and body…and for the modern variants of this notion: the idea, for instance, that mind and brain are related, but only in the sense that the mind is the software program run in a piece of computer hardware called the brain; or that brain and body are related, but only in the sense that the former cannot survive without the latter…This is Descartes’ error: the abyssal separation between body and mind…the suggestion that reasoning, and moral judgment, and the suffering that comes from physical pain or emotional upheaval might exist separately from the body. Specifically:
the separation of the most refined operations of the mind from the structure and operation of a biological body. (Damasio 1994: 247-250)

Refutation of Damasio’s characterization of Descartes’s error has become almost commonplace (see, e.g., Plamper, 2017: 18; Sorell, 2005: 113-139). The response is straightforward: while Descartes did believe that the ‘pure intellect’ operated independently of the body, he thought that most thoughts—and especially in this context, passions—depended on the body. It’s not, however, especially interesting to learn that someone misinterpreted Descartes. Hatfield remarks:

Ironically, it is on Damasio’s home turf—the passions or ‘feelings and emotions’—that Descartes developed his most extensive account of the body’s essential role in producing some mental states....The Passions treats human emotional life in detail, including the physiological processes that underlie the passions. Descartes’s theory of the passions and his broader physiological theories, especially as found in the Treatise on man, provide a very different picture of Descartes’s conception of the role of the body in human behavior than that offered by Damasio. (Hatfield, 2007: 4)

Attention to The Passions of the Soul, especially its first part, would have revealed to Damasio a Descartes who theorizes the interaction of mind and body in behavior in general, especially in passionate action, a Descartes who could have served as an ally, not as an opponent.

A very different kind of benefit from the emotional turn in the history of early modern philosophy derives from the details of Descartes’s approach to the passions. Although the question ‘what is an emotion’, has received attention from philosophers both before and after James’s eponymous article (James, 1879), and remains a standard question in present-day philosophical work on the emotions, I have long been surprised that in this post-Darwinian age, it is not generally asked by philosophers what the function of emotions is.

The function of the passions comes to the fore in The Passions of the Soul. In a section of The Passions of the Soul entitled “Wherein all the passions are serviceable, and wherein they are harmful,” Descartes gives a general account of the function of the passions:

Now it is easy to understand from what has been said above that the utility of all the passions consists only in their strengthening thoughts that it is good that the soul preserve and that could otherwise be easily effaced from it, and causing them to endure in the soul. So too all the evil that they can cause consists either in their strengthening and preserving those thoughts more than necessary or in their strengthening and preserving others that it is not good to dwell on. (Descartes 1989: 59)

In this passage, Descartes simultaneously characterizes the proper function of the passions and the respect in which they can malfunction. (This is important, because a function can only be attributed to something if it is also possible for it to malfunction.) The function of the passions is “to strengthen and preserve thoughts”; passions malfunction when they excessively strengthen or preserve thoughts, or when they strengthen and preserve thoughts that should not be strengthened or preserved. The basic idea is this: the function of the passions is to focus attention. (Greenberg, 2007: 713-734 is a sustained argument for this admittedly controversial interpretive claim.)

In this context, to my mind what’s important is not whether Descartes’s account of the function of the passions is correct—although parallel accounts of the function of emotions have been advanced by Derryberry and Tucker 1994 and Fazio, Roskos-Eweldsen, and Powell 1994 — but the general idea of considering the function of emotions. It seems to me that just as consideration of this issue enabled Descartes to illuminate the nature of the passions, it is worth investigating whether consideration of this issue can shed light on the nature of emotions.

The preceding examples are meant only to illustrate benefits that might be derived for
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present-day work on emotions from the history of early modern philosophical approaches to the passions. Others could be multiplied, history deserves attention in this context, because it “can offer...a laboratory of worked-out positions that are distant enough from present positions to facilitate a certain amount of detachment. Such detachment enables the study of past positions to teach us about possibilities in the problem space that we may not otherwise be familiar with, and it helps us see the contingency of the range of theoretical options that constitute the framework for contemporary thought” (Hatfield, 2003: x).

References


